

[**Question 11:** It is asked whether the definition of the subject or the definition of the passion is the middle term for demonstrating the passion of the subject.]

11.01 [**First Argument**] It seems that it is not the definition of the subject, since if it were, it would be either the definition given from one cause alone, or from several causes. It is not the definition from one cause alone, for such a definition is incomplete. The Commentator says, on *On the Soul* I, comment 16, that whoever receives matter into the definition and leaves out the form, receives it in a diminished way and whoever receives the form and leaves out the matter, thinks that he leaves out something unnecessary, but it is not so. Therefore, a definition given through the matter alone and one that is given through the form alone is incomplete, and consequently it is not the middle term. Nor is the definition given through all the causes the middle term, since in such a definition there is a *nugatio*, since that definition is composed from several definitions of which every one conveys the whole of the defined. In such a definition, therefore, the same nature is repeated (*replicate bis*).

11.02 [**Second Argument**] Moreover, the definition of the subject is not the cause of the passion, but the middle term in the demonstration must be the cause. Proof of the assumption: since the definition and the name of the defined signify the same reality precisely. And consequently, if that which is signified through the definition is the cause of the passion, what is signified by the defined is the cause of the passion in the same way. And so the conclusion of the demonstration would be immediate.

11.03 This is confirmed thus: “human being” and “rational animal” signify entirely the same thing. Therefore, these propositions, “every human being is able to laugh,” and “every rational animal is able to laugh,” signify entirely the same thing, since these propositions only signify because the terms signify. And consequently, if this is immediate, “every rational animal is able to laugh,” the other will be. But the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent. The proposition therefore in which the passion is predicated of the definition of the subject is not immediate, and consequently the definition of the subject is not the middle term.

11.04 If it is held that the definition and the name of the defined do not signify the same thing entirely, but there is some *modus* in what is signified by the definition which is not in the defined. <It can be argued> against <this that> this whole which is intrinsic to the essence of the defined, is signified through the definition, or at least included in what is signified by the definition. If, therefore, the definition still signifies more, what is signified by the definition adds something above what is defined, and thus it would be below the defined.

11.05 This is argued thus: Let A be that which is in what is signified by the definition and is not in the essence of the defined. The definition actually posits A, but the defined <does not>. Therefore something is posited actually through the definition that is not posited through the defined. Therefore the definition is lower.

11.06 Moreover, by the same reasoning, some *modus* would be in what is signified by the name of the defined which is not in what is signified by the definition, and consequently the definition would not express all that is signified by the name of the defined. In the same way, that *modus* is received which is in what is signified by the name of the defined. And I ask about what is left: what is left from that *modus* still has a genus and difference, and consequently it is a species completely, and consequently there is no such *modus* in the essence of the defined not included in what is signified by the definition.

11.07 Therefore another view is held, granting that the definition and name of the defined signify

precisely the same. But this is in different ways, and something can be better known in one way than it is in another way. And thus the definition of the subject can be the middle term in demonstration even though it signifies the same as that name of the defined signifies.

11.08 On the other hand: if this were true, the same would define itself, since the reality signified by “rational animal” is the definition of human being, since the definition is better known than the defined, but not by reason of the utterance, because it is possible that the utterance should be less known than the name of the defined. Therefore the reality signified by “rational animal” is the definition of human being, and that reality is a species; therefore a species is the definition of a species.

11.09 This can be argued thus: only the definition of human being is signified by “rational animal ,” and this species “human being” is signified through “rational animal,” therefore this species “human being” is the definition of human being. And if this is granted, it follows next that every definition can be defined, since every species can be defined.

11.10 Moreover, these propositions signify the same reality: “every rational animal is able to laugh,” and “every human being is able to laugh.” But the reality signified by one is better known than the reality signified by the other; therefore the same thing is better known than itself. Nor is this reply any good, that says that the same thing under one way is better known than itself under another way, since this is that under this way, and this under the other way is that. Therefore if this under this way is better known than this under the other way, it follows that this is better known than that.

11.11 In the same way, it follows that the reality signified by the conclusion is better known than the reality is signified by the premise. This is because, since the same reality is signified by the conclusion and by the major, if the reality signified by the major under some way is better known than the reality signified by the conclusion, it follows that the reality signified by the conclusion under some way is better known than the reality signified by the major.

11.12 Moreover, one reality can have several definitions. If therefore the definition signified the same as the name of the defined, all the definitions of the same reality would signify the same. And thus there would not be different definitions unless it is according to utterance, and thus the natural scientist and the metaphysician do not consider the same reality in different ways.