

Questions on De Interpretatione

By Simon of Faversham
Ed. Mazarella, pp. 151-170.
Translated by John Longeway

[Translator's Note: As we have the text it contains two recensions of similar material, the first done up rather sketchily, in the style of a literal commentary with questions inserted from time to time, the second in Simon's usual style, questions alone, fully developed and worked out. The two recensions seem to agree on the topics dealt with and the treatment of the topics, as though one were preliminary notes for the other. I have ignored the division of the text into questions in the edition, then, to add my own divisions, which reflect this structure.]

<First Recension>

"First it is necessary to establish" etc.¹

<Note 1>

Note that attributes [*passiones*] of the soul are taken in three ways. In one way an appetite existing in the sensitive part of the soul is called an attribute [*passio*]¹—of this sort are anger and hatred and such. "Attribute" is not taken here in this first way when it is said "Words are marks of attributes" etc.² Nor is it taken in the second way, namely for a similitude. Words do not signify similitudes of realities, but the realities themselves. We signify those things through words that we understand through them, but we understand through them true realities, and hence the Philosopher takes attribute as realities understood.³ And they are called attributes because they imply a certain attribute of the intellect, so that the words are signs of attributes, that is, of understood realities, to the senses.

<Question 1a>

And a doubt is raised concerning what he says, that "a name is an utterance."⁴

For it seems that it is not an utterance (*vox*),⁵ since nothing artificial is natural, but a name is something

¹Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 1, 16a1.

²Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 1, 16a4.

³In the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, Aristotle actually says that these attributes of the soul are likenesses of real things. So these likenesses of real things are presumably taken by Simon to be realities understood. The position does not seem impossible, but it certainly could use further discussion.

⁴Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 2, 16a19.

⁵An utterance will be a sound produced by the vocal chords etc., whether or not it is meaningful.

artificial, and an utterance is something natural; therefore etc.

It must be understood that everything artificial is an accident. Accidents, however, must be defined through the **substantial**, and natural things are the **subject** of the artificial. Therefore the artificial must be defined through the natural. And therefore name here is defined through utterance as through its subject, so that we say a name is an utterance, but not absolutely and without qualification, but a significative utterance.

To the argument, I reply that an artificial name is natural, not in such a way that the artificial is natural to a natural essence, rather the artificial is natural in this way, as an accident is to its subject.

<Question 2a>

A doubt is raised concerning something he says, namely, that “a verb is always a mark speaking of something else,”⁶ because if I say this, “a man runs, therefore he walks” this verb “runs” is said of another thing, and is not [itself] a mark speaking of something else [other than running]; therefore etc.

It must be understood that the intellect composes and divides things in speech (*oratio*)⁷ which the intellect first grasps with a simple grasp. Now the intellect grasps the quiddities of realities with a simple grasp, and therefore composes them together in speech. Therefore what is said of another is another quiddity and nature. But that which is a mark of this union is the verb, as it conveys a certain composition, and therefore the Philosopher says that the verb is a mark speaking of something else.

As for the argument, when you say “a man runs,” etc., I reply that one reality and nature is predicated here of another, hence this has to be expounded thus: “a man is a running thing.”⁸

<Question 3a>

A doubt is raised concerning something he says, namely, that a verb “consignifies a time . . . because it consignifies being now.”⁹

It seems that this cannot be the cause, since now is not a time; therefore it is not to be said that a verb consignifies a time because it consignifies being now.

I reply that it cannot be taken for an indivisible time, and the Philosopher does not understand it so. But in another way it can be¹⁰ taken for a present time, of which one part is past and another future, as in saying “this day is now” and it is in this way that Aristotle understands a verb to consignify a time because it

⁶Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 3, 16b7.

⁷Speech, or an *oratio*, is an utterance which is meaningful by convention within a language.

⁸Given what Simon says here, is predication to be reduced to an assertion of the identity of substances under differing descriptions? I don’t think so. I would guess that “Socrates runs,” on Simon’s view, means just “there is a running thing Socrates is identical to,” or, “ $(\exists x)(x = \text{Socrates} \bullet x \text{ runs})$.” This would seem to meet Simon’s requirement that “runs” never occurs except in an incomplete expression specifying a subject for it, but, since “x” here is a variable, no particular x is identified in this sentence that is the runner. Moreover, it seems clear we cannot avoid the expression “x runs,” which is a predication not reducible to an identity.

⁹Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 3, 16b8-9.

¹⁰The edition has “potest non accipi,” which must be emended to “potest accipi.” Perhaps “enim” or some such word was read as “non.” The same emendation is probably required as well in the first sentence of this paragraph, so that the “not” should drop out of the translation.

consignifies being now.¹¹

<Note 2>

Note concerning this that he says a verb is a mark of those which are said “about the subject and are in the subject.”¹² This is because predicates are two-fold, namely essential, and because of this he says that they are said to be of [or about] the subject, and accidental, and because of this he says that they are in the subject,¹³ and a verb is a mark of either of these.

<Note 3>

Note that indefinite names and indefinite verbs are excluded from the consideration of the logician,¹⁴ because the name and verb that a logician considers must be parts of a statement (*enuntiatio*),¹⁵ but indefinite names and verbs are not parts of a statement, since whatever has to be a part of a statement must signify some concept of the mind. A statement is chiefly on account of the truth, but we cannot have a truth, except through that which a determinate concept expresses. Now indefinite names and verbs do not express any determinate concept, for they are said indifferently of beings and non-beings, and therefore they are not verbs nor names for the logician, and therefore they do not belong to his considerations. But they are not excluded from the consideration of the grammarian, because they have the accidents of a name and verb, and using these accidents they can be established in relation to one another <in a statement>. And the Philosopher hints at this in the text when he says that an indefinite verb is a mark of speaking of something else.

<Note 4>

Note that a verb of the present tense is a verb without qualification, because a verb signifies action or the suffering of action, therefore that which signifies action or the suffering of action without qualification is a verb without qualification, and those which do not are not verbs without qualification. But it is only a verb of the present tense that signifies action and the suffering of action without qualification, and therefore this alone is a verb without qualification.¹⁶

¹¹Presumably a verb would not consignify a particular period of time. Rather, “Socrates runs” would mean, “Socrates runs now,” which would mean “(t)(t is a period of time including the now moment \supset Socrates runs for some part of T).

¹²Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 3, 16b9-10.

¹³The passage cited from Aristotle does not seem to make this distinction, though the distinction is found in *Categories* 2.

¹⁴Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 3, 16b11-15.

¹⁵A statement, *enuntiatio*, is speech which asserts that something is so, so that it either asserts or denies some predicate of some subject.

¹⁶The point is that it is only if one says “the man runs” that one speaks directly of what is, as opposed to what is no longer, but *was* or *will be*. To speak outside the present tense is to speak of what is with some qualification. One might add, though Aristotle does not seem to make this point, that a past or future tense verb always consignifies the present moment as well, since it asserts that the action happened in *its* past, before the time *when it was uttered*. So existence at present is the gold standard, as it were, for

<Note 5>

Note concerning this that he says that “it also signifies a certain composition which” etc.,¹⁷ that we can attend either to the primary significatum, and thus actual being is its primary significatum, or to the secondary significatum, and thus one attends to what is included in statement, and in this way it signifies a certain composition, which is not to be understood without its composite parts.

<Note 6>

Note that speech is not strictly speaking an instrument of the interpretative <i.e. signifying> power, but rather of the intellectual power, because the intellect, using the sentence, arrives at the cognition it seeks. And even though it is not <strictly speaking> an instrument of the interpretative power, still is formally an instrument of the interpretive power¹⁸ using instruments of the interpretive power, some of which are lips, teeth, tongue, palate, throat and lungs.

<Note 7>

Note that a statement is defined well through its signifying the true or the false,¹⁹ since a statement is an instrument of the intellect, through which it arrives at a cognition of the true. Now every instrument is best defined through its end, and therefore statement is defined well through its signifying the true and the false.

<Note 8>

Note that concerning statement-making speech is to be examined here, since, like all of logic, it is ordered to demonstration. For in demonstration only the true or false is sought, and only statement-making speech is true or false; therefore only about this does logic exert itself.

<Note 9>

existence, existence without qualification, and any other existence at another time has to be specified by reference to this gold standard.

¹⁷Emending “est” to “et,” Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 3, 16b24–25.

¹⁸That is, it is, as a matter of fact such an instrument, even if it is not such an instrument considered as it is a speech. The idea is that the ultimate point of speech is the intellect’s understanding of something, so the “interpretative” power (the power to signify things in speech, which is dealt with in the text at hand, *On Interpretation*) only makes it clear what is meant by another’s utterance, or how to utter speech which means what is wanted, to aid the intellect, whether one’s own, or that of another person who is receiving the information conveyed. The interpretive power has its own instruments by which it produces speech, an instrument which it uses to aid the intellect. It is rather like a smithy, who might make his own tools, which he will then use to make tools used by other tradesmen. The help to the other tradesmen is the ultimate aim, without which the smithy’s work makes no sense. And he has two sets of tools of his own, one set he uses to make tools for the other tradesmen, including tools he has made for himself and such things as his fire and bellows, which may be natural, or made by others, and the other set with which he helps the other tradesmen by making them and handing them over to those tradesmen.

¹⁹Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 4, 17a1–4.

Note that through this that he says, “Some realities are universal and some particular,” he wishes to say that some realities are signified universally, for instance human nature through “human being,” or signified as this same nature is signified through “Socrates.”²⁰

<Note 10>

Note concerning this that “it is not the same to say that ‘no human being is white’ and ‘no one is white,’”²¹ that the negation introduced by the “no” cannot be referred principally to the reality signified by the verb, and so “no human being” signifies the same as “no one,” if it refers formally to the composition; if not, it does not signify the same as “no one.”²²

<Second Recension>

<Question 1b²³>

It is asked about the book *On Interpretation*, and since the Philosopher says that utterances are marks of attributes which are in the soul,²⁴ therefore **it is asked whether** utterances signify realities existing outside the soul or attributes of realities.

And it is argued that they signify realities. For the Philosopher says in *On Sophistical Refutations* I that we use names in the place of realities,²⁵ but this would not be unless utterances signified realities; therefore etc.

Again, the Philosopher says that a stone is not in the soul, but the species of stone is.²⁶ Now if “stone” does not signify a reality outside the soul, but only a species of stone, then a stone is in the soul. Therefore etc.

²⁰Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 7, 17a37 ff.. Simon is working hard to keep Aristotle’s text from affirming real universals outside the soul. Aristotle’s own explanation what he means by “universal,” that it is what is by its nature suited to be predicated of many, might suggest that universals are words or concepts, if these are what one takes to be predicable of things, but Simon’s Latin for the passage indicates that realities, *res*, are universals, which suggests realities outside the soul, and Simon is concerned to disarm that suggestion.

²¹Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 17b35–37. Aristotle’s point is that “a human being is not white” could mean, if the universal “human being” is ‘taken universally,’ that no human being is white, but it could mean, if “human being” is not taken universally, only that *some* human being is not white, leaving it open for other human beings to be white. The way Simon makes the point is to work with the predicate instead of the subject. He speaks of the word “not” in the first statement as referring either to the reality signified by the verb, white, or else to the composition, the whole sentence. So the two senses are “a human being is not-white” and “not – a human being is white.”

²²“No human being is white,” if the “no” does not refer to the composition, but rather to “human being,” means “some non-human-being is white.”

²³This seems related to the first recension, Note 1.

²⁴Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 1, 16a4.

²⁵Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations* I 1, 165a7.

²⁶Aristotle, *On the Soul* III 8, 431b29.

The opposite is argued through the intention of the Philosopher, who says that utterances are marks of attributes which are in the soul; therefore utterances signify attributes.

Again, this is argued by reason, for a relation does not remain when one of its related terms is destroyed. But signification is a relation of the significant utterance to that which is signified. Therefore, when what is signified is destroyed, the signification of the word will not remain. If, therefore, that which is signified by an utterance were a reality outside the soul, then when that thing is destroyed, the signification will not remain. But this is false, since even when there is no existing rain, “rain” will signify the same thing it did before. Therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that there are two genera of realities, as was said of old, some are realities of primary intention, and some are realities of secondary intention.

Realities of primary intention are those which would have being even if the soul did not. Realities of the second intention are those which would not have being if the soul did not, and such are logical intentions, namely genus, species and the like. Hence, logic is said to be about second intentions joined to first intentions. And thus there are two genera of names, for some are names of primary imposition, for instance, human being and stone, while others are names of secondary imposition, for instance, genus and species etc.

It is plain that names of secondary imposition do not signify realities outside the soul, but there is a doubt concerning names of primary imposition, whether they signify a reality outside the soul. And I hold that they signify a true reality, and this is obvious because to signify is to establish a concept (*intellectum*), and therefore an utterance signifies that upon which the concept is established. Now this word, ‘human being,’ establishes a concept of a reality existing outside the soul, and does not establish a concept of a concept of a reality, since if it established a concept of a concept of a reality, then a real predicate such as running could not be made true of a human being. For this speech is false, “A human concept runs.” But this would be its sense, if “human being” signified a concept of a concept of a human being, or “this species of human being runs,” etc. And so “human being” will signify a true reality existing outside the soul.

Again, this is obvious because we signify those things through an utterance that we understand. Now we understand realities themselves and not the species of realities, for the whatness of a reality is what is understood, and therefore the Philosopher says in *On the Soul* III²⁷ that the soul discerns magnitude through the senses, but discerns being through the intellect, that is, the whatness of magnitude. Therefore we signify realities and not the species of realities through names.

It must be noted, then, that utterances do not signify a reality according to that formula according to which it has being outside soul, nor according to that formula by which it has being in the soul, but they signify realities absolutely in respect of their what it is absolutely, by setting aside every accident, as is apparent in the case of this name “human being.” And this is apparent because a name signifies that which its definition expresses, because the formula of which the name is a sign, is the definition, as is said in *Metaphysics* IV.²⁸ Now the definition signifies a reality insofar as it is without qualification and absolutely, setting aside every accident, therefore a name signifies a reality absolutely, setting aside every accident. But although an utterance may signify a reality absolutely, nonetheless a reality cannot be signified through an utterance, nor can the utterance be imposed upon it, unless it is first conceived by the intellect, and so a reality cannot be signified unless it is first understood. We hold that utterances are marks of attributes, that is, of understood realities, not because they signify them under that formula by which they are understood, but because utterances cannot signify a

²⁷Aristotle, *On the Soul* III 6.

²⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV 6, 7, 8.

reality unless they are first understood. And therefore, the text of the Philosopher is to be explicated, that utterances are marks of attributes in the soul, that is, “utterances are marks of realities understood by the soul,” and realities conceived by the soul are called attributes, because they plant a certain attribute in the intellect, and I mean by attribute health and a perfection. Hence they plant attributes in the intellect, because they perfect the intellect.

As for the arguments: As to the first, when it is argued, “Utterances are marks” etc., it was said in what way this must be explicated, since utterances are marks of attributes, that is, of realities conceived by the soul.

As to the other argument, when it is argued, “a relation does not remain” etc., I grant the whole argument up to “in signifying that which is signified” etc. I reply that it does not follow because a reality is not signified under that being, but an existing reality outside the soul is signified absolutely and not under that formula by which it is outside the soul. And therefore when the reality is destroyed as far as that being is concerned, it is not necessary that the significatum be destroyed.

<Question 2b>

Next it is asked whether truth and falsehood is a matter of composition and division.

And it is argued that it is not. Being and the true are convertible, but not every being is a matter of composition and division, therefore not everything true is, therefore truth and falsehood are not a matter of division and composition.

Again, the concept itself of what it was to be is always true, therefore etc.

Similarly, the Philosopher says that about its proper object a sense perception is always true. From this I argue: a sense perception is always true concerning its proper object, but a sense perception is not composite, nor divided, therefore truth and falsehood are not only a matter of composition and division.

On the other hand, it is argued: the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VI that “true good and bad,” but it is not in the understanding about what it was to be.²⁹ And so the Philosopher says two things, namely that true and false are not in things, and that true and false are not in the understanding which grasps simple things. From this I argue: truth is only in the understanding, as the Philosopher says there, but not in the understanding which grasps that which it was to be, as the Philosopher says there; therefore it must be assumed that truth and falsehood are only the understanding which composes and divides; therefore truth and falsehood is only a matter of composition and division.

It must be said in response to this that truth is found in the understanding that grasps and the understanding the composes and divides, for truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality, for the understanding is true when it is conformed to the reality which is outside it.

For it is not the case that a reality is such because we understand it to be such, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* IV, but rather, because the reality is such, we understand it to be so. Let us say, then, that truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality. And this is what Avicenna says, that truth is the making equal of realities and the understanding. From this I argue, if truth is conformity of the understanding to the reality, there is truth where conformity of the reality to the understanding is found; but conformity of the understanding to the reality which is grasped is found in the understanding which grasps;

²⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI 4, 1027b25 ff. Simon’s reference seems garbled, but the passage supports his thought. It runs as follows: “for falsity and truth are not in things—it is not as if the good were true and the bad were in itself false—but in thought; while with regard to simple things and essences falsity and truth do not exist even in thought) . . .”

therefore etc. Now that the understanding which grasps is in conformity with the reality which it grasps is obvious, for the understanding that grasps the whatness of human being is in conformity with that whatness, since it grasps the whatness as it is; therefore just as the understanding which composes and divides is in conformity with the reality which it composes and divides, so is the understanding which grasps; and before it was said truth is nothing other than conformity of the understanding to the reality, and such is found in the understanding which grasps, therefore etc. But truth is found more principally in the understanding which composes and divides than in that which grasps, since when something is found in several, in one as it were potentially, and in another as it were in actuality, it is found more principally in that in which it is found in actuality than in that in which it is found potentially. But truth is found potentially in that understanding which grasps, and actually in that which composes. The proof of this is that truth in the understanding which composes is complex, and truth in the understanding which grasps is incomplex. Now complex truth is caused from the incomplex, just as that which is actual is caused from that which is potentially. And therefore truth is more principally found in the understanding that composes than in that which grasps.

Again, this is apparent since the operation of the understanding which grasps is ordered to the operation of the understanding which composes and divides. It is reasonable, then, that the truth which is in the understanding which grasps is ordered to the truth which is in the understanding which composes, and therefore it is principally in that which composes.

Truth is found in both understandings, then, but in what way is it found in the understanding? I hold that it is as in something cognizing the truth, for the intellect cognizes the true more principally, and there is truth in what composes as it is that which cognizes the truth. And the Philosopher said that truth and falsehood are a matter of composition and division.

But truth is found in realities as in a subject. For that to which the understanding is referred *per se* has the formula of the true, since just as the practical understanding naturally strive for the good, so the speculative understanding strive for the true. Now the speculative understanding strives *per se* for the whatness of a reality, since this is its *per se* object; therefore the whatness of a reality is in a way called truth, and this way we say that truth is the true being of a reality. Truth, therefore, is not found in a reality taken absolutely, but as it is ordered to the understanding, and because of this Avicenna says that truth is a certain property, which belongs to a reality, according to which the intellect is conformed to it, so that there is no truth in a reality unless it be in its being ordered to some understanding. It appears in this way, then, that truth and falsehood is a matter of composition and division.

In response to the arguments opposed to this view: In response to the first, when it is argued “being and the true etc.,” it must be understood that being and the true are convertible both in nature and in intention, but they differ in formula. That they are convertible in nature is obvious, for as a reality is a being through its substance, as the Commentator proves, so a reality is true through its substance. For let us take some reality: this reality is true, therefore it is either true through its substance or through something added. If through its substance we have what was proposed, and if through something added, since that being is true, then either it is a being through its substance or through something added; if through something added I ask about this, and so there will be an infinite regress, or there will be some reality true through its substance, just as it is a being through its substance. Again, true and being are convertible in intention, for just as ‘being’ is used analogously for substance and accident, so also is ‘true’; and so true and being agree in this intention, which is analogous. For through the prior use, ‘true’ is said of substance, and through the posterior use of accident, just as with being. But these differ in formula, for something is called being according to its absolute being, but it is called true as it is ordered to the understanding, for when a reality is really ordered to the understanding, so that the understanding is conformed to it, then the reality is said to be true. When it is argued, “being and true are convertible,” then, this is true as regards the reality, but they differ in formula. And

I grant the minor premise, but the argument does not follow, “therefore truth is not etc.,” since that which ‘truth’ indicates it indicates as ordered to the understanding, but this is not the case with ‘being.’

In response to the other argument: “The Philosopher says in *De Anima* III that the understanding etc.” I grant that truth is in the understanding which grasps what it is, nevertheless it is more principally in the understanding that composes and divides than in the understanding that grasps.

In response to the other argument: When it is argued, “a sense perception is always true concerning its proper object,” without doubt this is true, for just as the intellect is conformed to the reality which it understands, so the sense perception is conformed to the reality which it senses. Therefore the sense perception has conformity to what is sensed, and since truth is a certain conformity, it is necessary to posit some truth in a sense perception in a certain way, insofar as it is in conformity with its sensible. But even if a sense perception be in conformity with its sensible, still the sense does not cognize this conformity, and therefore the conformity to its sensible that is in the sense perception will not be in the sense perception as in that which cognizes it, but it is only found in the understanding as that which cognizes it. From this it is apparent that truth is found in things and speech and in the understanding, but in nothing except the understanding as in that which cognizes it, and strictly speaking truth and falsehood are in a reality as in what cognizes them. And since truth is more principally in the understanding which composes and divides than in that which grasps composition and division, therefore the Philosopher says it is a matter of composition and division, as if to say, truth is in nothing principally except in the composing and dividing understanding.

<Question 3b>

Next, we inquire about the part “A name, therefore is an utterance” etc.³⁰ In which the Philosopher, mentioning indefinite names, excludes them from any formula. And his argument is that an indefinite name is said equally of beings and non-beings. And nothing like that is a name, since a name must express a definite concept, and the same is true of a verb. Therefore **it is asked whether** an indefinite name posits (*ponit*) anything.

And it is argued that it does, since the Philosopher in *Prior Analytics* I, in the chapter “There is some difference in constuing,”³¹ he says that being non-equal and not being equal are not the same, since something falls under that which is being non-equal.³² Now non-equal is an indefinite name. Therefore, something falls under an indefinite name. But this would not happen unless an indefinite name posited something. Therefore etc.

Again, the Philosopher says in *On Interpretation* 2³³ that from an indefinite predicate there follows the negation of a definite predicate, for it follows that a human being is non-just, therefore a human being is not just, and this does not convert, since upon the negation of a definite predicate an affirmation of an indefinite

³⁰Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 2, 16a19.

³¹Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I 46, 51b5 ff.

³²Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I 46, 51b24-26. Aristotle’s point is that for something to be non-equal (unequal) it has to be a quantity. A substance or quality is neither equal nor unequal to another substance or quality, for they are not the right sort of things to have equality, and therefore not the right sort of things to be deprived of equality. However, a substance or quality is not equal to another substance or quality, even if it is not non-equal to it. Simon makes this point himself in his determination of the question.

³³The point seems rather to be made in Chapter 10.

predicate does not follow.³⁴ Now if an indefinite name posits nothing more than a negative name, as seems to be the case, upon a negative concerning a definite predicate there follows an affirmative concerning an indefinite predicate. Since then it does not follow, as it seems, it is of the intention of the Philosopher that an indefinite name posits something .

On the other hand, it is argued that if an indefinite name were to posit something, then this consequence would be good: Every human is an animal, therefore a stone exists (*est*). But it is obvious that this consequence is not good, therefore it is obvious that an indefinite name posits nothing. Proof that the consequence is good: Given this, that it follows by contraposition that “Every human is an animal, therefore every non-animal is non-human,” I argue from this, “Every non-animal³⁵ is non-human, a stone is non-animal, therefore a stone is non-human.” But you will say that “non-human” posits something. It is argued, therefore, “a stone is non-human, therefore a stone exists.”³⁶ Therefore, from the first to the last, if an indefinite name were to posit something, it follows that if every man is an animal, a stone exists.

I reply to this that no indefinite name posits anything definite as existing. An indefinite name is imposed by negation of a form, hence, because it is imposed by negation of a form, since the negation of a form is equally said of a being and a non-being, since someone denying a form denies every determination, therefore an indefinite name is equally said of a being and a non-being. But if an indefinite term were imposed by privation of form, it would not be said of anything, unless it were suited by nature to be coincident with the form. So “just” is said of nothing except what is suited by nature to coincide with justice. And because of this the negative of the removed predicate does not follow on the negation of an indefinite predicate, for it does not follow, “wood is not just,” therefore “wood is non-just <i.e. unjust>.” Thus it appears therefore that an indefinite name is not imposed from the privation of form, but from a denial, and therefore it posits nothing definite. And because of this Boëthius says in his commentary that when I say, “non-man,” I destroy the present form, and leave behind indefinite others. For through “non-man” I can understand horse, cow, chimera and such. But I leave behind indefinite forms, since every form other than human being, and so I posit nothing definite, and thus an indefinite name posits nothing definite.

It must be noted also that insofar as any name is less common, the indefinite name produced from it will be more common. For example, “Socrates” is predicable of something unique, but “non-Socrates” is predicable of everything other than Socrates, for instance, of man, lion and others. And insofar as a name is more common, the indefinite name produced from it is less common, hence, “human being” is more common than Socrates, and “non-human” is less common than “non-Socrates.” We can say “non-Socrates” of something of which we cannot truly say “non-human,” since we can truly say that “Plato is not Socrates,” but we cannot truly say that “Plato is not human.” And since “being” is most common of all, the indefinite name produced from it is sayable of nothing. And because the ancients assumed that indefinite names cannot be produced from transcendent names, because nothing is left. It is clear, then, what must be said, that an indefinite name posits

³⁴The reason the converse does not follow is that something not suited by nature to be just might not be just, for instance, a stone. It does not follow from “this stone is not just” that “this stone is unjust,” even though it does follow from “this (human being) is unjust” that “this (human being) is not just.”

³⁵Emending the editions “every animal”.

³⁶Since stones are non-human, it must be that stones fall under whatever the determinate sort is that is posited by non-human. It is apparently assumed that this determinate sort can only be being in general, since anything more specific that falls under non-human turns out to be less general than the non-human. So a stone must fall under being. Therefore a stone exists. Perhaps the absurdity of this would be clearer if the example were not stone, but rose (in mid-winter, when there are none) or chimera.

nothing determinate.

In response to the arguments: As for the first, when it is argued “being non-equal” etc., the words of the Philosopher there are true concerning composite terms, but not concerning simple terms. For he does not intend that something should fall under this being non-equal taken *per se*, but that it falls under this whole composite, which is non-equal.³⁷ Something falls under wood, but not by reason of this, that it is non-equal, but by reason of this that it is wood. And more will appear about this below. But in a negation saying “not being equal to wood,” wood is not posited by virtue of the word, nor is any other.

As for the other, when it is argued, “upon an affirmative” etc., I reply that the rule has truth in composite terms, as also the previous one, and therefore he says below when he says “that upon an affirmative” etc., as was said in the resolutions. And therefore as the words of the Philosopher were to be understood in composites in the earlier, in a similar way here.³⁸

<Question 4b>

Next it is asked whether an oblique name is a name.

And it is argued that it is, since whatever is the subject of a statement is a name, but an oblique name is the subject of a statement; therefore etc. The major premise is proved: The Philosopher says in the beginning of *On Interpretation* 2³⁹ that every statement signifies something about something. But that about which something is a name. Therefore etc. The Philosopher, then, intends that whatever is the subject of a statement is a name. The minor premise is clear from speaking thus, “of opposites there is one discipline.”

Again, with whatever the definition of name agrees, that is a name. But the definition of a name agrees with an oblique name, since an oblique name is an utterance significant by convention of which no part is significant by itself, but this is the definition of name; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued, the case of a name is not a name, but an oblique name is a case of a name, as the grammarians say; therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that “oblique name” can be taken in two ways, either as it calls under the consideration of the grammarian, or as it falls under the consideration of a logician. If it be taken in the first way, an oblique name is a name. And the reason for this is that a part is a part through its mode of signifying, and this indicates the first part of the minor. For it says a part is a part through construction, but construction arises through a mode of signifying, and therefore a part is a part through a mode of signifying. And therefore that which has the specific mode of signifying of a name, that will be placed under the species of name. But an

³⁷That is, something falls under non-equal quantity, namely quantity. If non-equal is taken strictly as non-equal, without assuming it joined to that underlying sort which is suited by nature to be equal, so that it is an indefinite term rather than a privative term, then “non-equal” takes on the sense that Aristotle assigns in *Prior Analytics* 26 to “not equal,” and it posits no definite sort of thing as subject to it.

³⁸Does an indefinite term posit nothing at all determinate underlying it? If so, it was argued, “upon a negative concerning a definite predicate there follows an affirmative concerning an indefinite predicate.” For example, upon “this stone is not just” it would follow that “this stone is non-just.” But this does not follow, as we have seen. Nonetheless, Simon argues, non-just does not posit any definite kind, not even human being., taken in itself. It is only if we take it together with that which is by nature suited to be just, so that non-just signifies a privation, that something underlying it can be identified. So if non-just is used to indicate the composite (a non-just human being), as a privative term, the principle cited can be granted, but if non-just is taken strictly in itself, as an indefinite term, it cannot.

³⁹Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 5, 17a20.

oblique name has the specific mode of signifying of a name, because the specific mode of signifying of a name is to signify through the mode of a qualified substance, as the specific mode of signifying of a pronoun is to signify through the mode of subject matter. But to signify through the mode of a qualified substance is to signify through the mode of something permanent, and this as it is taken under a determine grasp. But to signify thus through the mode of a qualified substance does not coincide with both direct and oblique names. For just as “human being” signifies through the mode of a qualified substance, so also “of a human being.” And therefore just as a direct is a name according to the consideration of a grammarian, so is an oblique name.

But if an oblique name is taken as it is under the consideration of a logician, thus an oblique name is not name, since when some artisan chiefly considers some end, nothing is considered *per se* by that artisan, except what is ordered to that end *per se*. Now it happens that significant statement of the true⁴⁰ or false is the end of a logician. For it is this that the logician aims at in the end, namely to consignify the true or false, which is signified through significant statement. And because of this demonstration, through which truth is acquired, is the end of the logician’s business. And therefore nothing is *per se* of the consideration of the logician, unless it is expressive of truth and falsity, or is that according to which the true and the false can be expressed. But the true and the false cannot be expressed through an oblique name, but rather <only> through a direct name. And because of this the Philosopher says in the text that, if an oblique name is added to a verb, truth or falsity is not caused,⁴¹ as for instance when one says “of Cato <is>,” for this is neither true nor false, I hold. But if someone says “Cato is there,” it signifies something true or false. So an oblique name is not a name according to the logician. The logician says that that is a noun which, by addition of a verb, there can be caused truth or falsity, but by addition of a verb to an oblique name truth or falsity is not caused; therefore etc.

But someone might ask why it is that truth and falsity are not caused by the addition of an oblique name to a verb. I reply that truth extends *per se* to those which are *per se* and principal object of the intellect, since the true is the good of the intellect. But a *per se* object of the intellect is a whatness of a reality as it is whatness absolutely *per se*. Therefore speaking from the addition of those names to a verb truth and falsity are caused, which signify the whatness of a reality absolutely. But direct names are of this sort. The genitive does not signify a reality absolutely, but as something is of it; the dative, as something is acquired for it; the accusative, as that to or upon which, the ablative, as that by which.⁴² Therefore that which signifies the whatness absolutely is the nominative, and therefore by the addition of this⁴³ alone to the verb is the true and the false caused. And so the Philosopher says that, if it is said that “of Cato is,” this is neither true nor false.

Again, this is explained thus: that strictly speaking signifies the true and the false which establishes an understanding, so that those who hear are at rest. Now from the addition of a nominative name to a verb there is caused a denominative understanding, so that he who hears is at rest, as when it is said, “a human being reads.” But from the addition of something oblique to the verb, an understanding is not established, so that one who hears is at rest, because from the addition of the genitive to the verb, saying “of a human being,” it is not

⁴⁰Emending the editions *vel* to *veri vel*.

⁴¹Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 2, 16b1–5.

⁴²Each case is represented by a pronoun in the case, and for accusative ablative nothing further is done to represent the function of the case. This might be rendered in English if we used personal pronouns, where we have distinct forms for the various cases as Latin does. So “Genitive does not signify a person absolutely, but as hers or his; the dative as something gotten him or her; the accusative, as him or her; the ablative, as by him or her.” Only “he” or “she” signifies a person absolutely, without qualification and directly.

⁴³There is something wrong in the edition here, which speaks of the addition of “is” alone to the verb.

given to the intellect that “this is this,” but it is given to the intellect “being of this.” But in saying “being of this,” not determinate understanding is established, so that one who hears is at rest. And so from the addition of an oblique noun to a verb truth and falsity are not caused, unless it be under a nominative or express understanding, and therefore an oblique name is not a name under the consideration of a logician. So the argument stands on this: That strictly speaking signifies the true or the false, from the addition of which to the verb an understanding is established, so that one who hears rests; but from the addition of the nominative alone is such an understanding established; therefore etc.

As to the arguments: To the first, when it is argued, “the subject of a statement” etc., I reply that the primary and *per se* subject of a statement is a name. And you say “that an oblique name” etc. I reply that this does not occur unless it is in virtue of a direct name. And you say, “Of opposites is the same discipline.” It must be replied that, in due order is preserved, “the same discipline” is the subject.

As for the other argument, when it is argued, “To whatever it agrees” etc., I reply that an oblique name agrees with every part of the definition of name, because it must first be added what was said above, namely “finite and direct,” and this part, “direct,” does not agree with oblique names.

<Question 5b>

Next it is asked about the chapter concerning the verb. Since the Philosopher says that a verb is a sign of speaking about another, **it is asked** whether a verb is that which is predicated.

And it is argued that it is not, since a sign of predicating of another is not something predicated, but a verb is a sign of predicating of another; therefore etc. the major is clear, since a sign of something is not that of which it is a sign. The Philosopher states the minor in the text.

Again, that is not predicated in the minor which is not made a subject in the major, according to the arrange of the first figure. But a verb is not made subject in the major. Therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued, Boëthius say that this proposition, “Socrates is a philosopher,” has a two-fold concept. One concept is that being is enunciated of Socrates the philosopher, and then there is only predicate there, namely the word “is.” But there is another concept of this, “Socrates is a philosopher,” and here there are two predicates according to Boëthius. But there would not be two predicates here unless it is “there is a predicate”. Therefore etc.

It must be understood that Boëthius says that this sentence, “Socrates is a philosopher,” has a two-fold understanding, namely the reality of the verb, and also its composition. And this is apparent, for each one is composed from those into which it is resolved. Now a verb is resolved into two, namely into composition and into the reality of the verb. This is obvious in saying “a man runs.” It is resolved thus, “a man is a running thing,” and therefore the verb is resolved from these two. It is composed, one sees, from the reality of the verb and its composition.

Then I hold against the argument that a verb is predicated by reason of the reality of the verb. For it is not predicated by reason of the composition, but this is a union of the predicate with the subject. It appears that the reality signified by the verb is predicated *per se* because in sentences the utterance is not made either subject or predicate, since then every affirmative sentence would be false, except for that in which the same is predicated of itself, and every negative sentence would be true in which the same is not predicated of itself. For it is true to say that this utterance “human being” is not this utterance “animal.” It is necessary, then, that the reality signified by an utterance be predicated. It is necessary then that those thing that predicated be signified by the name or the verb. But, now, the reality of the name is not what is predicated *per se*, because the Philosopher says in the beginning of the third chapter of this work that an enunciation signifies something

of something; but that of which it is predicated is the name, and that which is predicated is the verb. Therefore the reality signified by the name that which is strictly speaking made the subject, but the reality signified by the verb is what is strictly speaking predicated. Therefore, just as the reality of the name is made subject per se, so the reality of the verb is what is per se predicated. And this is apparent from the text of the Philosopher, who says that the verb is a sign of that which is said about another thing. That therefore is said per se of another, of which the verb is a sign. But the verb is the sign of a reality, for example etc. And the minor is clear from resolving each verb into its reality, and in saying “the human being runs,” that is, “the human being is a running thing.” And so it appears that the verb is predicated considered under the formula of the reality.

Now if the verb is considered under the form of composition, thus it is not what is predicated, but it is the union of the predicate with the subject, and this is clear. For what unites some two things to one another, must be different from both of them. Now the verb, if it is considered under the formula of composition, is only a certain uniting of the predicate with the subject. Therefore the verb under the formula of composition is other than the predicate and other than the subject, and it is only that by which the predicate is united to the subject. And since this is so, every verb strictly by reason of composition is unitive of the extremes, and is not what is predicated, nor what is made subject, but the composition of all verbs is resolved into this verb “is.” Therefore, strictly it coincides with this verb “is,” which is unitive of the extremes. And noting this, the Philosopher said in the text that this verb “is” consignifies a certain composition, which is not understood without the things composed. And he says well “consignifies,” because composition is not of its principal significatum, but the primary significatum of this verb “is” is the actuality of a reality. Hence, when I say “a human being is,” I signify that a human being is actually existent. Implicitly [*ex consequenti*], however, this verb indicates the actuality of attribution. Thus, therefore, it appears that the verb is predicated per se by reason of the reality of the verb, but by reason of composition it is not predicated, but is rather composition of the predicate with the subject.

In reply to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued “that it is a sign” etc., I reply that the verb is what which is a sign of what is predicated of another, or it is a sign of the attribution of the predicate to the subject. It is not per se predicated. And when you say that the verb is a sign etc., I reply that verb gathers into itself three thing, namely, the utterance, the reality, and composition. By reason of the utterance it is a sign of what it indicates about another. And just as by reason of the utterance it is a sign of what is indicated about another, so the verb by reason of composition is a sign of attribution. And I grant that neither by reason of the utterance nor by reason of composition is it predicated, but by reason of the reality of the verb it is per se what is predicated.

In reply to the other argument, when it is argued, “it is not predicated in the minor” etc., I reply that the reality conveyed by this verb “is” in saying “a human being is,” is made subject there, since the form of being in whatever is included. Hence it is the same to say “a human being is an animal,” that is, “a human being is an animal existing.” And that is predicated in the minor, and thus the reality of the verb is made the subject in the major. But it is accidental that it is made subject. But it is per se predicated in the minor, since the reality of the verb is per se predicated, as was said.

<Question 6b>

Next **it is asked** whether an infinite form of a verb (*infinitivum verbum manens infinitivum*)⁴⁴ can be part of a statement (*enunciatio*).

And it is argued that it cannot, since the Philosopher says in this first that every statement (*enunciatio*)⁴⁵ is from name and verb, or from an infinite name and verb. But an infinite form of a verb is none of these, since it is not a verb, as the Philosopher says, and plainly is not a name. Therefore an infinite form of a verb is not a part of a statement. And this same the Philosopher says in the first chapter of the text, that every statement is from a name and a verb.

Again, Boëthius says this, that the infinite form of a verb, taken per se, is infinite. But this with names and verbs added does not make it infinite, but negative; for an infinite form of a verb is only infinite when it is placed by itself. Therefore the infinite form of the verb itself is not put together with others to constitute an enunciation.

On the other hand it is argued, every word (*dictio*) can be a part of speech, but an infinite form of a verb is a word; therefore an infinite form of a verb is a part of speech. And everything that is a part of speech can be included in an statement. Therefore etc.

I reply that an infinite form of a verb can be included in a statement, because whatever is a sign of speaking of another can be included in a statement. But an infinite form of a verb is a sign of speaking of another. The Philosopher says this in the text, that a finite verb is not a verb, but accidents of it happen to a verb, so that it is a sign of speaking about another. Therefore etc.

Again, whatever has modes of signifying through which it can be ordered with another in a statement is a part of the statement, because otherwise it would have false modes of signifying. But an infinite form of a verb has modes through which it is ordered with another. Since then an infinite form of a verb is a word (*dictio*), therefore it will be contained under another part of speech than name. It will be contained then, under verb. It will have, therefore, the modes of signifying of a verb, since the mode of signifying is the form of part of speech. It can therefore be ordered with another in speech.

It is explained in a third way thus: The accidental does not transmute the essential. The essential mode is the infinite form of the verb, which is one word. In this it differs from a negative verb, because it is one word, but a negative verb is several words. But to be added in speech is accidental to it, therefore this does not destroy its being one word. But it does not remain one word if it remains in the infinite form, therefore as it is in speech it will remain infinite. Because of this, I hold that, just as upon the affirmative of an indefinite predicate there follows the negative of a finite predicate, and vice versa, so upon the affirmative of an infinite form of a verb there follows the negative of the finite verb, because this follows: “a human being does not run” taking “does not run” as infinite, therefore “a human being does not run” taking “does not run” as it is negated, and vice versa. But because there is no difference in the utterance between the infinite verb and the negated verb, therefore the Philosophy does not multiply oppositions belonging to finite and infinite verb. But he could well have multiplied them, had he wanted to. And therefor the argument from Boëthius to the contrary is not valid, that says that if the infinite verb remains infinite in speech, then the Philosopher would have multiplied oppositions in the infinite verb.

⁴⁴An infinite form of a verb is parallel to an infinite name. An infinite name adds to a name, conjoined with it, a negation, as for instance, in “non-goat,” the infinite form of “goat.” One of the rules of direct inference in Aristotle, i.e. obversion, is that one can substitute the finite for the infinite form when it occurs in the predicate and change the quality of the statement (negative to affirmative or affirmative to negative), while leaving the quantity the same, and the result is equivalent to the original statement. So from “No goat is a carnivore” one can derive “Every goat is a non-carnivore” are the same.

⁴⁵A statement here would be either an affirmation of one thing of another, or a denial of one thing of another.

As for the arguments, against the first, when it is argued “every statement is from name and verb” etc., this is true. And to the minor, when it is said that “infinite verb” etc., I reply that an infinite verb is not a verb in view of this, that the infinite verb does not signify any determinate concept of the mind. Nevertheless the accidents of a verb coincide in it, and therefore infinite verbs in this way are verbs. And because of this when he said that every statement is from name and verb, he took verb in the wide sense for both finite and infinite verbs.

As to the other, it is apparent in the same way. For we can deny what Boëthius said. Still, if we want to preserve his authority, we can claim that Boëthius said this, because it is fit to say it, not because it is his own intention.

<Question 7b>

Now it remains to ask about what Aristotle said, that “runs” consignifies being now. And because of this let it be asked whether the [period of] time consignified by a verb in the present tense⁴⁶ is confused or discrete.⁴⁷

And I show first that it consignifies the confused present and not a discrete present, since if anything is such that after the addition (*adventum*) of some [determination] to it it stands actually for many, [before] the addition it stands potentially for all those. For example, speaking thus, “every human being runs,” here the word “human being” stands actually for many, and before the addition of the sign [i.e. “every”] it stands indifferently for those many, and thus the major premise is true. But as a matter of fact through the addition of some determination the verb stands in the present tense for many times at the same time,⁴⁸ as for instance speaking thus, “a human being runs of necessity.”⁴⁹ Therefore before the addition of that determination the verb stands indifferently for these times; therefore thus speaking, “a human being runs” the verb “runs” does not consignify the present determinately.

Again, if the verb in the present tense consignifies a discrete time, it follows that every [true] present-tense statement would be necessary and every false one impossible.⁵⁰ The consequent is false, and therefore the antecedent is. Proof of the consequence: If in speaking one says, “Socrates runs,” and the word “runs” consignifies the current present (*presens quod nunc instat*), and it is said in such a way that this is true, “Socrates runs,” it is also impossible for what runs in this now not to run now.⁵¹ And if then this is necessary, “Socrates runs,” for this time, this also is in the same way necessary then, “Socrates runs for this now,” since the

⁴⁶Literally, “verb about the present,” *verbum de presenti*.

⁴⁷It is to be noted that any reference to a *time* here is a reference to a period of time, however short, not an instant. A present period of time is one that contains the present instant, which is going on now as well as before and after now.

⁴⁸This would be the minor premise.

⁴⁹Adding the “of necessity” phrase forces us to read the sentence as intending to assert that “a man runs” is true at all times.

⁵⁰The idea, of course, is to show an impossible consequent for the notion that the present consignifies a definite time, rather than standing indifferently for whatever time the sentence happens to be uttered.

⁵¹Why impossible? Well, we ordinarily think it possible that Socrates should not be running now, even though he is, because at some later time we can truly say that he is not then running (we can say at the later time, truly “Socrates is not running now”). So for it to be possible that A is B, where “is” consignifies indifferently some time is for it to be true at some time in T that A is B.

sentence is necessary when the predicate cannot fail to be in the subject for that time with which it agrees or is denoted to agree. So this is necessary, “Caesar was,” as long as the predicate can agree with the subject.⁵² But it is thus saying, “Socrates runs” for that time in which he runs—it is impossible for the predicate not to agree, and therefore it is necessary.⁵³ In the same way a false sentence is impossible, since a sentence is impossible when the predicate cannot agree with the subject for the time for which it is indicated that it agrees with it, for this is impossible, “Caesar was not [i.e. never was],” since it is impossible for the predicate to agree with it for the time it is indicated that it agrees with it. In the same way, in this case. If this is false, “Socrates runs,” and the word “runs” consignifies running now, for the now time it is impossible for running to agree with Socrates; therefore it is impossible.⁵⁴ And so it must be argued concerning any false statement.

Again, the same present time is consignified through a verb about the present that is signified through the name “present,” and that is signified by this adverb “now,” since all these consignify the present distinguished from other different times. But⁵⁵ this name “present” signifies the present confusedly and not discretely. Therefore the present-tense verb will consignify the present confusedly. Proof of the assumption, “tomorrow⁵⁶ will be present”: by this which indicates a present there is conveyed a present that will be. And if I say “yesterday was,” the present that I indicate signifies a present that was. Therefore present is common to the present occurring, and the present that did occur, and the present that will occur. And in the same way, the verb consignifies about the present. Therefore it consignifies the present confusedly.

Again, if the verb about the present consignifies a discrete time, this cannot be other than the present that occurs now. But this cannot be, since then the verb changes what it signifies many times in a day. This is because if it is imposed on this verb “runs” to signify the present that now is, either the verb will right away fail to consignify the present that will be,⁵⁷ or if it does not, it must be held that what it consignifies will change,

⁵²“Caesar was” is necessary for every time after the present if it is true now, according to the Aristotelian concept of necessity presupposed by Simon. That is, given that Caesar did once exist, it cannot fail to be true at any future time that “Caesar once was.” The sentence, of course, would not have been true before Caesar existed, but perhaps that case is covered by the specification that the predicate be able to agree with the subject, since one cannot speak of Caesar in this way before he exists. The subject needs a referent in the past—the subject supposits for past things. (What about “Caesar will exist,” taken to be about the present? One might allow this to be true if Caesar’s future existence, like that of the Antichrist, were somehow to be guaranteed or necessary, but presumably his future existence always depended on free actions by his parents. So the referent is guaranteed in the case of Antichrist, and we can make statements about the future Antichrist that are straightforwardly true or false, so long as it is already causally determined that things will happen in the relevant way—but before Caesar existed, there was no such guaranteed referent for the subject of “Caesar will exist,” and the statement was not true or false, either one.)

⁵³That is, on the assumption that the only time consignified by “runs” in “Socrates runs” is the time the sentence is uttered, if it is true when it is uttered then it is true for every possible time, that is, every time that might under some condition become the actual time referred to in the statement. There is only one such time, and to make the statement later would be to talk about that time, which would then be in the past. In reality, of course, “Socrates runs” consignifies all the times when it might be meaningfully said, so at which Socrates exists, and some such time could be actual in which Socrates does not run even if Socrates runs now.

⁵⁴The reader is reminded that it is assumed for the sake of the argument that the only possible time that can be signified in the sentence is that one time at which it is uttered, so that any future utterances of it must refer to that same time.

⁵⁵Omitting the *non* from the editions “*sed non est ita quod.*”

⁵⁶Emending “*Cristina dies*” to “*Crastina dies.*”

⁵⁷That is, immediately after the present moment (for every time after the present moment however close to the present moment it may be) the sentence will be talking about a past present.

and thus there is a new imposition all day.

Again, if the verb of the present consignifies a determinate time, then I will ask whether it signifies a present determined in common or a present determined as a singular. If you answer in the first way, then I have what was proposed. If in the second way, then it follows that the verb which now consignifies the present will later consignify the past. Proof: that singular time which is now present will right away [immediately after this] be past. If, then, a verb in the present tense consignifies that singular time which now is, since that will be in the past right away it will consignify the past, and this is absurd.

Again, this proposition is true, “snow is white,” even when no snow exists in natural reality, and it is not more true for one determinate time than another, since for whatever reason it is true for tomorrow, when there will be snow, it will be true for the same reason for any other time when it is true. Then it will not be made more true in the present tense for one time rather than another, but it is made true indifferently. Therefore the present-tense verb does not consignify a determinate present, but a confused present.

Again, this is true, “this horse runs well, but stands in the stable.” And it is not more true for one time than another. Therefore it is necessary to say that here a determinate present is not consignified. For if it is made true for a determinate time, it is made true for that time which is mentioned, which is not true.⁵⁸ Therefore etc.

Again, I suppose that such sentences as these are true: “I am silent,” “I drink,” “I do not speak,” and “I read.” But for the times in which they are brought forward, such words are not true, because when someone says “I am silent” he is not silent, and when someone says “I drink,” he does not drink, and so on. I assume, then, that someone can truly bring forward such words. A determinate present it will not be signified by these verbs, but a confused present.

On the other hand, it is argued, “a human being runs, therefore a human being runs in this present,” but it would not follow unless this verb “runs” signified in the antecedent some discrete present; therefore etc.

Again, if a present-tense verb consignifies a confused present, so that the it no more consignifies the current present than any other that will be current, then this can be true, “Socrates runs, while Socrates is sleeping,” since if the word “runs” no more consignifies the current present than another, and the sentence is true for some other, therefore this will be true, “Socrates runs, while Socrates is sleeping,” which is false. Therefore that from which it follows [is false]. But this is that a present-tense verb consignifies a confused present; therefore etc.

Again, the time is accommodated to the verb, so that it makes certain and makes a distinction in favor of our actions. But if a present-tense verb consignifies a confused present, then it will not make certain or make a distinction in favor of our actions, as is signified by verbs; therefore etc.

Again, that which signifies a difference of some genus does not extend to that to which an opposite difference applies, for example, rational does not extend to that to which an opposite difference [i.e. irrational] applies. But past and future are opposite differences of the present. Therefore, when the present is a certain difference of time, it does not extend to that time with which opposite differences of time agree, for instance, to the future or the past, but is restricted to one determinate time. Therefore etc.

Again, if a present-tense verb does not consignify a determinate present, but a confused present, truth will no more be determined in those of the present than in those of the future, but this is absurd. Proof: because if the present-tense verb consignifies a confused time, then this sentence, “Socrates runs,” will have

⁵⁸The problem seems to be that if the only present consignified here is the time at which the sentence is uttered, the horse must be in the stable, and not running, at that time. So it is false. But when it is running it is not in the stable, so it is false then, too. Presumably Simon would parse the statement to mean “When the horse runs, it runs well, and the horse is in the stable.” There are two present-tense verbs here, if one does not count the “runs” in the dependent clause, and they clearly must refer to different times.

many causes of truth, and will extend to the present which is future, and this does not differ from the future. And thus truth is not declared in future things, nor in those of the present, given that the time that is signified through the present-tense verb was confused.⁵⁹

To this it must be replied that a verb of the present tense placed by itself signifies the present in common, but still not in an entirely confused way. And it does not signify any present that it could signify, though not entirely confusedly it also signifies it. I have to explain, and it is made clear thus: A verb of the present tense signifies a certain difference of time, and therefore it is suitable for it to exclude opposite differences, so that the present time excludes past and future, just as we see concerning the name of a difference in any genus, which does not extend to those of which an opposite difference is predicated. For rational does not extend to that opposite, of which irrational is predicated, and it is the same way in this sentence, that the present signified through the verb does not extend to that difference of time which is past or future. And therefore it always is related to but one, which is distinct from the past and the future in the reality, it is necessary that the verb signify that one as the present time, and consequently without confusion with any other, since the verb signifies that one as the present time, and therefore signifies without confusion. And this is reasonable.

But it seems that it does not signify one present time thus, because that one is part of the time which it can signify, so that it can be said that it signifies. That is, a verb of the present tense does not signify in this way, because, whatever part of time be taken, it will be before the future and after the past. But a verb in the present tense signifies the present time, as it were, by excluding the past and the future. But whatever part of time is designated, it will have future and a past and the present.⁶⁰ And if this is so, then another designated part of time cannot be signified by the verb. But then it will be taken that it signifies without confusion what it signifies, and so it signifies no designated present. And this is clearer, if we call that present which is not now .a., if anyone says that a verb of the present tense signifies .a., then it follows that, since the verb always signifies the same as .a., that it is true that the present will be after the past. And then it will have to be said that the verb of the present tense will signify a past time right away.

⁵⁹That is, if it is confused in its signification, the sentence will be true if Socrates runs now, or if he will run, and it does not specify either.

⁶⁰That is, any interval of time that is signified as the present will have some part that occurs before the present moment, and some part that occurs after the present moment.