

Questions on Porphyry

By Simon of Faversham.

Translated by John Longeway.

As the Philosopher says in *Physics* II, whoever does not distinguish between what is evident (*manifestum*) and what is not, is disposed to the cognition of beings in the way one blind from birth is disposed to the grasp of colors.¹ Now those who are blind from birth are disposed in this way, that they can indeed syllogize concerning colors, but they cannot judge about them in accord with the truth, for those who lack a sense lack the knowledge which comes through that sense, as it is said in *Posterior Analytics* I.² In the same way, whoever cannot distinguish the evident from what is not evident is indeed able to use words, but is lacking in reason and intellect, because of which the Commentator says, commenting on the passage in the *Physics*, that just as a blind person lacks vision, so such a person lacks the natural power of intellect.³ For they deny propositions that are primary without qualification and indemonstrable.

Now there are a number of causes why people cannot judge between what is evident and what is not. This happens to some from their natural construction, due to which their intellects can distinguish nothing among sensibles. Nothing can be impressed on the souls of such people from the cognition of sensibles, except with the greatest difficulty; for they have an intelligence blunted by nature, which have not the principles of the arts and sciences in themselves, and cannot receive them from others. Boethius says of these that we never see those with blunted intelligence drunk with philosophical nectar.⁴

This happens to some others through their having become habituated to the opposites of principles, since, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* II,⁵ “as we are accustomed [to hear], so do we judge it must be said,” and having become accustomed to hearing what is false, many are drawn into error. The Commentator says concerning this passage that there were many in his time who had a bad habit of denying what are held to be principles in philosophy, of whose number, he claims, was Avicenna.⁶ There are, therefore, some who, due to habituation, are unable to distinguish between what is evident and what is not, and who regard what is most evidently true to be most false. The Commentator speaks of these in commenting on *Physics* II, remarking that it is impossible for this sort of person to philosophize.⁷

Now it happens to some that they cannot judge between what is evident and what is not because they have too little instruction in logic. For they believe that everything can be demonstrated, and so wish to receive nothing that is said to them through mathematics. Now this can occur through a weakness of the mind, as the

¹Aristotle, *Physics* II 1.

²Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I 18.

³Averroes, *On the Physics* II comm. 6.

⁴Mazarella was unable to find a passage in Boethius saying this exactly, though he found passages in most of his logical commentaries that carry this rough sense.

⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II 3.

⁶Averroes, *On the Metaphysics* II comm. 15.

⁷Averroes, *On the Physics* II, comm. 6.

Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* IV, that it is a weakness of mind to seek demonstration of those things of which there is no demonstration.⁸ This happens too from an ignorance of logic, for it is explained in logic that one cannot proceed indefinitely in demonstration, and again, that one cannot demonstrate in a circle, from which it is immediately concluded that there cannot be demonstrations of everything. Since, then, such errors, and such great errors, happen in philosophy, because people do not know how to distinguish what is known through itself and what is known through something else, the Philosopher concludes in *Metaphysics* II that a human being should be instructed how one should proceed in the individual sciences, so that he does not seek the same certitude in all of them.⁹ He should be taught how much certitude is to be sought in each reality, that is, how much the nature of the reality admits. A science which thus instructs a person in the cognition of every reality is logic. This hands down the way in which one must, in each science, arrive at the cognition of something unknown from something known, in such a way that he does not seek the same certainty in all things, if it is not in accord with what the nature of the subject demands. And so logic, although it is a certain science in itself, is nonetheless a way of knowing for the other sciences.

Although there are many sciences, and every science has a special way of knowing, which differs from the way of knowing in other sciences as one science differs from another, still there is a way of knowing common to every science, since every science through a certain investigation of reason moves from what is cognized to the cognition of something not yet cognized; but this way in which reason runs from one to the other is treated in logic, and therefore logic is a certain way of knowing common to all the sciences. If, then, it be absurd to seek at the same time both a science and its way of knowing, it is absurd to seek at the same time logic and the other sciences together with it. It is necessary to learn each in the way in which one arrives at some result. But logic is the way in every science, and therefore, if any wish to proceed in an orderly way in the sciences, they must first learn logic. So whoever passes on to the other sciences, leaving logic out, perverts the order of things and seeks to do the impossible. For they seek to teach others, but do not care to learn, which is to be derided, since, as Boethius says, it is an unfortunate thing to become a master, when one has not learned to be a student.¹⁰ They seek to come to a certain end, but they do not care to enter on the way, and such crude and beastly people are regarded as wholly useless for cognizing the true and the good. Against such people we can cite what the Commentator says, “Woe to you, who are reckoned among the number of the beasts.”¹¹ And they are rightly called bestial, who pass on to the lucrative sciences and leave out logic, this is because they care more for the good of the body than the good of the soul. Since we agree with the beasts in the goods of the body, but act in the same way as the separated substances¹² in the goods of the soul, therefore the Commentator says against such people, “Woe to you, who reckon yourselves in the number of the beasts, not perceiving the good that is in you, through which you rise to higher things, and are similar to the Intelligences.”

In the consideration of the truth of beings, then, logic is not to be set aside, but is to be approached before all the other sciences. Whoever is ignorant of logic, even if he knows something, does not know that he knows it, since whoever knows himself to have some knowledge must know how this knowledge can be discovered, and whoever is ignorant of logic does not know the way in which any knowledge can be

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV 4.

⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II 2.

¹⁰Mazarella was unable to find the reference.

¹¹Mazarella was unable to find the citation.

¹²The separate substances or Intelligences are, for Faversham, the Angels.

discovered. For all the arts and sciences are discovered in accord with one of these ways, namely, by defining, dividing or syllogizing, but logic alone teaches each of these. Even though special sciences define their subjects and divide them, still they presuppose the way in which they are to be defined and divided as it is taken from logic. So logic is useful not merely to support some sciences, but for the support of all sciences, for those who do not know logic do not know how it is that one knows anything. Such people may know something, but they don't know that they know it.

Albert says in the beginning of his *Logic*, “whoever does not know logic, cannot discern either his own or anyone else's error. For he is not capable of judging whether what is known is known rightly or not.”¹³ Such people, then are like the uneducated even in those things they seem to know, since they do not know how to trace the causes of those things they know, and so the Philosopher says very often in his books that the cause of the error of past thinkers was that they did not have the science of logic.¹⁴ So logic is the first to be learned among the sciences, for otherwise coming to the cognition of beings is the same as pursuing a flying bird.

Since then logic is a science of the rational, since it is one concerning acts of reason as it proceeds in various ways, moving from some signs making a certain suspicion or presumption to others. Thus it is one part of logic, called pure rhetoric, if it is argued thus: “whoever comes out of a brothel is unchaste, this one is coming out of a brothel, therefore etc.” If reason proceeds from things construed as an abomination or object of delight in its discourse, thus it is the part of logic called poetics, for instance if it is argued thus: “This drink is similar to poison, therefore it is to be avoided.” If reason proceeds from the probable, thus it is the third part of logic, which is called dialectic, and this is treated in the *Topics*. If it proceeds from essential and proper causes, thus it is another part of logic, which is called demonstrative, and is treated in the *Posterior Analytics*. But if it proceeds from what seems to be, yet is not so, thus it is sophistic, which is treated in the *Sophistici Elenchi*. And since, when something is common to several things, it is necessary to consider this common thing separately, lest the same should happen to be repeated several times, therefore, aside from these parts of logic, which are about the species of syllogism, there is another part about syllogism in general, and this is treated in the *Prior Analytics*. Now sometimes reason does not proceed by moving from one to another, but receives the simple what-it-is of a reality absolutely, by considering it as it can be ordered both above and below a genus, and the book of *Categories* concerns this sort of act of reason, the subject of which is sayable incomplex beings that can be ordered in relation to a genus. And sometimes reason relates simple things it has grasped to one another by composition or division, and the *Peri Hermeneias* (*On Interpretation*) concerns such an act of reason, the subject of which is affirmative or negative statement.

Thus, according to the tradition of Aristotle, there are seven parts of logic: the science of the *Categories*, the science of *Peri Hermeneias*, the science of the *Prior Analytics*, the science of the *Posterior Analytics*, the science of the *Rhetoric*, the science of the *Poetics*, and the science of the *Sophistical Refutations*. And people ought to be taught the parts of logic in this order, as the Ancient expositors intend. Since a subject and predicate, from which a statement is composed, are prior to it, the book of *Categories*, which is about being as the intellect establishes its intention of subject and predicate upon it, must precede the sciences concerning statement, which is treated in the book of *Peri Hermeneias*.

Again, since a syllogism, taken without qualification, is composed from statements or propositions, which are the same considered as subject, the science of the *Peri Hermeneias* must precede the science of syllogism taken without qualification, which is treated in the *Prior Analytics*.

Next, since the shape and form of a syllogism is realized (*salvatur*) most of all in demonstrative syllogism, therefore the science of the *Posterior Analytics*, where matters concerning demonstrative syllogism

¹³Albertus Magnus, *Liber de Predicabilibus* Tractatus I, Chapter 3.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I 6; *On the Soul* III 3.

are settled, follows immediately on that of the *Prior Analytics*.

Then, since the shape of a syllogism through which we demonstrate is more immediately (*immediatius salvatur*) realized in dialectical syllogism, therefore the science of the *Topics* must follow on that of the *Posterior Analytics*.

Again, since after dialectic and demonstration the nature of syllogism is realized in rhetoric more completely (*per prius salvetur*)¹⁵ than in poetics, immediately after the science of the *Topics* there must follow the science of rhetoric.

And after that, since the shape of a syllogism is found in poetic syllogism, immediately after the science of rhetorical syllogisms, there must follow or be ordered beneath it the science of poetic syllogisms.

And last among the parts of logic in order must be the sophistical science, since in sophistical syllogism the shape and form of syllogism is entirely lacking.

Thus must we order the parts of logic among themselves. Nonetheless, because they are easy, the *Topics* and the *Sophistici Elenchi* come beforehand in teaching, and the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* come last.

Now these books are the ones necessary for the existence of logic, but aside from these there are others, which are for the sake of comfort, and assuring that it is done well, namely the book of *Porphiry, On the Six Principles*, the *Divisions* and *Topics* of Boëthius, and the books of Boëthius on the *Categories* and *Hypothetical Syllogisms*.

Now the book of Porphiry, which we have before us to be exposted, is useful for the book of *Categories*, for in that book of *Categories* mention is made of Aristotle on genus and species, and he has not yet given us an art for cognizing these. Therefore Porphiry composed his treatise on the five universals, in which he shows what each of them is. In the same way the book on the six principles is useful for the cognition of categories, since in this book the six principles, which are dealt with briefly in the *Categories*, are dealt with at length. But the book of *Divisions* is useful for the science of the *Posterior Analytics*, in which demonstration is dealt with, for the middle term of a demonstration is a definition, and definition is investigated by dividing the genus in which we predicate them *per se*. Hence, whoever does not have the art of dividing cannot know the art of demonstrating. Now the book of *Topics* corresponds to Aristotle's *Topics*, for Aristotle in that book makes a great many remarks about topics, but then does not say what those topics are, and so Boëthius made a treatise about these dialectical topics, showing what the topic is and what the differences of them are.

Since, then, in every work three things are required, namely what it is that it is about, why, and how, therefore Porphiry touches on these three in his proemium—why? Because of the teaching of the book of *Categories*, because of demonstration, and because of division—about what? The five universals—how? In a brief and practical way.

It must be known that science is only for removing ignorance. Since, then, ignorance is of two sorts, namely the ignorance of negation,¹⁶ which is removed through the proemium, and of disposition, which is removed through the treatise . . .¹⁷

¹⁵The series of expressions here around *salvatur* seems to rest on the notion that the nature of syllogism is most completely or ideally realized (or preserved) in demonstration, and that other syllogisms partake less fully of the nature of syllogism. So as we move through the logical sciences we deal with less and less perfect forms of syllogism, farther and farther from the original Form of Syllogism, until sophistical syllogisms participate in the Form just barely enough to exist as syllogisms at all. The conception is Neoplatonic, and I would hazard the guess it is taken from some reference in Albertus Magnus.

¹⁶This sort of ignorance involves ignorance of the very existence of the subject, while ignorance of disposition involves ignorance what is true of the subject.

¹⁷The sole manuscript seems to leave out a portion of the text here, picking up with Question 1 rather than finishing the Proemium.

Question 1

“*Mox de generibus.*”¹⁸ Since it does not seem that he was ignorant of those questions which he does not settle, perhaps he did not settle these questions because his book concerned logic,¹⁹ therefore it is asked first concerning logic, **whether logic is a practical science, or speculative or demonstrative.**

And it is argued that it is practical, since that science which teaches a manner of functioning is a practical science, but logic teaches a manner of functioning in individual sciences, since it teaches the manner of defining, dividing and collecting; therefore etc.

Again, reason and will belong to the same capacity of the soul, but that science which regulates human beings in acts of the will, that is, the moral science, is called practical; therefore in the same way that science will be called practical which regulates human beings in acts of reason, and it is because it does this that logic is called a science of the rational, therefore logic will be a practical science.

On the other hand, it is argued that a practical science discerns good from evil, but logic only teaches how to discern the true from the false; therefore etc.

It must be understood here what the difference is between speculative and practical science, for speculative science is what perfects a human being in the speculative intellect, but a practical science is what perfects a human being in the practical intellect. Since the speculative intellect inclines toward the true as an end, but the practical toward the good, therefore the end of a speculative science is a view (*speculatio*) of the truth, but that of a practical science is a function directed to something good. And therefore the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* I²⁰ that the end theoretically considered is truth, but practically it is some work, so that in the practical sciences the science exists only because of some work, since in these knowing is sought for the sake of the work, rather than work for the sake of knowing.

In the second place, it must be understood that the true to which the speculative intellect tends is a true what-it-is and nature, since each capacity naturally tends to its *per se* object. Now the what-it-is of a reality is the *per se* object of intellect, therefore the speculative intellect tends to this *per se*. Therefore the end of the speculative intellect is cognition of beings in respect of their natures and what-it-is.

When it is asked, then, whether logic is a speculative or a practical science, it must be said that it is neither speculative nor practical.

That it is not purely speculative is clear, since, in order for some science to be purely speculative, it is necessary that some truth be sought after in it, which is the perfection of the speculative intellect; but such a truth is the true what-it-is of a reality, and therefore a purely speculative science considers the what-it-is of realities. But logic does not consider what-it-is, and therefore it is not purely speculative. Logic considers intentions, which the intellect finds on realities and which are extraneous to realities, therefore from this consideration logic is said to be extraneous to philosophy. Then it is argued thus from what has been said: A science which is purely speculative considers the natures and what-it-is of realities, but logic does not consider the natures and what-it-is of realities; therefore etc.

Again, neither is logic purely practical, since in purely practical sciences knowing is sought for the sake of functioning. But in logic knowing is not sought for the sake of functioning, but for the sake of knowing. The proof of this is that logic was discovered, in the end, so that things could be set right in the other sciences, for

¹⁸Porphyry, *Isagoge* PL 64, 82A.

¹⁹The sense seems to be that Porphyry was not ignorant of the answers to the questions about the ontological status of universals that he sets aside, and so perhaps he set them aside because they were outside the scope of his book, that is, outside of logic. This might have been the case if logic is a purely practical art, and so the first question is raised.

²⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II 1, 4.

instance, so that a human being might know how to divide, how to define, and how to syllogize in the other sciences. But speculative sciences are for the sake of knowing, and not for the sake of any other utility. Therefore logic is, in the end, for the sake of knowing since its end is the way of knowing in the speculative sciences, which is explained in logic. Thus it is clear that logic is not purely speculative, nor purely practical, but speculative in one respect and practical in another. It is practical since it teaches, using syllogism, how to function, and so teaches syllogizing, defining and dividing and such. It is speculative since it teaches these not because of some work, but for the sake of scientific knowledge, for logic teaches us to syllogize, so that through its teaching we can set things straight in the other sciences.

Then **in response to the arguments**, as to the first, when it is argued, “Every science that teaches a manner of functioning” etc., I reply that every science that teaches a manner of functioning which is in the end for the sake of functioning, is practical. And I reply to the minor premise that, even though logic teaches how to function, it does not teach functioning for the sake of the work, but for the sake of knowledge, and therefore it is not practical.

when it is argued “Reason and will” etc., I grant it. And when you say in the minor premise, “But that science which regulates a human being” etc., I reply that it is not the same, since that science which regulates a human being in acts of the will is practical, for the will immediately moves one to function. But when a human being judges through the practical intellect that something is good and to be pursued immediately, if the will determines him to pursue this immediately, the human being begins to function. But the speculative intellect does not immediately move one to function, since that which moves immediately to functioning considers particulars, but the speculative intellect does not consider particulars, but rather universals. For it does not consider the good and the bad, but rather the true and the false; therefore when logic sets human beings right in acts of the speculative intellect, this intellect is not the first mover in functioning, so that logic is called a speculative science more than a practical one, for it does not set a human being right in the functioning of the practical intellect, but rather in the functioning of the speculative intellect, as was said. Therefore etc.

Question 2

Since it is Porphyry’s intention to discuss the five universals, therefore it is asked **whether it is possible for there to be knowledge of universals**.

And it is argued that it is not, for there cannot be knowledge about that which is not, but the universal is not; therefore there cannot be knowledge about the universal. The minor premise is proved through Boëthius, who says that everything that is is because it is one in number, but the universal is not one in number; therefore etc.

Again, every science is from what is prior and better known according to its form, but nothing is better known than universals according to form, for just as the singular is first known to the senses, so the universal is first known to the intellect; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued that there can be knowledge of all that which is associated with the intellect, but a universal is associated with the intellect; therefore etc.

It must be held that “universal” can name two things, the intention of universality and the reality subject to that intention. Speaking of the universal as regards the reality subject to the intention of universality, there can be knowledge of the universal. And the reason for this is that knowledge is a certain intellectual cognition, and therefore there can be knowledge, either through definition or through demonstration, of all that which is *per se* intelligible. Now a reality subject to the intention of universality is *per se* intelligible to the intellect, for otherwise the intellect would not found the intention of universality upon it. Therefore etc.

Again, speaking of the universal as regards the intention of universality, in this way too there can be

knowledge of the universal.²¹ And the reason is because the intellect is active through cognition, and so the intellect brings about none of those things which are, unless it cognizes it. Now the intellect functions to produce second intentions among realities, and because of this the Commentator, on *On the Soul* III, says that the intellect brings about universality among realities. Therefore it is necessary that the intellect cognize the intention of universality.²² Therefore the intellect has knowledge and cognition of the universal as regards the intention of universality. The intention of universality, however, is the intention of genus and species and the rest, and logic is said to be about these intentions. So it is because of this that logic is said to be the “rational science,” and it is not said to be the rational science because it proceeds through reason—for every science would be rational in this way, but that is called the rational science which is about those things that are caused by the intellect.

But the intellect causes such intentions, and is moved by their appearing in reality, and because of this the intellect attributes different logical intentions to things because of their different properties.²³ So the logician would not say this is true, “man is a genus,” but this, “man is a species.” Therefore all logic is taken from the properties of realities, since otherwise logic would be a figment of the intellect, something we do not hold. From this it follows that whoever discovered logic was not a logician, for he considered the natures of realities, and so was not a logician, for a logician, considered as such, does not consider the natures of realities, but only intentions, or, if he does consider realities, this is only because they fall under intentions.

So it appears in this way that there can be knowledge of the universal in both its meanings, both in respect of the reality subject to the intention, and in respect of the intention itself. Logic is about the universal in respect of the intention, and is wholly received from intentions.

In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued, “There cannot be knowledge of what is not,” I reply that there cannot be knowledge of what in no way is. In response to the minor premise, I reply that the universal is not a being to that extent, since it is not *per se* subsistent, but it is a being associated with the soul. And to the authority of Boëthius, I reply that everything outside the functioning of the intellect is because it is one in number, but the universal is not outside the functioning of the

²¹The difficulty here is that the intention of universality is in no way subject to further abstraction, so that one can form a higher intention, thus subjecting it to the characteristic operation of the intellect, and so understanding it. Thus it is not, it appears, *per se* intelligible. There is no more abstract notion to be formed from the notion of universality, nor are there a number of different notions of universality from which a common content can be derived. So how is it subject to the operations of the intellect, and so intelligible?

²²But, it seems clear, it does not cognize it through abstracting *from* it, but only through abstracting it from various universal intentions. It cannot abstract from it, at least it cannot form a new, third intention, by doing so. Rather, if it does so, it turns out to be an intention that falls under itself. Presumably the lowest intentions are abstracted from sensory experience. (Perhaps abstraction should be restricted to this movement from sensory experience, and so we should speak of generalization from intentions? But not so. Generalization will produce a genus to which those things subject to the various species we generalize from belong. The intention of universality, applied to the likes of *man* and *donkey*, do not provide such a genus (that would be *animal*), but rather a new intention related to *man* and *donkey* in the same way *man* is related to individual men. So this is abstraction from experience of things, though it is not sensory experience of them.)

²³So it seems that it is by cognition that the second intention (and the first, for that matter) is produced. There is no other cause (the position is like Searle’s position on intentionality). The cause of the operations of the intellect is the formation of these different universal intentions, which leads the intellect to different judgments about realities depending on the intentions formed. (His example, though, only shows it leads to different judgments about *intentions*, such as “*man* is a species.” How is this a judgement about the realities, i.e. individual men as such? They fall under the species *man*, but also equally under the genus *animal*.) Logic studies these intentions, so it studies something objective, with objective properties and relations to other things, in particular, to realities.

intellect; therefore it is not one in number.²⁴

In response to the other argument, “every science proceeds etc.,” I reply that this is true. And you claim that nothing is prior to the universal itself—I reply that there is something associated with the intellect prior to and better known than the universal itself, considered in respect of the form by which it is a universal, that is, considered in respect of the form of universality. This is because everything has something prior to and better known to the intellect than it is if its concept can be resolved into a prior concept. But the concept of the universal can be resolved into something prior, namely into “being predicable of more than one,” and therefore there can be knowledge of the universal considered in respect of the formula²⁵ (*ratio*) of universality.²⁶ Surely it is this way here as concerns the intention of all universals, according to which they all agree in this, that they are each predicable of more than one, and therefore all universals are defined through this, as is apparent from the way the author proceeds.

Question 3

Next we ask **whether a universal is a substance or an accident.**

And it is argued that it is a substance, since principles and the things of which they are principles must be of the same genus, but genera and differentia are principles of substances; therefore genera and differences are substances. But genera and differences are universals, therefore universals are substances. The major premiss is obvious, and the minor is proved since genera and differences are principles of substance, and consequently are substances.

Again, as is clear from the *Posterior Analytics*,²⁷ there is a difference between definition and demonstration, since definition is of substances, while demonstration is of accidents. From this I argue that definition is of substances only. But definition is also of universals only. Therefore only universals are substances.²⁸

On the other hand, every predication of one substance of another is either necessary or impossible. And this is apparent from induction on all such predications. For example, the predication, “this man is an animal,” is necessary, but the predication, “the man is a donkey,” is impossible. Therefore, if a universal is a substance, the predication, “man is a universal,” will either be necessary or impossible. It is clear that it is not necessary, since the predicate is not predicated of everything contained under its subject.²⁹ Nor is it impossible, since we admit such predications. Therefore a universal is not a substance.

It must be understood here that the universal can name two things, the intention of universality

²⁴The full intentionality of intention seems evident here. An intention is not even one thing in number, though it is one thing in some way, in genus or species, say, as opposed to being another thing in genus or species. An intention is in no way identified with a naturally existing (physical) thing. Nonetheless, it has being, but only in the intellect or the soul.

²⁵I want to translated “*ratio*” not as “form” but as “formula.” That is because it is not to be taken as a natural or substantial form, for which “form” often serves as shorthand.

²⁶It seems that it is the entire being of an intention to be predicable. There is nothing more to be said of an intention beyond what it is truly predicable of? Not quite, for to distinguish between what it is truly predicable of, and what it is falsely predicable of, we need some account of predication, and perhaps such an account requires that we regard predication as a mental action of a particular mind. If we take an intention to be in a particular mind, then, who is doing the predicating, and what he is predicating it of, possibly falsely, are also facts concerning a particular intention in that mind, and perhaps in a way concerning the intention itself (it has an instantiation with these properties).

²⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I 1-2.

²⁸I think this is correctly translated. See Simon’s reply below, and my note.

²⁹That is, particular men are contained under its subject, and Socrates is not a universal.

(*intentionem universalitatis*) or the reality subject to an intention.³⁰ If it names the intention, I hold that universal is an accident, and the reason for this is that everything that the understanding brings about with respect to a reality after its being is complete is an accident. But the understanding brings about the intention of universality with respect to a reality after its being is complete, since it is only when the reality is already completely understood and completely cognized that the understanding brings about the intention of universality in it.³¹ And therefore when it names the intention of universality, the universal is an accident.

But if we speak of the reality subject to the intention of universality, we must make a distinction, since the thing subject to the intention of universality can be considered either as it is in itself, or as something understood. If it is considered as something understood, it is not to be assumed that the reality is in this way a substance. The Philosopher explains this in the end of *Metaphysics* VII, where he speaks against Plato,³² for if it must be assumed that a reality that is actually understood is in this way a substance, then a third man must be assumed. For it is clear that the singular man is a substance, and if, therefore, you assume that the common man is a substance insofar as it is understood, and similarly of the singular man, then they will agree in a single essential form, which is the substance of man. This is a man common to the common man and to the singular man, and thus a third man, a substance common to both, must be assumed. This is opposed to what the Philosopher explains in the place cited, that the substance of each reality is proper to itself and not to anything else. But if a common man is assumed which is the substance of these particulars, then the substance of each is not proper to itself, since the common man which is the substance of Socrates is not proper to Socrates, but is in many others.³³ Therefore a common man which is a substance is not to be assumed. In this way, then, it is obvious that a reality insofar as it is understood is not a substance.

But if a reality subject to the intention of universality is considered as it is in itself, it can in this way be either a substance or an accident, since if the thing subject to the intention of universality is in the genus of substance, it is in this way a substance, but if it is in the genus of accident, it is in this way an accident.

And then the reply to the arguments is obvious, for each proceeds on its own way. When, therefore, it is argued that “principles and the things of which they are principles must be of a single genus,” I grant it. To the minor premise I reply that genus and difference can be considered either as regards the intention of genus or difference, and in this case they are not the principles of species, or as regards the reality falling under the intention, and in this case genera and differences are principles of species and so can be substances.

In reply to the other argument, when it is said “definition is only of universals,” I hold that this proposition must be understood in this way: “definition is of universals,³⁴ that is, definition is of realities with

³⁰Actually, there are three things, and one of them, namely first intentions such as *man*, Simon ignores here. The first paragraph concerns the second intention, *universality*. The second paragraph concerns realities subject to first intentions such as *man*.

³¹The intention in question only comes about when the realities are, first, understood under first intentions, and second, those first intentions are understood under a second intention, the intention of *universality*. Now one might wonder how realities fall under the intention of universality, and the answer, of course, must be that they do so only *as they are understood*, not as they are in themselves, i.e. as they are substances. This is explained in the next paragraph.

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII 6-7.

³³Does this argument cut against the notion of humanity *absolutely considered*, as opposed to humanity in the real world (particular men) and humanity as it is understood? It would seem to imply, as a matter of fact, only that humanity absolutely considered is not a substance (nor is humanity as it is understood, the intention). Whether one needs to postulate humanity absolutely considered to account for the possibility of there being an intention, *man*, needs independent discussion.

³⁴That is, definition is of all and only universals. The argument, as stated, is this: Only those things that are substances have definitions [i.e., if it has a definition, it is a substance]; only universals have definitions [i.e., if it has a definition, it is a universal]; therefore only universals are substances [i.e., if it is a substance it is a universal]. This is not valid, of course. But the quotation from Aristotle also supports the assertion that if it is a substance, it has a definition. If that is added as a premise, then the conclusion follows. Simon is pointing this out here.

which the concept of universality agrees,” and for that reason definition is of universals. And one must grant that realities with which the concept of universality agrees and realities with which definition agrees *per se* are substances, for strictly speaking accidents are not defined.

In reply to the other argument, when it is said that “every predication of one substance of another etc.,” I grant the major premise. And when you say, “therefore, the statement ‘this man is a universal’ is necessary etc.” it must be understood here in what way substance is predicated of substance and in what way it is not. For considering it with respect to the intention of universality this proposition, “man is a universal,” is not a predication of one substance of another, but of an accident of a substance, and in this way it is a contingent proposition.³⁵ But if we consider it with regard to the reality subject to the intention of universality, in this way the proposition is necessary, and this is its sense: “man is universal, that is, man is a nature which is subject to the intention of universality.” And you can say, “Since in a necessary proposition the predicate ought to agree with everything contained under its subject,” if this proposition, “man is a nature subject to the intention of universality” is necessary, then this proposition, “Socrates is a nature subject to the intention of universality” is also necessary. I hold that this proposition is true, “Socrates is a nature that is subject to the intention of universality,” and so is this one, “Socrates is a man, and man is universal,”³⁶ but this is not true, “Socrates is universal,”³⁷ nor is this, “Socrates is the universal, man.”

Question 4

Next, questions are raised concerning the part “Now concerning genera and species,”³⁸ in which Porphyry raises three difficult questions about the being and nature of the universal. The first is, whether universals are substances among natural things or are among naked and pure concepts alone. Therefore we inquire **whether genera and species must be outside the soul.**

And it is argued that they must, since an accident is in that to which it belongs, but genus and species are accidents of realities, therefore genera and species are in these same realities. But realities have being outside the soul. Therefore genera and species have being outside the soul.

Again, whatever is predicated of a reality is in it, but genera and species are predicated of realities, so that we say animal is a genus and man is a species; therefore genera and species are in realities. Therefore genera and species have being outside the soul.

Again, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* III,³⁹ an action which is an act of an agent is not in the agent as something is in a subject, but it is in the patient in this way. For if Socrates strikes Plato, the striking is not in Socrates as something is in a subject, but in Plato in this way. But now it is the understanding which brings about the intention of genus and species with regard to realities, as the Commentator says on *On the Soul* III.⁴⁰ Therefore the intentions of genus and species are not in the soul as something is in a subject, but are in realities in this way. But realities have being outside the soul, therefore etc.

On the other hand, if genera and species have being outside the soul, then genera and species do

³⁵It is contingent because its truth depends on man actually being thought by someone universally. If there are men, but no one thinks about them, forming the first intention *man*, then they are not universal in this sense.

³⁶That is, man possesses the accident, universality.

³⁷That is, it is not true that Socrates possesses the accident, universality, even though Socrates is a nature which is subject to this accident of universality. Socrates is man, but only insofar as man is a nature, considered absolutely, not inasmuch as man is a universal.

³⁸Porphyry, Migne, *P.L.* 64, c. 82 a-b.

³⁹Aristotle, *Physics* III 3.

⁴⁰Averroes, *In De anima* III c. 1.

not depend on the soul for their being. But this is opposed to Avicenna, who says that if the soul were not, there would be neither genus nor species.⁴¹

As regards this matter, it must be held that “genus” and “species” can name two things, namely the intentions of genus and species, or the reality subject to these concepts. If they name the realities subject to these concepts, I hold that in this way genera and species have being outside the soul. The reason for this is that what is predicated of particulars concerning what they are (*in quid*), and indicates the whole substance of these particulars, has true being outside the soul, since particulars truly are beings outside the soul. But a reality subject to the concept of universality is predicated concerning what they are (*in quid*) of particulars, and indicates the whole substance, as, for instance, when we say “Socrates is a man.” Therefore etc.

Considering genera and species as regards the reality subject to them, then, they have being outside the soul; but if they are considered as regards the intention, in this way they have being only in the soul. The explanation of this is that the intention of a genus or species is nothing but a certain formula applied to the reality by the understanding, according to which that reality is both one and a common predicable of many. For genus is nothing but a certain intention applicable to a reality, according to which it is predicated of many differing in species, and so for the other cases as well, each in its own way. But nothing outside the soul is a common predicable of many, since everything predicable which is outside the soul is predicable only in the manner of a particular.⁴²

And therefore Boethius claims that everything that is is because it is one in number. The concept of genus and species is only in the understanding. Noting this, the Commentator says, on *Metaphysics* XII, that universals in Aristotle are collected in the soul from particulars through the understanding’s consideration of them, making them one intention.⁴³ Also noting this, Themistius, commenting on *On the Soul* I, says that universals are certain concepts (*conceptus*) which the soul gathers up into itself and collects.⁴⁴ Avicenna agrees with this, and says that there must be two ways of being in the same material realities, namely a way of being outside the soul and a way being within the soul. They are outside the soul as regards their essences and what-it-is, but are in the soul as regards their being known. Natural realities, however, as they are outside the soul, must have real accidents, for instance, being white and black; but things as they are within the soul must have intentional accidents, such as being genus and being species, and so forth. And therefore if we circumscribe the intellect, we circumscribe all second intentions and we also mark out logic, which is about second intentions.

As to the arguments against this view:

In the first argument, when it is argued, “An accident is in that to which it belongs,” I grant this; and to the minor premise I reply that since realities have being in two ways, namely being in the soul and being outside the soul, I hold that genus and species and such, inasmuch as they are understood alone, and as such, are within the soul alone; but with respect to that other being, they are in realities outside the soul.

As to the second argument, when it is argued that “whatever is predicated of a thing is in it,” I grant this. And when you say that a universal is predicated of realities, I hold that man, and whatever else, is not species according to the being which it has outside the soul, since according to the being which it has outside the soul it is as a particular, but it is species according to the being it has in the soul. For since the understanding considers the nature of man as it is one which is in many, it establishes the concept of species in it. Therefore that nature in which the understanding establishes the concept of universality is actually understood, and the understanding establishes the intention of universality in it as it is understood.

As to the other argument, when it is argued, “an action which is the act of an agent etc.,” I hold that

⁴¹Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V c. 3.

⁴²It is unclear how a particular is predicable even of itself, but perhaps Faversham means that we can say truly that Socrates, or this particular person, is Socrates, that is, presumably, is identical to Socrates.

⁴³Averroes, *In Metaphysics* XII, c. 1, p. 137 v. 12 sqq.

⁴⁴Themistius, *In De anima* I c. 4 (ed. Venetiis apud Hier. Scotum, 1559)p. 142 B.

there are two sorts of action—a sort which crosses over into external matter, and another which does not. Therefore, I maintain that an action which crosses over into external matter is in the patient as in a subject, but that action which does not cross over into external matter remains in the agent as the a subject. But the universal is of this latter sort with respect to the understanding, and therefore the universal is in the understanding as in a subject.

Question 5

Next a question is raised concerning the third doubt upon which Porphyry touches, namely, **whether universals are separated from particulars with respect to being.**

And it is shown that they are, for each thing acts according to what it is in act; therefore those things which have separate action have separate being; and thus, as is seen, universals will have being separated from singular things.

Again, those things of which there are definitions *per se* cannot come to be or be destroyed, but definitions are *per se* of the universals themselves; therefore universals cannot come to be or be destroyed. But whatever is in singular things can come to be or be destroyed; therefore the universal is not in singular things.

On the other hand, that which indicates the whole substance and what-it-is of singular things is in singular things, but universals indicate the whole what-it-is and substance of singular things; therefore etc.

<**The opinion of the author**> The opinion of Plato, which the Philosopher often reproves, was that universals are certain natures subsisting *per se* outside the intellect, and separately from singular things in their being. And these natures, he claims, are the whole substance of particulars, so that the source of knowledge of particulars, and also of their being, is of the same species as the particulars. So he posited a certain man separated from particular men, and he supposed this to be the substance of all particular men, and he supposed that the same thing is the source of both the being of singulars and of the knowledge of singulars. But there are many things wrong with this opinion.

The first is that he assumes a universal which exists *per se*, separated from singulars, and yet is the substance of singulars, for these cannot possibly both stand at the same time, since the substance each is in each and not separated from it with respect to being—for the substance of Socrates is in Socrates and the substance of Plato is in Plato. But the universal is the whole substance of particulars, and Plato supposes this, therefore it will not be separated from particulars. And the argument is confirmed from this—that that which is predicated of something, the predication saying “this is this,” and is predicated as concerns its substantial nature (*in quid*) cannot be separated from it, but universals are predicated of particulars, with the predication saying “this is this,” as is the case in saying “Socrates is a man” or “Plato is a man,” and they are predicated as concerns the substantial nature of these things; therefore etc.

Again, what he says afterwards, that the separated universal is of the same species as the particulars, cannot be true. For corporeal and incorporeal things are not of the same species. But this separated man is incorruptible *per se* and *per accidens*, and these particular men are corporeal. Therefore this separated man cannot be of the same species as these particular men.

Again, this opinion fails since he posits that separated thing to be the source of knowledge of particulars. For nothing is understood as it is formally through that which is separated from it in being, but this separated man which Plato posited is separated from particulars in being; therefore etc.

The argument which moved Plato is not convincing. He believed that that which is separated with respect to the understanding is separated with respect to being, and since universals are separated from singular thing with respect to the understanding, therefore he believed that they are separated with respect to being. This is not a good argument, since it is not necessary that what is separated with respect to cognition be separated with respect to being; for as it is in sensitive cognition, so will it be proportionally in intellectual cognition. But it is not necessary that what is separated or distinct with respect to sensitive cognition be separated with respect to being. Proof: since in milk there are two things conjoined with respect to being—namely, whiteness and sweetness. But these are distinct with respect to sensitive cognition, for vision

grasps whiteness and taste sweetness. Therefore they are not separated with respect to being. Therefore it will be similar in intellectual cognition, i.e. not everything that is separated with respect to the intellect is separated with respect to being, and therefore, although universals are separated from singulars with respect to the intellect, it is not necessary that they be separate with respect to being. Thus it must be said that universals are not separated in being from particulars, for the universal indicates the whole substance of particulars and is predicated concerning their substantial nature, and therefore it is not separated from particulars with respect to being. So a universal man is not to be assumed because it exists universally, but it is universal because it is understood universally, leaving out every individuating condition. Therefore the Philosopher says that man and animal and whatever is said universally of singulars is not a being, but it is understood, for whatever is a being outside the soul is particular, so that universals are otherwise, since they are understood.

As to the arguments against this view:

As to the first, when it is argued that “each thing acts” etc., I grant the major premise. And when you say that, “therefore, whatever has separate actions” etc., I hold that they have separate being in the same way as they have separate action. And you say that universals act on the intellect, and so have separate actions. It must be understood here that universals, such as man, donkey, cow, and so on, are not understood in actuality, nor do they act on this very intellect, of themselves. It is the active intellect which, in the presence of sensory images, brings it about that they are understood in actuality. Therefore they have separate actions, but this is in virtue of the active intellect, and because of this they have separate being in virtue of the active intellect, but they do not have this through their own power.

As regards the other, when it is argued that “those things of which there are definitions *per se*” etc., I hold that it is true that such things cannot be brought into being or destroyed *per se*; but they can be brought into being or destroyed *per accidens*, in connection with the coming to be and destruction of particulars. And therefore, although there are definitions of the universals themselves, they can still be destroyed *per accidens*, and brought into being as well, in connection with the coming to be and destruction of the particulars in which they are.

Question 6

Next it is asked concerning the sufficiency of [the classification of] universals [given in Porphyry].

And it seems that they are infinite,⁴⁵ since in however many ways one opposite is said, the other is said in the same number of ways. But singulars and universals are opposites, and singulars are infinite. Therefore etc.

The sufficiency of [Porphyry’s classification of] universals is accepted for this reason: Every universal is predicable, and it is predicated either as regards the essence (*in quid*), or some characteristic (*in quale*); and if regarding the essence, then it either indicates the whole essence or some part of it. If it indicates the whole essence, thus it is species, but if it indicates some part of it, thus it is genus. And here one might misunderstand what it is for the genus to indicate a part of the essence. For if it is understood that the genus indicates a part in such a way that it does not indicate the whole essence of that of which it is predicated, this is a misunderstanding. Rather, it is said to indicate a part of the essence because it indicates the [whole] essence of the reality after the manner of matter, and consequently after the manner of a part, just as a difference indicates the whole essence after the manner of form. Thus do those explain the matter who deny any degree in forms. If it is predicated regarding some characteristic, either it is a substantial characteristic, and thus it is a difference, or some accidental characteristic--and this happens in two ways, either convertibly, and thus if it is a property, or no convertibly, and thus it is a [common] accident.

As regards the argument, “in however many ways” etc., that is however many meanings one

⁴⁵We should take this to mean not just that there are a great many universals, but that they cannot be reduced to any order or system, that there will always be some universal that escapes any classification we set up. Perhaps there are an infinite number of kinds of singulars, because imperfect singulars and monsters may always escape any classificatory net.

opposite has, the other has as well, etc. I grant that however many meanings one of these opposites has, namely “the universal,” “the singular” has the same number, and vice versa. But it is not necessary [on this account] that there be as many universals as there are singulars. Or it can be understood strictly concerning these that they are strictly and really opposed, but universals and singulars are not opposed in this way, since the universal is predicated of the singular insofar as it is the reality made subject; therefore, even though there are infinite singulars, it is not necessary that there be so many [kinds of] universals, but they will be as many as has been said.

Question 7

We ask about the remark that genus and species seem to be said in several ways.

And **it seems that genus and species ought not to be defined**, since if genus and species are said in several ways they are equivocal, but nothing equivocal is defined; therefore genus and species are not defined.

I reply that genus and species can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, they can be considered as they are equivocal, and thus they ought not to be defined, nor does Porphyry define them taken in this way, for he gives no definition that is common to every signification of genus. In the other way genus can be taken for just one of the things it signifies, and thus genus is not equivocal, and Porphyry defines genus taken in this way when he says that genus is what is predicated etc.

And from this it is obvious how to reply to the argument, for the argument does not lead to any conclusion except that genus as it is equivocal is not defined, and I grant this.

Question 8

We ask **about the remark that a father is a principle for something’s coming-to-be—why is it not said that the mother is a principle in the same way**, since the mother contributes to the coming-to-be just as the father does.

I reply that this is the cause, because the mother is materially the principle of coming-to-be, but the father is the principle as the efficient cause and formally. Since the name is taken from what is more formal, therefore the offspring is said to take its origin more from the father than the mother, and so the father is said to be the principle of its coming-to-be more so than the mother.

Question 9

We ask about the remark that species supposits for the genus.

And it seems that according to this the difference is the genus, because if the species supposits for the genus, and the species supposits for the difference; therefore the difference is the genus.

I reply that species supposits for the difference and the genus in different ways, since species supposits for the genus directly and in the line of categories, but the species supposits for the difference collaterally, and therefore the difference is not the genus.

Question 10

We ask about the second definition of genus, when it is said that genus is what is predicated of several things different in species.

And it seems, according to this, that species is a genus, since if genus is what is predicated of several things differing in species, species is also what is predicated of several things different in species. When we speak thus: “Man is a species,” “Cow is a species,” and so on, these differ in species, and so species is predicated of several things differing in species in this way. Therefore, it seems that species is genus.

I reply that genus is predicated in a different way of several things differing in species in their essence. Species is predicated of several things differing in species, but it is predicated of them accidentally and not in their essence, because this predication, “Man is a species,” is an accidental predication; and therefore species is not genus. Indeed, it can be proved in a similar way that an individual is a species, since it is predicated of several things differing in number; and one ought to respond in the same way to this.

Question 11

Next it is asked **whether place is a principle of coming to exist.**

And it is argued that it is not, since place and time are both accidents which come to a thing from without, but time is not a cause of coming to exist; therefore neither is place. That time is not a cause of coming to exist is clear, for the Philosopher says in *Physics* IV, that everything is made hot, and is destroyed, in time, and nothing new nor good is done in time.⁴⁶ Time, therefore is not a cause of coming to exist, and so neither is place.

Again, if place were a cause of coming to exist, it would be either a material cause, a formal cause, a final cause, or an efficient cause. Now it is not a cause in the way form or matter is, since form and matter are in the reality and of its essence, but place is outside the reality; therefore etc. Again, neither is it a final cause, since the end and the form coincide, but it is not the formal cause; therefore neither is it a final cause. Again, neither is it an efficient cause, for place is a quantity, as is apparent from the *Categories*,⁴⁷ and a quantity is not an efficient cause of anything, since it is something mathematical and mathematical neither act nor suffer action; therefore place is not an efficient cause.

On the other hand, it is argued that coming to exist comes to an end at being; therefore place is a principle preserving the reality in being, since it pertains to the form of place to contain and preserve; therefore place is a principle of a reality’s coming-to-be.

It must be noted that, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* II, a human being and the Sun bring a human being into existence differently, for the Sun is the principal agent for this bringing to exist, whereas human being is an instrumental agent.⁴⁸ The Sun is the principal agent since it is what brings to exist but cannot be brought to exist, whereas the human being is the instrumental agent, or what brings it to exist, since it is what brings to exist and is itself brought to exist. And therefore just as an instrumental agent does not act except in virtue of the principal agent, so neither does a human being act to bring something to exist except in virtue of a superior agencu, that of the Sun and the rest. And therefore the bringing to exist of a human being and of other superior things cannot be, unless it is by a power that has flowed in from superior bodies, but the power that has flowed in from superior bodies is not received in these inferior bodies unless it is by containing a mediating power. Therefore these inferior bodies do not act in bringing a human being or other animal into existence unless it is in virtue of some power they contain, and therefore the place contributes a great deal to the production of animals and other inferior bodies. And this is a sign that it is true that place is a principle of coming to exist, that lions in the second and third climate cannot bring other lions to exist, but in the others they can. Another sign is that certain plants bear fruit in one part of the Earth, but if they are planted in another they do not bear fruit. Therefore the power and disposition of the place contributes much to the coming to exist of animals and other inferior bodies.

From all this two arguments can be formed to show that metaphysically place the principle of coming to exist, by which the power of the principle agent that brings things to exist is received in every secondary agent, because the secondary agent does not bring anything to exist unless it is in virtue of the first. But place

⁴⁶Aristotle, *Physics* IV 12, 221a31-b3, where Aristotle’s point is that we only attribute decline and decay to time.

⁴⁷Aristotle, *Categories* 4.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Physics* II 2.

is what mediates, by which the power of the principle agent that brings things to exist is received in the secondary agent, by the mediation of which it flows into these inferior things, therefore etc.

Again, that is a principle of coming to exist of which the change provides the first capacity to bring into existence, but change of place provides the capacity to bring into existence, as is clear from what has been said; therefore etc.

And that place contributes much to coming to exist is clear from what Albert said, that everything born in the same place strives, as it were, to follow one law and one custom.⁴⁹ Now this would not be unless place contributed to it. Therefore place is the principle of coming to exist and of conservation in existence.

But it must also be noted that place has a two-fold nature, namely qualitative and quantitative. Though its qualitative nature it brings into existence and conserves, and through its quantitative nature it contains, so that place is the principle of coming to exist not insofar as it is quantity, but insofar as a power flowing from a celestial body is received in place, which virtue is suited by nature to contribute to the coming to exist and conservation of a body in that place. And therefore this place in the middle where we are is the principle of human beings and the other animals, not as it contains them abstractly, but as there flows into it a power from a celestial body, which is suited by nature to contribute to the coming to exist of men and other inferior bodies.

As for the arguments to the contrary, as for the first, when it is argued, “time and place etc.,” I reply that time is not a *per se* principle of coming to exist, but rather it is *per se* a principle of destruction, since time is the number of motion, and in number is the successive destruction of the parts, and therefore time is more the cause of destruction than of coming to exist, since it separates a reality from the condition in which it once was. Now place is not the measure or number of motion, but is the measure of a reality having in itself a certain power, and through this it is the measure of a reality, and there is received in it from a celestial body another power to bring into existence and to conserve in existence, and through this power flowing into it it is a principle of coming to exist, even though time is not a cause of coming to exist.

As for the other, when it is argued, “if place were a cause etc.,” I reply that place conveys two things, namely containment and conservation. Hence I hold that speaking of place in the first way, it is not a material cause, nor is it a formal cause, nor efficient, as a single argument proves, since, as such, it is quantity. Nor is it a final cause, and this since it is not a formal cause. But speaking of place as it has a power to conserve that has flowed into it from a celestial body, thus it can be called, in a way, an efficient cause.

Question 12

Next it is asked about the part, “Genus is said in a three-fold way,” in which the author gives a definition of logical genus, saying, “Genus is what is predicated etc.” And it is asked **whether that which is defined is a reality or an intention.**

And it is argued that it is not an intention, since that is defined which is predicated of many differing in species. But intention is not predicated of many differing in species, for we do not say that a human being is a genus, or a donkey is a genus, by predicating an intention of a reality. Therefore etc.

Again, animal is defined here, but animal is not an intention, therefore an intention is not defined here. The major premise is clear, since the author says in the text that genus is what is predicated of many, etc., for instance, animal, and therefore animal is what is defined.

On the other hand, it is argued, only that is defined here which falls under the consideration of the logician, but only intention falls under the consideration of the logician; therefore only intention is defined here.

It must be understood here that a reality is not defined here absolutely, since it is said that genus is what is predicated etc. And the reason for this is that what is defined here is genus, but “genus” does not name a reality absolutely, but it names a reality as it has a relation and order to *supposita*. Therefore Albert says

⁴⁹Albertus Magnus, *Questiones super De animalibus* VIII, qu. 5-9; Intro., I qu. 21.

that the name “genus” is a relative name, or one concerning the order of superior to inferior.⁵⁰ Then it is argued thus: that which is defined here is genus, but genus does not name a reality absolutely, but a reality as it has a relation to *supposita*; therefore etc. And this is explained thus: with whatever the defined agrees the definition also agrees, since definition and defined are convertible. But a reality taken absolutely, for instance, animal, agrees with its *supposita*. Therefore its definition also agrees with its *supposita*. If, therefore, that which is defined here were an absolute reality, then it would be obvious that this definition would agree with all its *supposita*, and so every *suppositum* would be predicable of many differing in species; but this is not true; therefore a reality taken absolutely is not what is defined here.

Again, neither is a reality as it is under an intention defined. The proof is because a reality as it is under the intention of genus only has being in the soul, but what has being only in the soul is separated from particulars. From this it is argued that a reality as it is under an intention is not that which is predicable of many *supposita*, because it is separated from them. But a reality as it is under an intention is separated from *supposita* or from singulars, and has being in the soul. Therefore etc. Therefore a reality as it is under an intention is not defined here.

It must be held, then, that only the intention is what is principally defined here, although this is not what is usually said. To make this evident it must be considered that there is a difference between the definition of substances and the definition of accidents, since the definition of substances is not given through something added, but the definition of an accident is given through something added, because it is given through the subject, that is, a reality in another category. And the reason why the definition of accidents is given through something added is that it is a definition of true being outside the soul, and therefore whatever it is on which something depends in its true being outside the soul, it depends on that in its definition, but an accident depends on its subject in its true being outside the soul, hence accidents are not beings unless they are beings of a being, and therefore it depends on its subject in its definition. Now the intention of genus is something founded on a reality only through the operation of the intellect, since it is only the intellect that makes second intentions, so that the intention of genus is in two things as subject, namely in the reality understood, and in the intellect, and therefore it is defined through both.

Since then it is sad that genus is what is predicated of several different species as regards what it is, definition must be explicated thus: Genus is a certain intention caused by the intellect and applicable to a reality, which is predicated of several things differing in species as regards what it is. Now Porphyry, to be brief, does not set out all of these conditions, that is, that the genus is an intention applicable to animal, that animal indeed is predicated of several things differing in species etc. The intention of genus, as is of each accident, is defined through something formal and something material, through something formal, as it is an intention caused by the intellect, and through something material, as it is a reality predicable of several etc., so that what is placed first in its definition is more formal, and what comes after is more material, in contrast with the definition of substance.

But perhaps someone will ask, “this reality which is predicated of several etc., either it itself is predicated of several, according to the being it has in the soul, or according to the being it has in *supposita*; but not according to the being it has in the soul, as is apparent since it is separated from its *supposita* according to that being, and nothing separated from something is predicate of it; nor is it predicated according to the being that it has in *supposita*, as is apparent since then every *suppositum* would be predicable of several things.

Again, to be predicated is a certain act of reason, therefore it does not agree with a reality according to the being it has in *supposita*. I reply to this that animal, which is predicated of several etc., has being both in the *supposita*, and in the soul. It has being in the *supposita* because otherwise it would not be predicated of them by a predication saying “this is this.” Another that this predicated thus of something is not separated from it. Again, animal, which is predicated of several etc., has being in the soul. The proof is that animal is not predicated of many differing etc., unless it is as it is one in many, but every unity is in the soul, therefore animal which is predicated is in the soul.

⁵⁰Albertus Magnus, *Logica, Liber de praedicabilibus*, Tracate III, Chapter 2.

But you will ask next, whether animal, according to the being it has in the soul, is predicated of several things differing etc. I reply to this that animal is not predicated of several etc. according to the being it has in the soul, and this absolutely, but as it has being in the soul and the soul related the nature of animal to *supposita*. Hence when the intellect considers actually the nature of animal, as this has being in *supposita*, and it considers the nature of animal as this being is one, and not made diverse in the *supposita* it actually exists in, the formula is assigned to it of predication of several differing in species, and it founds the intention of the genus on these, and he says that such a nature is predicable of several differing in species as regards what it is. Thus, the nature of animal is that which is predicated of several etc., and the intention of genus is founded on that nature. And so we will hold as Porphyry does that a genus is an intention caused by intellect and applicable to a reality, which is predicated of several things differing in species, as regards what they are.

As to the arguments on the other hand, to the first, when it is argued, “that is defined which is predicated of many etc.,” I reply that this is not true. Indeed, that which is defined here is an intention caused by the intellect, etc. And you will say that the intention of the genus is not predicated. It is true that it is not predicated, but it is applicable to a reality which is predicated in this way. So if we take it for the reality it is not defined here, as was said before.

As to the other, when it is argued, “animal is that which is defined here, etc.,” I reply that when Porphyry says that “genus is that which is predicated etc.,” it is said that the definition must be explicated, thus, “that genus is the intention caused etc.,” and such a reality is an animal. Therefore the intention of genus belongs to it.

Question 13

Next it is asked whether the genus is the principle of its species, as the author says in the text.

And it is argued that it is not, for the principle and that of which it is the principle differ through their essence in species, therefore etc. The major is clear since a cause is that upon which another follows, and therefore the effect is essentially different from its cause. The minor is also clear, since then the genus would not be predicated of its species *per se*, therefore etc.

Again, a principle is not predicated of that of which it is the principle, but genus is predicated of species; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued, everything is defined through its principles; but a species is defined through its genus and difference; therefore genus and difference are the principles of species, and thus genus will be a principle of its species.

The Philosopher distinguishes different senses of principle in *Metaphysics* II.⁵¹ Principle is two-fold, namely the principle of a reality and the principle of a cognition. Speaking of the principle of a reality we can say that matter and form are the principles of a species, and in this way substance is in a different manner the principle of accident, so that . . . the principle of a cognition⁵² is that upon which it depends as far as its cognition is concerned, and in this way accidents are in a way principles of substances, for accidents contribute a great deal to cognizing what it is. Speaking of principle in the first way genus is not a principle of its species, since when something is constituted from real principles it is different in essence from each of them. But it is not other in essence from its genus, for the same essence is conveyed by both. Therefore one cannot say truly that genus is a principle of species speaking of a real principle.

Again, this is explained thus: If a genus were a real principle, it would be either matter or form, or an end, or an efficient cause. It is not an end or efficient cause, since these are extrinsic to the reality, but a genus is not something extrinsic to its species, since the essence of a genus is not included in the essence of its species.

⁵¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V 1 is probably intended.

⁵²Emending *rei*, of a reality, to *cognitionis*, of a cognition. There seems to be something wrong in this sentence, perhaps something has dropped out of the text where I indicate the ellipsis.

Therefore it is not a principle as an end or efficient cause. Again, it is not a principle of its species as form or matter, since matter is not predicated of that of which it is matter by a predication indicating “this is this,”⁵³ nor as form, but genus is predicated of species; therefore it is neither matter nor form. Since genus is none of these, genus will not be a real principle of its species.

But speaking of a principle of cognition, in this way the genus is a principle of its species. That it is clear, since those things which are prior according to intellect are principles for cognizing the posterior. Now the more universal are prior according to intellect to the less universal, and this is what the Philosopher says in *Physics* I, “The way from the more universal to the less universal is innate to us,” therefore the more universal are the principles for cognizing the less universal. But genus is related to species as the more universal to the less universal, therefore etc.

From this it is clear that a species is not constituted from genus and difference as from different essences, but as it is established as one concept from different concepts. And because of this, in the definition which is given through genus and difference, there is not an aggregation of several realities, but of several concepts, since in one and the same reality, according to different things that appear, the formula of the genus and the formula of the difference is founded. For we say that a man reasons and senses, and to sense is itself common to all animals, but not reasoning. And therefore the concept of the rational is a determining concept, and the concept of animal is a concept of something undetermined, and from these two concepts a determinate concept is formed, namely the concept of man, and we say that man is rational animal.

To the arguments on the other hand, it is replied to the first, when it is argued⁵⁴ “that the principle and that of which it is the principle differ” etc., that this is true of a real principle. And when you say that “genus does not differ” etc., I reply that this is true, and because of this I grant that it is not a real principle of the species, but a principle according to reason, and such a principle does not differ in essence from that of which it is the principle.

To the other, in the same way, when it is argued “a principle is not predicated of that of which it is the principle,” I reply that this is true of a real principle, and since genus is not a real principle, but only a principle according to reason, it can certainly be predicated of that of which it is the principle.

Question 14

Next it is asked: The species is placed immediately after the genus, but it seems that the difference must be placed before the species, since just as genus is a principle of species, so also difference. Therefore as the treatise concerning genus comes before it, so the treatise concerning difference must come before species.

To this Boëthius answers that since genus and species are [genus and species] relative [to one another], immediately after genus he discusses species. Avicenna answers differently, holding that the genus is outside the formula of the difference, but is not outside the formula of the species, but included in its formula. Therefore, because the difference between genus and species is less than that between genus and difference, immediately after the treatise on genus he treats of species.

Question 15

It is asked about what he says, namely that species is what is placed under its assigned genus.

And it is argued that the individual is the species, for if species is what is placed under its assigned genus, and the individual is what is placed under its assigned genus, then the individual is the species.

It is to be replied that species and individual are under the assigned genus in different ways, since species is under its genus immediately and in the line of categories, whereas the individual is under the genus

⁵³Rather, it is predicated obliquely, “this is <the matter> of this.”

⁵⁴Emending *auquitur* to *arguitur*.

with species between them, and is outside the line of categories.

Question 16

It is asked about what he says, namely that genus falls in the formula of species, and vice versa.⁵⁵ For it seems from this that the same is both prior to and posterior to itself essentially and without qualification. For if genus falls in the definition of species, genus is without qualification prior to species, since that which falls in formula of another is prior to it. And if again species falls in the definition of genus, genus is without qualification posterior to species, and species is without qualification prior to genus. Therefore the same, that is, the same genus as well as the same species, is indifferently prior without qualification and posterior without qualification to itself.

I reply to this that something can fall in the formula of another in two ways, either as it indicates its essence, or as the respect in which it is determined (*sicut terminans eius respectum*).⁵⁶ Hence, what falls in the formula of another in the first way is without qualification prior to it, but genus and species, as they are understood here, do not fall under another's formula in this way, but in the second way, namely as genus is determined [as a genus] in respect of a species, and as species is determined [as a species] in respect of a genus.

And through this it is clear how to reply to the argument. The argument assumes that the genus falls here in the definition of the species, and vice versa, as something indicating its essence, and not as something indicating the respect in which it is determined, which is false.

Question 17

Someone might also have a doubt concerning what he says, namely that "some genus is subaltern," and it seems that a [contradictory] opposite is adjoined (*oppositum in adiecto*), since genus indicates something under a formula of being above another; but subaltern indicates something under a formula of being under another, and being under another and being above another are opposites. Therefore "subaltern genus" includes [contradictory] opposites.

I reply that "genus" and "subaltern" are not taken in respect of the same thing, since that is said to be genus in respect of what is below it, and subaltern in respect of what is above it. And this is not absurd, nor does it include [contradictory] opposites, since something one and the same might be superior and inferior in respect of different things. But nothing other than this is conveyed in what is said. Therefore saying "subaltern" in this way is not adjoining its [contradictory] opposite.

Question 18

It seems next that there is not anything between the most general and the most specific, since the middle is caused by the extremes. But if something is placed in the middle between the most general and the most specific, it cannot be caused by its extremes. For nothing is caused by the most general,⁵⁷ since it is indefinite, even though (*cum*) whatever is caused is caused by something posterior to it, and nothing is posterior

⁵⁵That is, genus is defined as a universal which has species falling under it, and species is defined as a universal falling under some broader genus. Thus, as Simon points out in his reply, genus and species, as understood here, are relative terms and correlative to one another, not quidditative or absolute terms.

⁵⁶Species in the definition of genus indicates the respect in which a genus is determined as a genus, that is, it is a genus of (relative to) a given species. Similarly a species is a species inasmuch as it is of a given genus. Species and genus, therefore, are not absolute or quidditative terms, for they do not indicate a thing's quiddity as such, but only a certain relation in which what they name stands to another thing. This is true however much it may turn out that the relation is a relation between quiddities.

⁵⁷Emending *quia specialissimus* in the manuscript to *generalissimus*.

to what is most specific.⁵⁸ Therefore, as it seems, there will not be anything between the most general and the most specific.

I reply that “middle” is two-fold, namely the middle according to nature and the middle according to position. Hence I reply that the middle according to nature is caused by the extremes. Of this sort is the dark, which is in between white and black. But the middle according to position is not caused by its extremes, and such is the middle genus of which we speak in the matter at hand.

Question 19

There is a doubt concerning what he says, that being is not a genus in relation to substance. For it seems that it is its genus. For it follows, a substance is and therefore a being is, and therefore being is above substance. Now either the genus is above it as a genus, or as a species. It is not above it as a species, since it is most common. Therefore it will be the genus.

I reply that it does not follow in virtue of the form that “a substance is, therefore a being is.” This is because being, taken as such per se, is the same as substance, and so it does not follow in virtue of the form, because as it is being it is not above substance. So it is not necessary that it be the genus. This being said, it suffices for the present.

Question 20

The author says in the text that a genus contains a multiplicity of species which are under it, in which he seems to suggest that genus requires a multitude of species.

And **it is argued that** it does not, since as species is related to individual, so is genus related to species, for in both there is a comparison of the whole of a universal to a part subject to it. But the nature of a species does not require a multitude of individuals. For instance, the sun and moon and such are species, and yet they do not have many individuals below them. Therefore etc.

Again, the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics V* that there is a difference between a universal whole and an integral whole. An integral whole is divisible into parts, of which none is the whole itself, just as no part of a house is a house. But a universal whole is divisible into parts, of which each is itself its whole. For instance, human being is divided into Socrates and Plato, and in whichever of these man is preserved as a whole. From this I argue: A universal whole is preserved sufficiently in each of its parts, but a genus in respect of its species is a universal whole, and therefore genus is sufficiently preserved in each species.

On the other hand, it is argued that it belongs to the formula of the whole to have several parts, but a genus is related to its species as a whole to parts, and therefore it belongs to the formula of genus to have several species.

It must be noticed here that genus can be considered in two ways, either as to its essence or as to its being. If it is considered as to its essence, thus it does not require a multitude of species, indeed, what is more, not any species is included in the essence of a genus, neither one nor many. The proof is because genus is contracted to its species through opposing differences. Now a difference is outside the formula of the essence of a genus, since as Avicenna says, genus is related to differences as matter to form and subject to accident. Now we know that in the essence of its matter the form is not included, nor is an accident included in the

⁵⁸The most general universal is being, and being is so indefinite that it cannot be identified as the cause of anything. The point seems to be that Aristotle does not allow that being is the highest genus, but rather identifies the categories, substance, relation and so on, as the highest genera. So being does not enter into anything's definition. On the other hand, the most specific cannot be identified as a cause either, for the effect is posterior to the cause, and the most specific is the most posterior, for everything more general to which it is related is prior to it. So the presence of animal does not cause there to be life, but rather the presence of life causes there to be an animal. (Roughly, perhaps, one cannot expand animal to life, but contracts the living to animal. Living things are not a kind of animal, rather animal is a kind of living thing, and so animal arises from the living, not vice versa.) Here the causal relation would have to be between various species and genera, not particulars.

formula of its subject. Therefore difference is not included in the formula of a genus, but genus is contracted to species through difference. Therefore no species is included in the essential formula of a genus.

But you will ask: the essence of a genus is nothing other than the essence of its species. How it then, that in the essence of a genus there is not included any species? For it seems that some⁵⁹ must be included, since the essence of a genus is nothing other than its species.

It must be noticed here that the contrariety which is in a genus is not a contrariety according to the reality, but only according to the concept. For genus does not signify one real nature in different species, but only one thing according to formula or concept. It is not possible that some one quiddity be made several through different quiddities. This is not possible because then one thing essentially would be several essentially. Now if genus signified one real nature in different species, one quiddity would be divided into several quiddities, because that which is signified by the name of the genus is divided into several species through different differences. What is left, although this is impossible, is that the genus does not signify one quiddity.

I reply then that a genus does not signify one quiddity, but signifies different quiddities of different species, such that they come under some common concept in the intellect, and this common concept is taken from something common appearing in the reality. By the operation of sensing, which appears in a human being and in a donkey and in a cow and many others, it elicits a concept understanding one common formula, under which different species are signified through the name of the genus. I hold, therefore, that a genus signifies several quiddities in accord with some one common formula, which is found in its different species. I argue from this that what pertains to the essence of a genus is something one according to formula, which is found in things differing in species. Now no species, whether one or several, considered in its proper nature can be found in things different in species, therefore no species whether one or several is included in the formula of a genus, and therefore it happens to animal that it is human being, and therefore this predication is an accidental predication, “the animal is a man.” Then the genus considered as to its essence does not require a multitude of species. But if it is considered as regards its being, thus it can be considered in two ways, either as regards the being it has in the soul, or as regards the being it has in the external reality. If it is considered as regards the being that it has in the soul, thus I hold that genus does not require a multitude of species. If it is considered as regards the essence of the genus a multitude of species is not required, nor in relation to its essential concept, because it is the same disposition of the reality in being and in truth. If it is considered as regards the being it has in an external reality, thus it requires several species, but only potentially. For genus is related to differences as a subject is to its two contraries. But the subject actually existing under one contrary is in potency to the other. Similarly it is necessary to assume that a genus actually informed by one difference is in potency to being informed by the other, and differences are constitutive of species, therefore a genus actually existing under one species potentially exists under another.

Again, it is clear from another argument, because every effect is virtually in its cause. A difference is a cause of its species, namely the formal cause, and therefore the species is virtually in the difference. Just as the genus, then, contains its differences, so we can say that it contains its species. Now genus alone, as regards its being, contains several differences potentially, as Porphyry says,⁶⁰ therefore it contains these species only potentially. So it appears that genus, considered as regards its essence, does not require a multitude of species, nor does it require such a multitude for its being understood. But inasmuch as it is outside the soul it requires a multitude of species potentially.

In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued, “as species is related to individual,” etc., the similitude is in respect of what it is (*ad quid*), since as the species is predicated of the individual in its what-it-is, so the genus is predicated of the species, and in both there is a comparison of the whole universal

⁵⁹Emending *alia* to *aliqua*.

⁶⁰Porphyry, *Isagoge* 125C.

to a subjunctive part.⁶¹ But there is a dissimilitude here, because the genus descends to the species through contrary differences, but species does not descend to individuals through contrary differences. And since this is so, when, then, it exists actually under one difference, it is necessary that it be potentially under another; and since the difference constitutes the species, the existing genus under one species is necessarily potentially under the other, and therefore it necessarily requires several species potentially. But the species is not divided into individuals through opposite differences, but only through the division of matter, and therefore a species does not necessarily require a multitude of individuals either actually or potentially.

As to the other, when it is argued, “the whole universal” etc., I reply that this is true, and I grant the whole argument, because it does not follow (*convenit*) unless the genus does not require a multitude of species in actuality. For if it is assumed that there is no animal except human being, if animal is, human being is, and so the genus can be preserved in a unique existing species.⁶²

Question 21

Next it is asked whether a genus is predicated of its species.

And it is argued that it is not, since matter is not predicated of that of which it is the matter, but its genus is the matter of a species, and difference its form, therefore etc.

Again, the part is not predicated of the whole. Now the genus is part of the species, therefore etc.

It must be replied that the genus is predicated of the species both in respect of what it is, because for something to be predicated of another in respect of what it is nothing is required except that it indicate the whole essence of which it is predicated under a less determinate formula. I say “under a less determinate formula,” because otherwise the higher would not be predicated of the lower. But the genus indicates the whole essence of the species under a less determinate formula. Since it falls under the formula of the other indicating what it is, it indicates its essence, but the genus falls under the formula of the species indicating what it is, therefore etc.

Again, he says that it is the whole essence of the species not because it is an aggregate of several realities in the definition, but of several concepts (*intellectuum*), so that the genus is essentially predicated of the species.

Again, this is explained in another way, for as Albert says,⁶³ predicating is an act of reason, putting together and ordering predicables to one another, and therefore what can be ordered in a category as higher and lower can be predicate one of the other so that the higher is predicated of the lower. But genera and species are related thus in a category, because the genus is above the species and the species is under the genus. Therefore the genus will be predicated of the species as regards what it is, as was said. But how the genus is predicated of the species, that is, whether it is as it is common or in some other way, remains to be seen.

In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued “matter is not predicated” etc., I reply that this is true of matter strictly speaking, but the genus is not matter strictly speaking, but only matter insofar as the difference indicates it as it determines it, while the genus indicates it as a determinable and in the material mode. Indeed, the genus, considered in the material mode, is only predicated of the species, because whatever names the species names the whole but under a less determinate formula.

As for the other, when it is argued, “the part is not predicated of the whole,” I reply that part is three-fold, namely quantitative part, essential part, and part according to reason. Speaking of the quantitative part, it is true that the part is not predicated of the whole, at least in the abstract, for this is not true, “A man

⁶¹A subjunctive part, it appears, is the sort of part that appears under a whole through the addition (subjoining) of something to that whole to make up the part, so that the individual has a particular matter, perhaps, added to the quiddity, and the genus has a difference.

⁶²The point is that the argument begs the question.

⁶³Albert the Great, *Logica, De praedicabilibus*, Tract 4, Chapter 6.

is his hand or foot.” But an essential part is not predicated of the whole, because matter is part of the whole and this is not true, “a human being is its matter.” But a part according to reason is indeed predicated of the whole, and genus in relation to its species is such a part.

Question 22

For the understanding then of what has been said, **next it can be asked** concerning the predication of the genus, namely, whether the genus taken in its commonness can be predicated of the species, which is to ask whether animal taken in its commonness can be predicated of human being.

And it is argued that it cannot, because if animal taken in its commonness is predicated of human being, then whatever is not contradictory to animal taken in its commonness is not repugnant to human being. But donkey is not contradictory to animal taken in its commonness. Therefore donkey is not contradictory to human being, and therefore this will be true, “a donkey is a human being.”

Again, in every true affirmative predication the predicate is the same in number with the subject. But animal taken in its commonness is not the same in number with human being. Therefore etc. The major is obvious. The minor is explained, since same in number is said in three ways, as *Topics I* [6] explains, namely the same in definition, property and accident. Now it is plain that animal taken in its commonness is not a property of human being, nor its accident, nor its definition. Proof: definition is convertible with the defined, but animal taken in its commonness is not convertible with human being; therefore, it is not its definition.

On the other hand, it is argued that nothing that is not taken in its commonness is predicated of human being as its genus, therefore animal is taken in its commonness there.

I reply to this that animal taken in its commonness is predicated of human being, for otherwise, in predicating animal of human being genus would not be predicated of species, and we supposed the opposite.

But it must be noticed that two things are conveyed by the name genus, namely the intention of the genus and the thing subject to that intention. Now when we say that genus is predicated of species, this is not to be understood of the intention of genus, since the intention of genus is not predicated of species. The proof of this that whatever is predicated of another is in it, but the intention of genus is not in the species, therefore the intention of genus is not predicated of species. So when we say genus is predicated of species, this is not to be understood concerning the intention, but it is to be understood concerning the reality subject to the intention. So when we say, “Human being is an animal,” here the genus is predicated of the species because some nature is predicated here, to which the intention of the genus can be applied. Therefore the reality subject to the intention is predicated.

But is the reality predicated as it is under the intention?

I reply that it is not, and this is explained from three things. First, that predicates a term which signifies it, and nothing else. Now a term signifies what is expressed by its definition, for the formula of which the name is a sign is its definition, as is said in book IV of the *Metaphysics* [ch. 4]. And therefore that predicates a term which indicates its definition. Now the definition of animal is ‘animated sensible substance,’ if therefore that and only that is predicated that the definition of animal indicates, the definition of animal is what indicates the nature of animal alone. Therefore the nature of animal alone is predicated when we say here, “a human being is an animal.” But the composite of the reality and intention is not predicated, nor the intention, but the reality alone. And to say the reality as it is under the intention is predicated is to say the intention is predicated. For instance, to say that a human being that is white dazzles is to say that white dazzles.

And this is more especially clear, because the reality as it is under that intention is not predicated, since the intention of the genus is a certain commonness, and nothing such as that is in animal, except as animal is understood. But this predication is accidental, “a human being is an animal as it is understood,” indeed even more so is this accidental, “a human being is an animal, as it falls under an intention.” But this is per se, “a human being is an animal,” as book I of the *Posterior Analytics* has it. Therefore animal is not predicated of human being as it falls under an intention.

In the third place, it is explained thus: Animal is not predicated of human being under that formula

which pertains to the difference between human being and animal, for otherwise this would not be a fallacy of accident: Animal is a genus, human being is an animal, therefore human being is a genus. But the intention of the genus belongs to the difference between human being and animal. Therefore animal is not predicated of human being as animal is received under the intention of genus. The reality then is not predicated as it is under the intention of the genus, but it is true that the reality that is under the intention of the genus is predicated.

But perhaps someone will say, “we claim that that animal that it signifies, it signifies indeterminately, and what signifies something indeterminately signifies it as common. Therefore that animal which it signifies it signifies as common, but the same signifies and predicates, therefore it predicates something as common, or, as it is genus. We shall say then that a human being is an animal as it is genus and as it is common.” When it is said that animal signifies something indeterminately, I do not understand that this indetermination falls in what is signified by animal, or in the formula of its signifying, which must belong to it per se, since that which agrees with some one thing in itself agrees with each participant in its nature. If, then, being indeterminate as regards different species agrees with animal in itself, so that animal is signified, then being indeterminate as regards different species coincides with each animal, and so with human being, which is false.

Since then this indetermination is not of its signification, nor of the mode of signifying, indeed that animal signifies as such is removed from [*absolutum ab*] every accident both real and intentional. Indeed, it signifies only what its definition indicates, and predicates that alone.

And you will say, “if these things are true, why is it that we say this, that animal signifies something indeterminate?”

I reply that this must be understood thus: That animal signifies something which is in itself determinate. This also is clear, a human being is an animal, which is not in itself determinate, but determinate through another, since it is determinate through a difference, and this is only because a human being is a rational animal.

But then someone might say, “to be predicated is an action of reason and the intellect, therefore, given that someone says animal is predicated of human being, he says it is something as it is grasped by reason. But as it is grasped by reason the intention of genus belongs to it. Therefore animal is predicated as it is under the intention of genus.”

I reply to this that it is true that predication is an action of reason. If we were to set aside the concept, nothing would be predicated. Now if the concept were set aside, a human being would still be an animal, but it is not because of this that animal is predicated of human being. Hence it is very different⁶⁴ to say this is predicated of that, and this is that. For we say that the genus is predicated of the species, but we do not say this is true, “the species is the genus.”

And when you say next that, when animal is predicated of human being it is something grasped by reason, this is true, but it does not follow, “it is not predicated of human being except when it is grasped by reason, therefore it is predicated of it under the formula.” This does not follow, but it is true that if there were no concept animal would be predicated of human being, and yet it is not predicated of human being under that formula. Indeed, this is false, “animal as predicable is predicated of human being.” For instance, it does not follow, “animal is not predicated of human being unless it is grasped by reason, therefore it is predicated under that formula [i.e. under the formula, ‘grasped by reason’].” For Socrates does not generate Plato, unless he is generated by another, but he does not generate another under that formula by which he is generated by another. In the same way, in the matter at hand it is not predicated of a reality unless it is grasped by an intellect, and still it is not predicated under that formula [i.e. under the formula, ‘grasped by the intellect’]. Thus it appears what it is that is predicated in “a human being is an animal,” since what is predicated is the nature and quiddity of an animal conveyed through its definition, and this nature and quiddity is such that the intellect can find the intention of the genus upon it. So insofar as we predicate animal of human being we indicate that the genus is predicated of the species.

As for the arguments, concerning the first, when it is argued “if animal taken in its commonness

⁶⁴I emend *reffert* p.44 line 5 to *differt*.

is predicated of human being, then whatever is not contradictory to animal taken” etc., I reply that animal taken in its commonness indicates all of what is found in different species, for instance in human being, and in donkey—nonetheless, it indicates it as human being and donkey and the other species do not differ from one another. Now human being indicates the same thing, but under a formula by which human being differs from donkey. Therefore even though a donkey is not contradictory to animal taken in its commonness, still human being is contradictory to donkey, and therefore it does not follow, if an animal taken in its commonness is not contradictory to donkey, that donkey is not contradictory to human being.

As for the other argument, when it is argued “in an affirmative proposition” etc., I grant this. And when you say, “animal taken” etc., I reply that the animal taken in its commonness is the same in number with the human being. And to the proof I reply that the animal is not a property of a human being, nor an accident, nor even its definition, although it pertains to its definition, and it makes one in number with it and this by numerosity of essence.

Question 23

There is a doubt concerning what he says in the chapter on difference, that one kind of difference is common, one proper, and one more proper. For it seems to be a conjunction of opposites to say “common difference,” since “difference” indicates lack of agreement and “common” agreement. Therefore to say thus “common difference” is to say “disagreement agreement” or “agreeing [disagreement].”

It must be replied to this that the author does not understand that it is a common difference because it is in it in common and agrees, but because commonly speaking they say something differs from another. But Or it can be said that the word “difference” and the word “common” are understood in different respects, and thus there is no conjunction of opposites.

Question 24

There is a doubt concerning what he says, namely that difference is not per se susceptible to more and less. For it seems that this is false, since one human being is more understanding than another, and so it seems, more rational, since he would reason concerning more things. And so it seems that rational, which is a difference per se, is susceptible to more and less.

Avicenna says that form, from which difference is taken, in itself per se can be considered in three ways, either in itself, or as it is a principle of some operation. Hence not in the first way, nor in the second does is form susceptible to more and less, and so neither is difference, which is taken from it considered as such. If it be considered as a principle some operation, thus it can be further considered in two different ways, because insofar as it is from itself that form neither becomes more intense nor more remiss, but if it is considered as regards its related abilities that are in the subject of which the form is the perfection, thus form is susceptible of more and less, and consequently a difference taken from it is too, considered thus. For example, a substantial form in itself is neither more intense nor more remiss, but, because there is more ability in me for reasoning than in someone else, thus the form is more intense and remiss, and so also the difference, which is taken from the form considered in the same way. And it is the same concerning the ability to laugh, because this, in someone in whom the ability to laugh inheres more [i.e. is more given to laughter?], is more an ability to laugh. Hence Albert the Great says that those who are more able to wonder, are more, laugh more, for laughter comes from a certain delight concerning something wondrous according to Albert.

Question 25

There is a doubt when he says that Socrates as a boy differs from himself as an old man. For it can be

proved from this that someone is at the same time an old man and a boy. And I argue thus: Every relation⁶⁵ needs the terms it relates at the same time. If then this is true, Socrates as an old man differs from him as a boy, since difference is a certain relation, therefore it needs the terms it relates at the same time. Therefore Socrates will be a boy and an old man at the same time.

I reply to this that relatives are at the same time as far as being related goes, and so the terms and the difference are at the same time, and since this differs from that, that also differs from this. And in this way a boy and an old man are at the same time. But they are not so according to actual existence, and so it is not necessary that someone be at the same time both an old man and a boy, so that he actually exists at the same time as an old man and a boy. And it is in this way that what is said in *De interpretatione* must be understood, that relatives are at the same time, because they are at the same time according to being related, not according to the being of actual existence. For it is not necessary that the terms be at the same time as far as actual existence is concerned. And so it does not follow in what is proposed, that “Socrates as a boy differs from himself as an old man, therefore Socrates is both an old man and a boy at the same time,” because difference is a certain relation, and it does follow, “therefore, since Socrates as a boy differs from Socrates as an old man, immediately (*statim*) Socrates as an old man differs from Socrates as a boy,” and so the terms are the same insofar as they are related.

Question 26

About the chapter on species, three things are asked in order, and first it is asked whether the species requires a multitude of supposita.

And it seems that a species requires a multitude of supposita, because that is required for the form (*ratio*) of a universal. Now a multitude of supposita are required for the form of a universal, because, as the Philosopher says, a universal is one in many and of many. Again, Porphyry—it is suited to be predicated of many. Again, Themistius says in *On De anima* I that a universal is a certain concept without a substance (*sine ipostasi*) of a mere (*tenui*) similitude collected from singulars. Therefore it appears that a multitude of supposita is required for the nature of a universal, and consequently for the nature of a species.

Again, that is required for the nature of a species which is placed in the definition of the species, but a multitude of supposita is placed in the definition of species. For Porphyry says that species is what is predicated as regard what it is of many that differ in number, therefore etc.

It is argued on the other hand, the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VII⁶⁶ that sun and moon are universals, and if the definition applies to them, that will be the definition of a universal. But the sun and the moon do not require a multitude of supposita, because there is only one sun, and one moon. Therefore etc.

It must be replied regarding this that the nature of a species does not require a multitude of supposita, neither in actuality nor potentially. The explanation of this is that if the nature of a species required a multitude of supposita in actuality, either it will require a multitude of supposita due to its essence, or due to its being. Not due to its essence, since there is not any individual included in the essence of a species, not one, nor many, as this is not in the nature of a genus. The proof of this is that, if Socrates were included in being a human being, then if there were any human beings, there would be Socrates, but this is absurd. Again, not due to its being, because that the being of which can be preserved in a single individual does not require a multitude of individuals for its being; but the being and nature of a species can be sufficiently preserved in a single individual, because the whole nature of human being is preserved in Socrates, and also wholly in Plato. For this is the nature of a⁶⁷ universal, that it be found in any one of its supposita as a whole. Therefore the

⁶⁵The edition has *actio*, but *relatio* seems demanded by the argument, unless we can conceive *relatio* as a kind of *actio*.

⁶⁶Chapter 15.

⁶⁷The edition has “of a whole universal”.

nature of a species does not require a multitude of supposita actually, nor potentially, because the nature of the species is found in higher bodies,⁶⁸ and yet the multiplication of individuals under one species is not possible there.

And what is the reason why a multitude of supposita is found in these lower bodies? I hold that it is this, that all the matter belonging to one species is not found in a single individual. Because outside Socrates⁶⁹ there is found other matter, which is perfectible by the form of human being, and similarly, outside Plato, and therefore a multitude of individuals occurs in the species of human being. But in higher bodies, all of the matter belonging to a species is found in one individual, for which reason a potential multitude of individuals is not found there, since every potentiality must be reduced to actuality [in the higher spheres] it would happen that sometimes there would be several individuals in actuality; and there would actually be several individuals. Because a perpetual thing being does not differ from possibility, this we do not see. Therefore in higher things there is no multitude potentially, which is the reason why all of the matter of a single species is found in one individual. I hold that this is because it is closer to that which is truly one, therefore all the matter of one species is in one individual, which remains eternally according to the Philosopher. Now although in higher things a multitude of individuals is not found potentially, still there is a multitude of supposita according to aptitude, because it is not contrary to the form of the sun that there be many suns, since the form is not individuated from itself.

On the other hand, it seems that there is a contradiction in what was said. For it was said that in higher things a multitude of supposita is not found potentially, and it was said that a multitude is found there according to aptitude. These things do not seem to be possible at the same time, because potentiality and aptitude seem to be the same thing.

I reply that potentiality and aptitude are not the same thing, because potentiality by its formula is reducible to actuality, but aptitude, according to its formula, is not. This is clear, because a blind person is suited by nature to see, and this aptitude will never be reduced through nature to actuality, and we do not say that this is true, *A blind person is potentially sighted*, because a return from privation to possession is impossible. And so in higher things there is a multitude of individuals according to aptitude, but not in potentiality.

In separated substances, however, a multitude of supposita are not found according to actuality, aptitude or potentiality. And I hold this according to the intention of Aristotle, because a multitude of supposita arises from a division of matter, but a division of matter arises from a division in quantity; but in separate substances quantity is not found. And therefore a multitude of substances is not found, neither actually, potentially, nor according to aptitude.

But someone might ask whether the formula of the universal is found there. I reply that it is, but different formulae of universality are there and in lower things, because here there is found a formula of universality as it is understood, and as it is related in actuality to supposita. But though this also is found in separated substances, the formula of universality insofar as it is understood in actuality, still the formula of universality as it is related in actuality to supposita is not found, since it has no supposita. Thus it appears that in corporeal substances the nature of the species requires a multitude of supposita according to aptitude, but does not necessarily require a multitude of supposita actually or potentially.

In response to the arguments, as for the first, when it is argued, “what is required for the nature of a universal etc.,” I grant this. And I hold as regards the minor premise, that it is required for the formula of universal a multitude of supposita according to aptitude, and so species require a multitude of supposita according to aptitude, but not according to actuality or potentiality.

As for the second, when it is argued, “that is required for the nature of species etc.,” I reply to the minor premise that it is true that in the definition of the species there is found a multitude of supposita according to aptitude. For the definition must be expounded thus: A species is what is predicated etc., that is,

⁶⁸That is, bodies that are not below the sphere of the moon.

⁶⁹The ms. Has *soram*, which the editor reads as *formam*, but *Socratem* is better.

a species is an applicable intention caused by the understanding of the reality, which is suited to be predicated of many, so that here the intention is defined, and so is the reality informed by the intention. But the intention here is defined principally, because when we say that the species is the applicable intention, when the intention is defined, this is principle in this definition. And when it is added that it is predicated of many, etc., the reality informed by the intention is defined there, and so the intention is defined principally here, and consequently the reality that is the subject of the intention is. And in this way what was said in a certain preceding question⁷⁰ is to be understood, when it was said that the whole intention is defined.

Question 27

Next it is asked whether being is the genus for the ten categories.

And it is argued that it is, since the first object of the understanding must be of one formula; but being is the first object of the understanding, for this is what occurs first to our understanding according to Avicenna,⁷¹ therefore being is of one formula. From this I argue: that which is predicated of everything as regards what it is, and is of one formula in itself in everything, is a genus, but being is predicated of everything as regards what it is, and is of one formula in itself; therefore being is a genus.

Again, this is argued thus: Several things are not the object of a single capacity, except insofar as they agree in some one thing, which is the primary object of this capacity. For example, white and black are not grasped by vision, except insofar as they agree in one nature, which is the primary object of vision, of which sort is color. But substance and accident are the object of the understanding, therefore it must be that they agree in some one thing, which is the primary object of understanding. This is nothing other than the formula of being. Therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued that if a genus were predicable of every being, then it would be predicated of them according to name and formula; but being is not predicated of every being according to name and formula, for the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* IV⁷² that every being is said with reference to one thing, but not in accord with one thing; therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that being does not have the formula of genus in relation to substance and accident. To make this evident, we must consider that what genus indicates, it indicates through an indeterminate mode, but one determinable through something else. Now what difference indicates, it indicates by determining another. But a determining formula is outside the formula determinable by it, and vice versa [i.e. the determinable formula is outside the formula determining it], and there is a proof of this in Avicenna.⁷³

Again, it is clear that the genus is not predicated per se of its difference, because what is outside the essential formula of a thing is not predicated of it per se; but the essential formula of a genus is outside the essential formula of its difference; therefore etc. From this I argue, a genus is not predicated per se of its difference, but being is predicated per se of every being; therefore etc.

Again, there are differences for every genus, but there are not any differences for being; therefore being cannot be a genus. Now that being is predicated per se of all beings can be proved by the reason the Commentator touches on speaking about *Metaphysics* IV.⁷⁴ It goes thus: A human being is a being, therefore it is either a being through its substance, or through something added. If it is a being through its substance, we have what was proposed, namely that being is predicated per se of human being. If you hold that it is a being

⁷⁰Question 4.

⁷¹*Metaphysics* I 6.

⁷²Chapters 2 and 3.

⁷³*Logica*, Secunda pars, fol. 10 r.

⁷⁴Averroes, Comm. 2.

through something added to its substance, it is obvious that what is added here is a being. Then I ask: either it is an added being through its substance or through something added. If it is through its substance, by the same reason, things stand as in the first case. If through something added, I ask about it as before, and thus it either proceeds indefinitely, or every being will a being through substance, and so being is predicated per se of all beings.

Let us now summarize the argument: Genus is not predicated per se of difference, but being is predicated per se of every being; therefore being is not a genus. In the second place this is explained, if being were of the same formula in every being, it would be necessary that that formula [not] be absolute, because then it would coincide with accidents, for accidents do not have absolute being. If they were [not] absolute they would not coincide with substances, because substances have absolute being. Therefore no one formula coincides with substance and accident, and so being will not be a genus. And therefore the author spoke well when he said, “if anyone indicates all beings, he names them equivocally, and non-equivocally.”⁷⁵ But not purely equivocally, which is apparent because in those which are contained purely equivocally under something, one does not lead to the cognition of the other, nor does one make for the being of the other, as is apparent of the celestial star and marine animal, which are indicated equivocally under this, that each is a dog. But for equivocal there is just one common utterance (*vox*), and we see among beings, that one being (*ens*) leads to the cognition of the other, and one contributes to the being (*esse*) of another, because a substance leads to the cognition of an accident and contributes to its being (*esse*). Therefore being (*ens*) will not be purely equivocal to substance and accident. Therefore there will be analogy according to prior and posterior, because it is said of substance prior, and of accident posterior. And that does not seem to be what the Philosopher explains anywhere except in the beginning of *Metaphysics* VII. For he takes being (*ens*) from the name “essence.” Now beforehand essence is strictly speaking in substances, but is in accidents accidentally and as a consequence, and the Philosopher proves this.

For to the question asked, through what absolutely, we answer, *white* or *hot*, but *man* or *God*, Now if it is asked quality or quantity, it is answered, “accident.” If then to the questions through what absolutely we reply “substance. What-it-is is strictly speaking found in substance and not in accidents, except insofar as they are related to substance. And as what-it-is is not found in accidents, except in relation to substances, so neither is being (*entitas*). For this reason the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VII that a substance is a being (*ens*) and a nature, but accidents are not beings (*entia*) except because of being (*entis*), from which it is apparent that being (*ens*) is not a genus. From this it appears that Porphyry was able to speak truly when he said, “If anyone calls every etc.”⁷⁶

As for the arguments to the contrary, to the first, when it is argued, “the first object etc.,” I grant it, and when you say that “being (*ens*) is the first object of the intellect,” I reply that this is being as relates to what it signifies primarily, and as related to what it signifies as a consequence, it is not the first object of the intellect. Then, as to the form, I grant the major premise. And to the minor, I reply that being (*ens*), as it relates to what it signifies primarily, is the first object of the intellect. Hence that which intellect primarily considers is what-it-is; and noting this, the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII says that substance precedes every accident in cognition, definition, and time. And therefore it seems that accidents are not defined, except in relation to substance, and this is only if the substance is better known to us.

Concerning the other, when it is argued, “several things are not the objects of a single capacity,” I reply that it is true that several things are not the object per se, except insofar as they agree in some one nature, which is the primary object of that capacity. Hence, as there are two genera of realities, thus we have a twofold nature congruent to it corresponding to it, namely sense and intellect. Sense grasps accidents, because by means of the senses we recognize white and black, quantity and other such things. But intellect grasps substances, and there when one says that “many etc.,” I reply that this is true. And then to the minor I

⁷⁵Porphyry, *Isagoge* 108 B-C.

⁷⁶Porphyry, *Isagoge* 108 B.

reply that an accident is not grasped by the intellect, except through substance, and this is that one thing which is the primary object of the intellect.

Question 28

Next it is asked whether this is true: Socrates and Plato are one human being.

And first it is argued that it is not, for one human being and more than one human being are opposites. From this I argue, opposites are not made true of the same thing, but one human being and more than one human being are opposites; and this is true, Socrates and Plato are more than one human being, therefore this will not be true, Socrates and Plato are one human being.

On the other hand it is argued, things that are undivided in the nature of human being are one human being, but Socrates and Plato are undivided in human being; therefore etc.

Concerning this it is to be understood that one being is the undivided being of some nature. For “one” indicates undividedness. But undividedness is a privation. Now a privation requires a subject nature, and therefore being one is being undivided in some subject nature. Since, therefore, it is asked whether this is true, “Socrates and Plato are one human being,” the word “one” can indicate undividedness in the nature of human being absolutely, of in the nature of human being as it is limited to a suppositum. If it indicates undividedness in the nature of human being absolutely, thus it is true. Socrates and Plato are one human being, because Socrates and Plato are undivided in the nature of human being. But if “one” indicates undividedness not in the nature of human being absolutely, but as it is limited to a suppositum, in this way this is false that “Socrates and Plato etc.,” since those things that are one in one nature as it is limited in this way are one in number, which limits that nature. If then Socrates and Plato are one in human nature as limited to some suppositum, Socrates and Plato are one in some suppositum. But this is false, there the proposition is in one way true, in another false.

Still, I believe, if we consider the truth of what is said, that this proposition is false. For the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* V that one is said in three ways: one in genus, one in species, and one in number.⁷⁷ But one through what is prior is said of one in number, through what is posterior of one in genus or species. But now this is the nature of analogy, that when it is placed by itself, it stands for that with which it primarily agrees. If, then, one is primarily said of one in number, but secondarily of the others, then when it is said, “Socrates and Plato are one human being,” the sense is, “Socrates and Plato are one human being in number.” And it is obvious that this is false. And therefore I hold that speaking without qualification this is false, “Socrates and Plato are one human being.” And that an analogous term stands for that with which it primarily agrees, taken by itself, is apparent. For the Philosopher in *Physics* I says that although being is said of both substance and accident, when we say being absolutely it stands for substance.⁷⁸ In the same way, though “to be suitable” is said of procuring good things, and procuring bad things, when it is said “this is suitable,” it stands for what is suitable among good things. But still, if you add something pertaining to what is secondarily signified, it stands for that secondarily signified thing, for instance, if it is said, “Socrates and Plato are one human being in species,” then the word “one” stands for one in species, and what is said is true.

As for the arguments to the contrary: In reply to the first, when it is argued, “things which are undivided in some nature etc.,” I reply that as they are undivided, so they are one. And you hold that Socrates and Plato are undivided etc., and I reply that this is true, they are undivided in the nature of the species. And you say, “Therefore Socrates and Plato are one human being,” and I reply that they are one human being by participation in the species.

⁷⁷*Metaphysics* V 6.

⁷⁸*Physics* I 3.

Question 29

Next it is asked about the chapter on difference. The author, in positing the definition of difference, says that a difference is that by which a species etc.; for a genus has all the differences potentially, but none actually; therefore **it is asked whether its difference is in a genus.**

And it is argued that it is. Those things that are one in essence and nature are so related that one is in the other essentially. But genus and difference are one in essence and nature. Therefore differences are in their genus essentially. And the argument is confirmed, because what is predicated of something is in it, but difference is predicated of its genus. For this predication is true, “An animal is rational,” because truly human being is rational, but human being is an animal, therefore an animal is rational. I then argue thus: what is predicated of another is in it, but difference is predicated of its genus, as in saying “an animal is rational,” therefore a difference is in its genus.

On the other hand, it is argued: Opposites are not in the same, but what divides a genus in definition are opposites; therefore these things dividing a genus are not in the genus. This is the argument the Author touches on in the text.⁷⁹

It should be replied to this that, as Porphyry says, genus potentially contains all its differences, but it actually contains none. For this, that genus has no difference in actuality, is explained from two considerations.

The first is, that which is outside the essential formula of a genus, in actuality is not contained in the genus, because we only say that is actually contained in the genus that is included in its essential signification. Now every difference is outside the essential formula of its genus, because it stands outside the formula of animal that one animal is rational and irrational. Hence, as Avicenna says, genus is related to difference as matter to form and potentiality to actuality. But every form is outside the essential formula of matter, and actuality is outside the essential formula of potentiality. Therefore every difference is outside the essential formula of its genus.

The second is explained thus: what is contained in act in the essential form of something, but is immediately added to it, causes a repetition (*nugationem*), as appears in saying “a human being⁸⁰ is an animal.” Now adding a difference immediately to a genus is not a repetition, for there is no repetition in saying “an animal is rational,” because then every difference would be repetitive. Therefore difference is not actually included in a genus, and it must be said that a genus has no difference in actuality, but it has them all potentially. And the reason for this is that genus is related to difference as matter to form, and the Author says this in the text. Now matter contains many forms potentially, and therefore genus contains all its differences potentially. Hence, as all forms are in matter under a certain confused and indeterminate being, thus all differences are together in their genus.

But it should be noted that according to Albert things are in a genus⁸¹ in four ways.⁸² Either as per se ordered in the genus, and in this way species and genera and individuals are in the genus, but most strictly speaking species. Others are in the genus because they are in the development of a genus to the reality of the genus, and in this way we say that motion to substance is in the genus of substance, and motion to a quality is in the genus of quality. Others are in a genus because they are principles of the reality of some genus, and in this way matter and form are in the genus of substance, point and unity in the genus of quantity. In the fourth way some are in a genus as the genus is their principal, and in this way differences are in a genus, for genus is a certain principles of differences, a principal containing them in a confused way.

⁷⁹Porphyry, *Isagoge* 125C.

⁸⁰I.e., a rational animal, . . .

⁸¹The editions has *per se* instead of *in genere*, which is required by the sense.

⁸²Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicabilibus*, Tractatus IV, Capitulum 7.

It appears, then, that differences are not contained in actuality under their genus, because they are not included in the essential formula of the genus. But they are included in the essential formula of the species. From this it follows that it is difference by which species exceeds genus. But (*alia autem*), the excess by which species exceeds genus is not according to reality (*non attenens est secundum rem*), but according to reason. The difference does not indicate anything real added to the genus, and this is consistent with a proof by a certain argument, which the Philosopher touches on in *Metaphysics IV*, to prove that being and one are one nature. And it is argued so: whatever predicates predicate its substance of something, and not something added, are one essence and one nature; but genus and difference indicate predicates of its species, and not something added, therefore etc.

But perhaps someone of these authors will say that genus and difference are predicated of species, for they predicate the substance, but not all of it. Avicenna argues against this:⁸³ Part of the whole is not predicated essentially and as what-it-is, if then the genus and difference predicate a part of the essence of the species, genus the matter, difference the form, then neither genus nor difference are predicated as what-it-is, the opposite of what we assumed.

But perhaps someone will hold to the argument that part can be received either concretely, or in abstraction. A part in abstraction is not predicated of the whole, but a part concretely taken can be predicated of the whole. Now what animal indicates, it indicates concretely, and therefore this is true, “a human being is an animal,” even though animal indicates a part. But this is false, “a human being is animality,” taken abstractly.

On the other hand. As an animal is something concrete inasmuch as it is an animality [i.e. a kind of animality], so also a piece of wood is something concrete inasmuch as it is a [kind of] wood. But wood as a concrete thing is not predicated of that of which it is a part, saying “the Arc (*archa*) is a [kind] of wood (*lignum*),”⁸⁴ therefore if animal indicates a part, it cannot be truly predicated of its species, even if it is taken concretely.⁸⁵ For a part in no way has the essential formula of the whole, and therefore it is not predicated of the species as what-it-is.

From all this it is clear that differences are predicated [potentially] in the genus, but actually so in the species, and therefore the species exceeds the genus, and this excess is not taken according to reality, but only according to reason.

As for the arguments, as for the first, “those which are one essence and nature,” I grant that they are in a certain respect one essence and nature. And as for the minor premise, I grant it. And I grant that one is in the other essentially insofar as that reality conveyed by the name of difference is in the genus. But the difference beyond this essence adds something else according to reason, that is not included in the essential formula of the genus. Hence although genus and difference are not different realities, they are different understood things, and one is formal and the other material. Just as we see that from matter and form there arises one thing in reality, so from genus and difference there is some one thing according to reason. Hence although the difference is not another reality than that which is conveyed by the name of genus, still it is another understood thing, and is, as it were, the formal, but that is the material. Hence, as to the form, I grant the major premise. And to the minor, I reply that they are really one essence nature and formula, hence it is the other essentially, although they are distinguished according to reason as determining and determinable, of which each is included in the other.

As for the other, when it is said, “what is predicated of something is in it,” it truly is so. And as for the minor premise, when it is said, “the difference etc.,” I reply that the difference is predicated of the genus

⁸³*Metaphysics V*, Cap. 7.

⁸⁴*Genesis* 6:14, where Jerome has “*fac tibi arcam de lignis*,” “make yourself an arc of (wooden) boards.” I suppose in English the thing can be done, though. “Make an oaken arc” or a “cherry table” seems perfectly in order. But the table is not a piece of cherry wood, rather, there are pieces of cherry wood that are parts of the table (and other parts of the table include fasteners of iron, varnish, and so on—so Jerome specifies fasteners and bitumen as parts of the Arc.)

⁸⁵So donkey is not animality.

as a reality, but that reality does not indicate the whole nature of the genus, nor the whole formula of the difference. But this nature, as it is considered by a determining reason, indicates the complete formula of the difference, and as that nature is received under the formula of determinable, it indicates the complete formula of the genus.

Question 30

Next it is asked about what he says, that a difference divides those things under a genus, and he says that we are ensouled and divine beings (*animalia sumus nos et dii*), but that the addition of “mortal” separates us from them [from the other divine ensouled beings]. From this it seems that “mortal” is the difference of human being, therefore **it is asked whether mortal is a substantial difference of human being.**

And it is argued that it is, because what is assumed in a definition of something, whether it is placed there as a genus, or as a difference, but “mortal” is assumed in the definition of human being, therefore it is assumed as genus or difference, but not as genus, therefore as difference.

Again, what makes a human being differ according to species from other things is the specific difference of human being; but mortal is like this, for it makes a human being differ from separated substances, therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued that the Philosopher says in *Topics* IV that those err who assume an attribute (*passio*) of something to be a difference of it, but “mortal” is a certain attribute of human being, for he says that something is introduced (*illatum*) by a substance of a reality, and such a thing is called an attribute; therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that “mortal” is not the difference of human being. This is obvious thus: Every difference is posited from a form, because every difference is per se constitutive of some species according to Porphyry. From its being constitutive of the species it gives being, therefore from the formula of difference, per se it give being. Since then, this belongs to the formula of form, it is obvious that every difference is taken from form per se. Now “mortal” is not taken from the form, but rather from matter, hence it follows that the whole composite by reason of matter, and not because of the form. For “mortal” indicates a potentiality for not being, that is, to dying, but matter has a potentiality for not being, for it is the matter in each thing that can be and not be, therefore mortal is consequent on the whole composite by reason of matter and by reason of form. For this reason it does not possess the formula of difference. This is also what was explained and can be taken from the text. In order that something be a difference it does not suffice that it divide those which are under the same genus, but it is necessary that it conduce to being, and thus be a substantial part of the reality. Now “mortal,” although it divides what falls under the same genus, since it divides human being and animals from separate substances, still it does not conduce to being, and therefore is not a difference.

Again, it is not a specific difference of human being, because a specific difference of human being must be convertible with human being. But “mortal” is not convertible with “human being,” for there are a number of mortal things that are not human beings, and therefore “mortal” is not a specific difference of human being in respect of what-it-is, therefore human being differs in species by something else. I believe that human being differs in species from other things by reason, and this makes sense, as it explains that “rational” names a certain power and potentiality of the soul, through which the soul proceeds discursively from one thing to another. And because of this Avicenna says that reason is a certain power of the soul, making it run from cause to what is caused, so that “reason” names a certain power through which the soul runs from manifest accidents to capacity, which is hidden, because accidents bring together a great part etc., and from causes to what is caused. Now such reason, through which the soul runs from one to another, is not found in separate substances, for we understand discursively, since we collect our condition [?? Cognition?] from sensible things; but separate substances do not. For they do not understand through images, as we do, but, as was said, through innate

species, and hence strictly speaking separate substances are not intelligible reasons,⁸⁶ if we wish to adhere strictly to the meaning of the term.

Why then did Porphyry oppose this with this particular “mortal”? I reply that perhaps he was of the opinion that separate substances, being rational . . . ,⁸⁷ or he understood the same⁸⁸ by “rational” and⁸⁹ “understanding”; for then it will [not]⁹⁰ be superfluous to add “mortal.” For a human being does not differ from separate substances because it is an understanding substance, since they understand as well. And therefore he adds “mortal,” so that there will be a difference distinguishing human beings from separate substances. Now even though mortal and immortal are not specific differences, still a diversity of species follows on their diversity. For if it is possible that of two individuals under one species, one is mortal and the other immortal, because matter pertains to those which are thus related to the essence of one, and not to the essence of the other, still they cannot be contained under one species, because of those existing under one species there is one matter and one form. But having matter follows on mortal, and not having matter follows on immortal, and so they are not in the same species. And so I grant that a diversity in or according to species follows mortal and immortal, although it does not follow causally.

As to the arguments, to the first I reply that “everything that is assumed etc.” is either genus, or difference, or is put in the place of genus or difference; hence I reply that mortal is not a difference strictly speaking, but is put in the place of a difference.

As for the other, I grant the major premise and deny the minor, and I reply that what makes it differ is the formula of “mortal,” but it does not make it differ by other specific differences, but a difference that is suggested by (*attenditur secundum*) a certain accident.

Question 31

Next it is asked about the fourth universal, namely property, and **it is asked whether property is a universal.**

And it is argued that it is not, because every universal is common, but a property is not common; therefore etc. The minor is clear, because the universal is what is suited by nature to be predicated of several things, and every such is common. The minor is proved, because just as universal and singular are opposed, so proper and common; but one opposite is not the other; therefore, as it seems, a property is not common.

Again, a universal is what is predicated of more than one, but a property is not predicated of more than one, but of one species alone, of which it is the property; therefore etc.

On the other hand it is argued, of those that are convertible as regards their supposita,⁹¹ if one is convertible, the other is as well. But a species and the property of the species⁹² are convertible as regards their supposita, therefore etc.

It must be held that a property is a universal. For since the formula of a universal is that it is predicable of more than one, with whatever this formula agrees, the formula of universal agrees. But the

⁸⁶That is, they cannot be understood through abstraction, since they have no sensible instances.

⁸⁷Something seems to be omitted.

⁸⁸Following the reading of the Ms. rather than the edition.

⁸⁹Following the reading of the Ms. rather than the edition.

⁹⁰*Not* is required by the sense, but apparently omitted in the Ms.

⁹¹That is, concepts of the same extension.

⁹²The Latin seems to have some mistake in it, *species et proprium cuius est proprium*. Perhaps it should be *proprium et species cuius est proprium*. In any case, this sense is required by the argument.

formula predicable-of-more-than-one agrees with property, for it is predicated of the species, and of the individuals contained under the species. Therefore etc.

But you will reply, if a property is a universal, it is either universal as regards those things of which it is a property, or in respect of something else. It is not universal in respect of those of which it is a property. Proof: because this is about the formula of universal which agrees with more than one; but concerning the formula of a property in respect of that of which it is a property, it what agrees with that alone; therefore a property is not universal as regards those of which it is a property. If you reply that it is universal in respect of something else, since in respect of these it is not a property, therefore a property considered as such will not be universal.

It must be answered that the same according to subject is what is universal and proper; but this is in respect of different things; for it is a property in respect of the species of which it is property, and universal in respect of individuals contained under the species. And because it is a property in respect of the species, therefore it agrees with no other species than that of which it is a property. But because it is not a property with respect to the individuals, therefore it does not agree with only one individual, but with many others as well. And therefore because it agrees with many individuals as they are individuals, it is not proper, but in respect of its species it is not universal, for nothing is universal in respect of a species except its genus, or difference; and so it is not both proper and universal in respect of the same thing.

But next you will ask, if a property is a universal, isn't a universal distinct from an accident? It seems that it is not, because Boethius says that property flows from the genus of accidents, but what flows from another is not distinguished from it. Therefore a property is not a universal, speaking of such a universal as is distinct from accident, that is, distinct from the accident⁹³ that is assumed as the fifth universal; and not universal as it is distinguished from the accident which is distinguished from substance, because property is located under accident as distinguished from substance. For a property is not a substance, hence accident and property differ, speaking of the accident that is taken as a fifth universal. Property differs from accident taken thus in this, that the property has a firm and stable cause in the subject, and therefore never leaves the subject. But an accident taken in this way does not have a firm and stable cause in the subject, and therefore leaves the subject while the subject remains.⁹⁴

With this, we should consider how accidents are in their subjects in four ways: Some are in them through the nature of the form, some through the nature of the matter, some through some intrinsic action, and some through an extrinsic action.

Those in them through the nature of the form are like three being in a triangle, and rational in human beings, and in every case, every property is in its subject thus, and such accidents are called accidents per se and properly, and thus we speak hear of property. And because this sort of accident is in its subject through the nature of the form, and what it is arises principally from the form, therefore such accidents are demonstrated fo their subjects through a middle term, which is the definition.

Other accidents are in their subjects through the nature of matter, as for instance being able to come into being and destructible in all things able to come into being or be destroyed, because matter is that by which they can be or not be. And these accidents are said to be proper accidents. And because matter is what is more common than form, because there is a single matter of all things able to come into being or be destroyed, but not one form, therefore that property that follows on the subject through the nature of matter is more common than what follows through the nature of the form. Hence, there should be a three-fold proper accident of human being, namely, able-to-laugh, able to come into being and be destroyed. And being able to come into being and able to be destroyed are found in more than able-to-laugh is found in. For able-to-laugh

⁹³In the edition there is an error in punctuation here.

⁹⁴This is a bit confusing, in my judgment. The picture is this: property is a sort of accident₁ (that is, not a substance), but it is not an accident₂ (the fifth predicable, a separable accident). So it is not universal₁ (a universal substantial nature), which is defined as distinct from accident₁. But it is universal₂, that is, universal in the sense that an accident distinguished from substance, accident₁, is, as well as universal in the way accident₂ is. Both it and the fifth predicable (and secondary substances) are universal in this sense.

is found only in one species, but those are found in many.

Accidents that follow on a subject through a certain accidental intrinsic disposition are, for instance, sweetness in a fruit, which is not due to the nature of the material or the form, but a certain proportion of prior qualities, namely heat, moistness, and so on. Hence sweetness I caused from the proportion and heat and moistness, but bitterness is from an excess of heat, burning away the moistness, and this is apparent because all bitter things are found to be burned.

But those accidents which are in a subject the action of an external agent are such as color in a wall; and in the same way moving upward is in what is heavy through the action of something throwing the heavy thing upward.

Thus, sine there are four sorts of accidents, an accident in the first way is called accident most truly and is a proper accident, in the second way, it is called a property, but not so truly, since it is found in several species, but accidents in the third and fourth way are placed under accident, that is, the fifth universal. And so it appears how property differs from accident, since a property is whatever is caused from the essential principles of the subject, but an accident, as it is the fifth universal, is not.

Next, it should be noted that some proper accidents are in their subjects according to actuality, and others according to suitability. According to actuality: like transparency, a proper accident found in higher bodies and found in them in actuality.⁹⁵ Some proper accidents are caused from the essential principles of the subject according to suitability, and so Porphyry says that able-to-laugh is in a human being all the time, but not because one always actually laughs, but rather because one is suited by nature to laugh. So then, it appears that a property is universal, and that it is distinct from accident, and that some are in their subject according to actuality, and some according to suitability.

As for the arguments, as for the first, when it is argued, “Every universal” etc., I grant this. And I reply to the minor premise that a property, in that way in which it is a property, is not also common in respect of the same; but what is proper in respect of one thing may well be common in respect of another. Hence what is proper in respect of species, is surely common in respect of individuals, and therefore a property is not universal in respect of species, but only in respect of individuals.

As for the second, when it is argued, “a universal is what is predicated of more than one” etc., I reply that a property, as such, is predicated only of one species, but still, because it is a property, it is predicated of more than one, because it is predicated of the individuals contained under the species.

Question 32

Next we ask about accident. Now the author, in introducing a difference for accident says that an accident is what can be present in or absent from etc. And it is explained that being present in or absent from occurs through the understanding, rather than the destruction of the subject. **Therefore it is asked, whether accidents are separable from their subjects through the understanding.**

And it is argued that they are not, because understanding follows being. Therefore what is not possible in being is not possible in understanding. But it is not possible for accidents in being to be separated from their subjects, therefore it is not possible for accidents to be separated from their subjects in the understanding.

Again, a definition is a certain intellectual cognition. Therefore whatever is only defined in relation to a subject cannot be understood except in relation to the subject. Because of this the subject is posited in the definition of every accident. Therefore an accident cannot be understood except in relation to a subject, and so it is not separable from its subjects according to the understanding.

On the other hand, it is argued that every accident is separable from its subject, since, if it were not separable from its subject, it would not be an accident, and if it were not an accident, it would be essential.

⁹⁵That is, the spheres are transparent because they always allow light to pass through them, not because they are always suited to do so, even if sometimes they do not.

Now an accident is not separable from its subject in such a way that it exists separately. Therefore it must be that it is separable from its subject in such a way that it is understood separately. Therefore accidents are separable from their subject according to the understanding.

It must be understood here that a subject according to the intellect is separable from its accident, and an accident is according to the intellect separable from its subject.

First, it is explained that everything prior can be freed from what is posterior to it, because what does not depend on the other in its being, does not depend on the other for its understanding. Now what is prior in being does not depend on what is posterior, therefore neither does it depend on what is posterior in understanding. But the subject is prior to every one of its accidents. For an accident comes to the subject after it is completely actual, and this appears from the difference between substantial form and accidental form. For although substantial and accidental form agree in this, that both are actual, still they differ in this, that the substantial form gives being without qualification and actually, and its subject is a being in pure capacity, because only matter is its per se subject. But accidental form does not give being without qualification, but gives being-such—for instance, hot or cold presupposes being without qualification—and therefore the actuality that is in matter is from the actuality of the substantial form, and the actuality that is in the accidental form is from the actuality of the subject. For an accident only has being in actuality because it is in a subject that exists actually, and therefore it comes to a substance after that substance is a being in actuality. And so the minor premise is explained. To summarize the argument: Everything prior can be freed from what is posterior through the intellect, but the subject is prior to every one of its accidents; therefore etc.

In the second place, it is explained that an accident is separable in the understanding from its subject, and we ask a question about this. That which does not include the subject in its essence, nor any relation to the subject, is separable from the subject according to relation, but an accident does not include the subject in its essence, nor any relation to the subject, as has been explained, nor does it include in its essence a relation to the subject, as is obvious, nor does it include in its essence a relation to the subject, as is proved.⁹⁶ Therefore an accident is separable from its subject according to the understanding.

That it does not include a relation to the subject is explained from two things.

In the first place, that which belongs to the essential formula of the accident is not in it through anything extrinsic. The reason for this is that between what it is and that of which it is there is no middle cause, because if there were such a middle cause, then what it is would be demonstrable of that of which it is through that middle cause, which is contrary to Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*.⁹⁷ But the subject is extrinsic to the accident itself, therefore nothing essential to the accident is in it through its subject. But this would happen if the relation to the subject were in the being of an accident, because it seems that that relation would be in the accident through its essence. Therefore, it seems, an accident does not include in its essential formula any relation to the subject. Therefore an accident can be understood separately from its subject.

In the second place, the same thing is explained thus: Signifying follows understanding, just as understanding follows being. Therefore what can be signified without any dependence on a subject can be understood without any dependence on a subject, which the names of accident in abstraction declare, therefore etc. It seems then that accidents are separable from their subjects according to the understanding, so the same thing must be said about the whatness of accidents, as Avicenna says,⁹⁸ and about the whatness of substances.

⁹⁶Something has pretty clearly been copied over twice here, but the sense is clear.

⁹⁷*Posterior Analytics* II 8.

⁹⁸*Logica, prima pars*, fol. 2 v A. “Realities are known in two ways, in one way as it is understood alone, so that (when the name is in our possession through which it is designated) an intention is represented to the soul, although it is neither true nor false there, as when it is said, *human being*, or it is said, *doing this*, since then you would grasp the intention of what was said to you, and already have understood it [without considering its truth]. In the other way, when there is belief in the intellect, as when it is said to you that *every whiteness is an accident*, from which you will not have understanding of the intention of what is said (*huius dictionis*) alone, but would also believe it is so. But when you doubt whether it is so or not, you have already understood what was said to you.”

He says that humanity, as such, neither is nor is not, because if it were of itself, it could not fail to be, and if it were not, of itself, it could not be. But it has of itself only that it is humanity. In the same way, an accident such as whiteness neither is nor is not, but from being whiteness it only has that it is whiteness, and does not have of itself anything that depends on another.

Therefore Avicenna says that substance is a reality having a whatness, for which there is being not in another, and accident is a reality having a whatness, to which being in another belongs.⁹⁹ And being in another and not being in another are not of the essence of substance and accident, but are immediately consequent on substance. And if next you ask what it is that distinguishes substance essentially from accident, it must be replied that it is this, that the latter is an essence by the former, but we do not know what a substance is or an accident either. The substantial differences of these are unknown to us as are those of other realities.

As for the arguments to the contrary, as to the first, when it is argued, “what is not possible in being” etc., let whatever the argument is able to conclude be granted. For it only concludes that it is not possible in understanding for accidents to be separated from their subjects. And I hold that this is true, that it is not possible in understanding them, so that the understanding can truly understand that the accidents exist separated from their subjects, of that they can exist thus. It is indeed possible to understand them separately in this way, because we understand the accident without understanding the subject, or we can understand them otherwise. I deny the major premise, and hold that something is possible in understanding that is not possible in being. For the understanding, due to its immateriality, distinguishes between some things between which nature does not distinguish in the being of reality, and this is apparent in the senses. Nature in the being of reality does not distinguish the sweetness of the mile from its whiteness, but the sense of taste grasps sweetness with grasping whiteness, and vision whiteness, without grasping sweetness. In the same way and more so, the understanding, since it is more immaterial than the senses, can grasp something which is joined with another without grasping that other. And so, even though an accident is joined in being with a substance, the understanding can very well grasp the accident without grasping the substance, and so some things are possible in understanding which are not possible in being.

But you will reply, understanding follows being, therefore what is not possible in being is not possible in understanding. I reply that understanding follows being, because the understanding does not understand anything in the opposite way than it has being in reality. For if any substance according to real being is material, the understanding also never understands the reality to be immaterial, but some way of understanding is still possible that does not correspond to the way it is. For the understanding understand human being immaterially, because it understands material things immaterially and temporal things atemporally, as the Commentator says on *De Causis*. Still, material things are never immaterial in being in reality, We can understand an accident without substance, but an accident never is without substance.

As for the second argument, when it is argued “definition is a certain intellectual cognition,” I grant this. And when you claim in the major, “that an accident is only defined in relation to its subject,” I hold that if an accident is defined insofar as it has being of existence, it is impossible that it be defined not in relation to its subject, because it is impossible for an accident to exist without a subject. And so what is said by the Philosopher must be understood, when he says that the definition of accidents is through something added, since as regards the being of essence they are defined without the subject and without relation to a subject; for thus they are defined through genus and differences alone, which indicate the whole essence of the accident.

Here ends the questions on the Book of Porphyry according to Master Simon.

⁹⁹*Metaphysics* II 1. “Being occurs in two ways. One is that which, although it is in something extrinsic to it, and an acquired species is in it, still it is not in it as a part of it, nor can it be without it. And this what is in a subject. The other is what is, but is not in any other in this way, since it is not in a subject at all, and this is substance.”