

Questions on the Categories

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Question 1

“Those things are called equivocal” etc. About the book of the Categories it is asked whether there can be a science of the categories.

And it is argued that there cannot, since all knowledge is through the cause, but the categories have no cause, therefore there is no knowledge of the categories. The major is obvious, since “we think each thing to be known when we cognize its causes,” and since there is a cause of it, etc. The minor is clear, since the categories are first principles of realities, and such do not have a cause, and therefore the categories do not have a cause.

Again, all knowledge is had through definition or demonstration, but there cannot be knowledge of the categories through definition, nor through demonstration, therefore etc. The major is obvious. The minor is proved, first, because it is not through the definition, since every definition is through genus and difference, but categories have no genera above them through which they can be defined, for the ten categories are the ten highest genera above which there is no other genus. Proof that it is not through definition, since the middle term in demonstration is a definition, and so of that of which there is no definition, there is no knowledge through demonstration; but there is no definition of categories, therefore there is no knowledge of categories.

On the other hand, it is argued that of everything concerning which one can err or act rightly there can be a science, for science is directive in matters in which one can err and act rightly, but one can err or act rightly concerning the categories; therefore etc. The minor is proved because there is no science¹ unless there is a coordination of provables according to higher and lower, but coordinating categories according to higher or lower can occur rightly or not rightly, therefore etc.

It must be replied that there can be a science concerning categories. For in order that there be a science three things are required, namely that there be a being, and that it be intelligible, and that it have parts constituting it, properties and attributes that can be proved of it. That there must be a being is apparent, since what is not cannot be known. And the reason for this is that nothing is known except what is understood, and everything that is understood is a being, and therefore what is known is necessarily a being. And therefore the Philosopher spoke well when he said that “one cannot know what is not.”²

Again, it is obviously necessary that that about which there is knowledge be intelligible, since knowledge is a certain intellectual habit, and therefore a certain perfection of the intellect, and so a knowable must be intelligible, and therefore that about which there is knowledge must be intelligible.

Again, it is necessary that it have parts constituting it, for what is known must be known through definition, but definition is an account (*sermo*) with parts, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII (Chapter 4), and therefore what is known must have real parts or rational parts, which are so-called because they are intelligible (?).³

¹Science' emended from 'category.'

²*Metaphysics* I 2.

³*Quod dico propter intelligentiam* in the edition. Perhaps, *qui dicuntur propter intelligibilia?*

Again, necessarily that about which there is to be knowledge has properties and attributes demonstrable of it, if it is known through demonstration. Therefore these three are required if there is to be science about something. Now every category is a being, and not a being in the soul, but a true being outside the soul. For the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* V [2] that it is true being outside the soul that is divided into the ten figures of the categories. Now I call that a true being outside the soul which does not depend on the soul, but I call that a being through the soul which depends on the soul, as, for instance, logical intentions such as spices and the like do.

Again, whatever is placed in a category is something intelligible; and the proof of this is that only genera and species are placed in a category. Therefore those placed in a category must be such that the intellect founds upon them the intention of genus and species. From this I argue that everything upon which the intellect founds an intention of genus or species is intelligible by the intellect, for the intellect founds an intention of genus or species on no reality unless it is actually understood. But a singular placed in a category is such that the intellect founds the intention of a genus or species upon it; therefore a singular which is placed in a category is an intelligible being. So we have that the categories are beings, and intelligible beings.

Again, the categories have properties and attributes. That they have properties is obvious from the Philosopher's procedure, for he gives properties of substance, quantity, and the others.

Again, every category has parts constituting it. Every category is constituted from two things, namely from a reality and from a manner of being added to the reality. Hence a reality which coincides with a manner of being which is not being in another, is substance, but a reality which coincides with a manner of being which is being in another, is accident, and it is through the manner of being in another and being not in another that substance and accident are principally distinguished, although these are not their substantial differences, but accidents immediately following on their essences. And since every category has parts in this way, everything in a category is composite. So there can be a science concerning categories. But next it must be noted that since science is a habit produced through demonstration, just as there are two sorts of demonstration, so there are two sorts of science. One is demonstration that proceeds from what is prior and better known without qualification, the other demonstration proceeding from what is prior and better known to us. The first demonstration arises through the cause, the second through the effect.⁴ For since the effect⁵ is for the most part better known to us than the cause, we have demonstrations sometimes through the effect.⁶ This is the same as what is said in *Posterior Analytics* I, that some demonstrations are demonstrations why, because⁷ they proceed through the cause, and some demonstration that it is the case.⁸ In the same way, scientific knowledge is two-fold, one of which proceeds from what is prior and better known without qualification, and the other from what is prior and better known to us. And what is better known to us is sometimes less known and posterior by nature. Now the science of the categories is not from what is better known and prior without qualification, since then science of the categories would be possessed through definition constituted from genus and difference. But categories have no genus, and therefore there is no science of them through from what is prior and better known without qualification. For these occur first in our intellect, and among them that which occurs first of all is substance. But the science of the categories is possessed from what is prior to us, though

⁴Emending *essentiam* to *effectum*.

⁵Emending *affectus* to *effectus*.

⁶Emending *affectum* to *effectum*.

⁷Emending *quia propter quid* to *propter quid quia*.

⁸See *Posterior Analytics* I 2, I 6.

it is posterior without qualification, for the essences of the categories are hidden from us, like the essence of every [other] reality. Therefore the Philosopher, in settling things about the categories, only settles concerning them that they have certain properties—that substance does not admit of greater or less, and nothing is the contrary of a substance, and such as apply to the act of being a substance. And in this way he compares primary and secondary substance to each other. And all these are posterior without qualification to the quiddity of substance, but prior in respect to us. Thus there is a science of the categories, and it is not from what is prior and better known without qualification, but from what is prior and better known to us. Hence the Philosopher does not proceed here demonstratively, but rather through names and examples.

Again, there is not only a science of the categories, but one science. And the proof of this is that a science is related to its subject as a capacity to its object. Now the unity of a capacity arises from the unity of its primary and per se object. For instance, vision is one capacity, because it grasps one object, color, and hearing is one capacity, for it grasps one object, sound. And therefore the unity of a science is from the unity of its object. And because of this the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* I [2] that there is one science of one genus, considering the parts and properties of its subject. But it is not required because a science is one that its subject be one in species, since there is one science of two contraries, just as there is one capacity for two contraries, for instance, vision of the white and the black. For contraries are of different species, and therefore it is not required that the subject be one species. Again, it is not required that the subject be one in genus, since the divine science is one, but its subject is not one in genus, since its subject is being, and being is not one genus. But for a science to be one, it suffices that the subject be one according to attribution. In this way the divine science is one, since everything considered there has attribution to a single primary being, that is, substance, and not to just any substance, but to the first substance, which is God, as appears from the way it proceeds. In the same way, everything which is considered here has attribution to one, and that one is incomplex, sayable being that can be ordered in higher and lower genera. Hence things are settled here concerning substance and others, as there is found in each of them something that can be ordered higher and lower. And from this it is apparent how this science of the categories and the divine science consider things in different manners, since the divine science considers them as essence and parts of being, but in this book categories are not discussed as subject matter (*res materiae*) absolutely considered, but as they have such and such a manner of predicating (*predicandi*), and therefore it is called the book of *Categories* (*predicamentorum*).

In response to the arguments: To the first, when it is argued, "every science is through the cause" etc., I reply that this proposition is to be distinguished, since science is a habit acquired through demonstration, but demonstration is of two sorts, namely demonstration that it is the case, and demonstration why it is the case. And therefore science is twofold, some acquired through demonstration why, and some acquired through demonstration that it is the case. The first is obtained through the cause, but not the second. And it is through such demonstration that we have the science of the book of *Categories*. We have it from what is prior to us, not from what is prior by nature, and therefore I grant that it is not through the cause.

As for the other argument, when it is argued, "every science is possessed through definition or through demonstration," this is true if we extend the name of definition. One sort of definition is strictly so-called, which is given through genus and difference, and from what is prior according to form (*rationem*); and another sort is loosely called definition, using other names, and this is not the definition saying what the reality is, but what the name signifies. Now I hold that there is no definition of categories said in the first way, because they do not have a genus, but there is a definition of them using other names, saying what each of the categories signifies.

Again, there is a definition of them, which is a making known which expresses their essential traits, for instance, it appears that difference does not have a definition strictly so-called, but it has a certain making known which expresses its essential traits, as when it is said that a difference is what divides what is under the same genus and contributes (*conducit*) to the being of a reality. When, therefore, it is said that "every science"

etc, I reply that this is true—either through definition said in the first way, or in the second. There is a science of the categories through definition said in the second way. And this is what the expositors of Aristotle prove, dividing each category thus, because first they consider a category as to its essential attributes, and in the second place as to its accidents and properties.

Question 2

There is a doubt concerning the text, and it seems that the definition of equivocals makes univocals equivocal. For if equivocals are those of which only the name is in common, and the account (*ratio*) of the substance different, the univocal are like that, too. This is obvious in the case of human being and donkey, for human being is rational mortal animal, and donkey is irrational mortal animal, or some such, and these accounts are different, and so it seems that there is only a name common to them, and the account of the substance different. But they are univocal, and hence univocals are equivocal.

It must be replied that this is resolved through what is said in the text. For it is said that equivocals are those of which only a name is in common, and according to that name, the account of the substance is different. Now we see that even though the accounts of the species of human being and donkey are different, still, in accord with that name by which they are univocally called, that is, in accord with 'animal,' the account is one, for in both it is 'sensible ensouled substance.' But in equivocals, in accord with that name in which they agree, they are of different accounts, as appears in the case of true human being and a human being in a picture, for they equivocate in 'animal.' For a true human being is a sensible ensouled substance, but a human being in a picture is a similitude of a sensible ensouled substance, and so in respect of that name there is a different account. And it is the same with all equivocals in respect of their equivocating [name].

Question 3

A doubt is raised concerning the rule: He gives a contrary "when one of the other" etc., for given that this is so, this seems to be a good argument: Animal is a genus, human being is [a kind of] animal, therefore human being is a genus. This is because through the rule, whatever is said of the predicate is said of the subject. Animal is said to be genus, therefore it seems that it ought to be said of human being.

I reply to this that the rule is to be understood so that when something real and in the categorical line is said of the predicate, that is said of the subject. Now genus is intentional, and not ordered above animal in the category of substance. Therefore, even though it is said of animal, it is not necessary that it be said of human being. Or, it could be said that the rule is to be understood that if what is predicated of a predicate does not belong to the difference between the subject and the predicate. Now genus pertains to the difference between human being and animal. For this is false, "man is [a kind of] animal," insofar as animal is genus, although this is true, "man is [a kind of] animal, which is a genus."

Question 4

A doubt arises concerning this, which he says, "of different genera" etc. And it seems that that rule is not true, because substance quantity are different genera, and neither subalternates the other, and still body is a species of both. And so it seems that the same species belongs to different genera of which neither subalternates the other.

It must be replied that body can be considered in two ways, either as it names three dimensions alone, or as it names a nature subject to three dimensions. In the first way it is in the genus of quantity, and in the second way in the genus of substance. And so it is not the same species that is in the genus of substance and in

the genus of quantity. Note above this what he says, that the incomplex is neither true nor false, because truth is twofold, one of which is the true being of a reality, and thus every being in a category is true, because it has true being in reality, while the other is the truth that is caused from the relation of a complex of things to one another. And what is true in this way is not in a category, because what is in a category is incomplex.

Question 5

There is a doubt concerning this which is said: a primary substance is that which is strictly and principally and to the greatest degree called substance. And it seems that this is false, for that which is in the genus of substance is more a substance, but genera and species are in the genus of substance, and individuals are not, since they are indefinite <in number>; therefore it seems that genera and species are more substance than a primary substance.

It must be said as regards this that 'substance' is said from two acts, namely the act of subsisting and the act of standing beneath. Primary substance subsists strictly speaking, and therefore it is strictly called substance from the act of subsisting. It also principally stands beneath, and therefore it is principally substance from the act of standing beneath. It stands beneath to the greatest degree, for it stands beneath both secondary substances and accidents, and therefore it is called substance to the greatest degree in the same way from the act of standing beneath.

In response to the argument, when it is argued, "that is more substance etc.," I reply that individuals can be considered in two ways, either according to what they are, or as they are indefinite. If they are considered according to what they are, in this way they are in a category, and in this way genus and species are not more substances than individuals, for these subsist strictly speaking, and to the greatest degree and principally. If they are considered as they are indefinite, they are not in a category, for as such they cannot pass into the understanding; and it is as they are indefinite that the argument draws its conclusion. These words are customarily explained in another way, but it is not preferable to this.

Question 6

It is asked why, in giving examples of primary substances, he says this: Some human being, some horse—and he does not say, "Socrates, Plato."

I reply that this is because every imposition is from a form. The reason for this is that the same is signified by the name and the definition, and definition arises from a form, and therefore imposition does. And since the same is the form of the species and of the individual, and this essentially, therefore from the same, as it were, there will be imposition. But since that which indicates a species in an indeterminate mode indicates an individual in a determinate mode, a particular sign is added to designate this determination. Therefore, we say "some human being," and not "Socrates," for "Socrates," as this is signified, belongs accidentally to what is supposed in this way by "human being." But "some human being" is necessarily its *suppositum* because of the agreement in form which it expresses.

Question 7

It is doubted concerning this, which he says, that if primary substances are destroyed it is impossible for any other to remain.

And it seems that this is false, since when destructible things are destroyed, indestructible things are not necessarily destroyed. But primary substances are destructible things, and secondary substances indestructible. Therefore etc.

Regarding this it must be held that when destructible things are destroyed it is not necessary that indestructible things be destroyed without qualification. But it is necessary that destructible things be destroyed as far as that being they have in destructible things is concerned. Therefore, although it is not necessary that they be destroyed without qualification when primary substances are destroyed, still it is necessary that they be destroyed insofar as that being which they have in primary substances is concerned.

Question 8

It is also asked about what he says earlier, and he also says the same thing later, namely that something is predicated of something, and still its definition is not predicated of the same thing. For instance, he introduces the example of accidents in a conclusion which is about substances, but he does not give the reason for this.

For this seems unreasonable, because the definition and that of which it is the definition are convertible, and concerning whatever one convertible is said the other can be said too. Therefore it seems that it is a true that⁹ of whatever a name is predicated its definition will also be predicated.

I reply to this that concerning whatever the name is predicated, the definition is predicated of the same, if it has a definition strictly speaking. Now we know that accidents do not have definitions strictly speaking. And therefore even though they are said of their subjects, their definitions are not said of their subjects, because they don't have definitions.

In another way, some says that the Philosopher understand this concerning proper accidents; for even though a proper accident is said of something, it is not necessary that its formula be said of it. For both of these can be true, a man is snub-nosed, and yet the formula of snub-nosed is not predicated of the man. But of common accidents they do not say this is true, because in this way this is true, "a man is white, so this is true, "a man is colored, scatters light, seen (*coloratus, disgregatus, visus*)".

Or it can be said that the Philosopher understands it thus, that the name is said of something, of which the formula is not said, it is true as it indicates its essence, but it is said in a certain way of it, and thus accidents are said of substances as names and not according to their definition <or> formula, because the formula of an accident does not indicate the essence of the substance. And therefore it is not said to be predicated in accord with the formula, but in accord with the name only. But an essential predicate is said according to name and formula, because its formula indicates the essence of that of which it is predicated.

Question 9

It is doubted concerning what he says, that species is more substance than genus, for he says afterwards that substance is not susceptible of more or less, and so he seems to contradict himself.

Regarding this it must be said that substance can be considered in two ways, according to what it is, or as far as the act of standing under is concerned. So I maintain that as far as this act of standing under is concerned a species is more a substance than a genus, for it stands under more.¹⁰ And the Philosopher understands it thus. So far as what it is is concerned, it is not susceptible of more or less, for something is called more which is such that it goes over more to one contrary than another; for instance, something is said to be whiter which has black less mixed with it; and since nothing is contrary to substance according to what it is (even though, as it is considered as divided through opposites of which one has a more perfect form and the

⁹The edition has "*verum unitum*," which I cannot make sense of. Perhaps it should be "*verum dictum*."

¹⁰More in what way? Perhaps more directly, there being no species mediating between it and primary substances.

other a less perfect form, since it is impossible for two species under one genus to be equally perfect, in this way there is a contrary to it), as such, substance is not susceptible of more or less. But there will be discussion of this later.

Note that substance is not in a subject; for a subject names some being in actuality, but that which is in being in actuality is an accident, and since substance is not an accident it is not in a substance.

Note concerning this that he says that great and small are not contraries, for great and small can be considered in two ways, either as great is related to another as exceeding it and small as exceeded by it, and in this way they are contraries, or insofar as they are quantities, and in this way they are not contraries.

Question 10

Against the last property of substance, which is that although substance is one and the same in number, it is susceptible of contraries, Albert introduces four objections: (1) Substantial form according to its change is not susceptible of contraries,¹¹ and yet it is substance; therefore etc. (2) Again, god is a substance and yet is not susceptible of contraries. (3) Again, intelligences are substances and yet are not susceptible of contraries. (4) Again, the heavens is a substance and yet does not receive contraries, for it does not receive wandering impressions according to Aristotle.¹²

Because of the first objection it must be considered that this properties only agree with what can be ordered *per se* within the genus of substance, but substantial form is not such, since it is simple; therefore this property does not agree with substantial form.

In response to the second, I reply that God is not in a genus, but above every genus, and therefore even though He is a substance, it is not necessary that He receive contraries.

But concerning intelligences there is a difficulty, since there are in the genus of substance but still do not receive contraries. Therefore it must be said that one pair of contraries belongs to intelligences as they are in themselves, since they arise from nothing, and consequently can be converted to nothing, as they are in themselves. And this is what Plato says, "O divine gods, of whom I am the workman, just as by your nature you are dissoluble, so by my will you are indissoluble ."¹³ Therefore, as they are in themselves they are susceptible to contraries, namely, to being and non-being.

In response to the last, I reply that celestial bodies are susceptible of contraries because of the different positions they have, for sometimes they are in the eastern, sometimes in the western part, and as such, they are susceptible of contraries. Therefore everything which is *per se* in the genus of substance is susceptible of contraries.

It should also be known that truth is in a reality as in a cause, in an utterance as in a sign, in the understanding as in a subject; and therefore, it is not strictly said that a phrase is susceptible of the contraries, true and false, since a phrase is not their subject.

Question 11

¹¹The point is that 'substantial change,' as it is called, is coming to exist and ceasing to exist, not alteration of an existing substance's properties, which is 'accidental change.'

¹²Albertus Magnus, *Logica, Liber de praedicamentis*, Tract II, Chapter 12 (ed. Vives, I:188-199).

¹³Plato, *Timaeus* 41ab. The Artificer is speaking to the lower gods who rule the heavens. The passage and what follows makes the point that these gods, since they have been made, can in principle be destroyed, but the Artificer will in fact never allow them to be destroyed. So they are immortal by the will of God, but not by nature, and no natural being is of itself indestructible.

Next is it asked whether it is possible for a name to be equivocal.

And it is argued that it is not, since whatever does not signify one thing, signifies nothing, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV, but an equivocal name does not signify one thing, but several, and therefore it signifies nothing, and consequently is not a name, for a name is a significant utterance, and if it is not a name, it is not an equivocal name. It seems, then, that no name is equivocal.

Again, the unity of matter argues the unity of a form perfecting that matter. Now what is signified is a form perfecting the utterance. Since then, the utterance in an equivocal term is one, what is signified will also be one. But if the utterance is one and what is signified is one, no equivocal utterance will be assumed.

On the other hand, it is argued according to what the Commentator says on *Metaphysics* XI, that every [name] signifies actual being and potential being, but actual and potential being cannot be signified univocally through one name; therefore every name signifies several things, and so every name will be equivocal, or so it seems.

It must be replied to this that it is possible for every utterance to be equivocal, but still, not every utterance is. That it is possible, I prove, since an equivocal utterance is one which signifies several things equally principally, and from imposition. But it is possible for every utterance to signify several things equally principally and from imposition. Therefore it is possible for every utterance to be equivocal. Proof of the minor premise: First from the viewpoint of the reality, since just as a reality determines no utterance for itself, so also no utterance is repugnant to it. If¹⁴ a reality determines an¹⁵ utterance for itself, then it could not be that a reality is signified by different utterances in different languages, and we see the opposite to be the case. A reality, therefore, determines itself to no word as it is in itself, but every reality can be signified through every utterance as it is in itself.

Again, the contrary is proved from the viewpoint of the utterance, since just as utterance determines itself to no reality, so it is repugnant to the signification of no reality. But no utterance determines itself to a reality. This utterance, 'man,' no more determines itself to human nature than to anything else, but is determined from the imposition of someone attaching this utterance to this thing to be represented by it.

Again, it is proved from the viewpoint of the impositor, since the impositor is an understanding subject to a will; but a will is a rational power; now a rational power extends to opposite actions; therefore if the impositor wills, he could impose any name to signifying this and to signifying whatever else. Therefore from the viewpoint of each of these it is possible for every utterance to signify anything, and so every utterance can be equivocal.

But you will ask, Since an utterance does not determine itself to an any reality, can a word signify something indefinite? And it seems from what you have said that this is so, as much from the viewpoint of the reality, since it is indefinite, as from the viewpoint of the utterance, since it determines¹⁶ itself to no reality, and even as much as from the viewpoint of the impositor, since it is a voluntary agent.

I reply that every utterance, although it can signify several things according to the argument, still an utterance cannot signify anything indefinite, since for an utterance to be significative in this way not only requires a reality that must be signified and a signifying utterance, but the understanding of the impositor of such an utterance for such a reality. Now although this is possible from the viewpoint of the utterance and the reality, still it is not possible from the viewpoint of the impositor that he impose an utterance to signify something indefinite, even though he can impose the utterance to signify different things. For as he understands, so he imposes, but he does not understand something indefinite, therefore etc.

¹⁴Emending *sed* to *si*.

¹⁵Omitting *nullam*.

¹⁶Emending the plural *determinat* to the singular, *determinat*.

But even if it is possible that every utterance be equivocal and signify different things, still not every utterance is equivocal. What is signified by words cannot be proved, but we know it from the usage of authors. **An utterance cannot signify that a principle of demonstration is a principle of demonstration.** The Philosopher assumes this in *Metaphysics* IV, while disputing against those who deny first principles. But since we see from the usage of authors that some words signify one thing, and others several things, therefore we hold that some words are actually univocal, and others are actually equivocal.

As for the arguments, to the first, when it is argued “What one does not signify etc.,” I hold that what does not signify one thing by a single signification signifies nothing, just as whoever does not understand one thing by an act of understanding understands nothing. Therefore the equivocal signifies one thing, and several, one by one signification, several by several.

As to the other argument, when it is argued, “The unity of matter, etc.,” I grant the major premise. And when it is said in the minor premise that “the signified is the form etc.,” I grant that signifying absolutely considered is included in the account of utterance and is its form, but signifying this or that determinately is not the form of the utterance (*vox*), but is the form of what-names (*denominatio*). It is called ‘what-names’ through the form of signifying given it by the impositor. It is called ‘what-names’ because it is called such and such determinately, and because this or that signified thing is not the form of name, there is one what-names belonging to an equivocal utterance. For the utterance is not the matter of what is signified, hence this or that is what is signified, one or several, but it is one signified thing absolutely considered. Therefore even though there are several things signified, it is not necessary that there be several utterances. But since name is the matter of the utterance considered as it signifies this or that determinately, therefore an equivocal utterance is several names considered as there are several things signified.

Question 12

Next it is asked concerning the part “of those which are said according to no complexity,” in which the Philosopher posits the number of categories. Therefore we inquire concerning the number and the sufficiency of them.

And it seems that there are more than ten, for is one of a pair of opposites is said in several ways, the other is too. But substance and accident are opposites. Since there are nine genera of accidents, there will be nine genera of substances. In the same way it can be shown that there are only two genera, since if one of the opposites is not said in several ways, neither is the other, but substance is only one genus; therefore there will be only one genus of accident, since substance and accident are opposites.

Again, it is argued that there are more than ten, since just as acting is distinct from receiving action, so is having distinct from being had, but acting and receiving action are different categories; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is clear through the Philosopher, who says there are only ten categories, namely substance, quantity, etc.

It must be said in response to this that there are ten categories and no more nor less. To make this clear it must be considered that all things other than primary substances are either said of primary substances or are in primary substances. If they are said of primary substances they are either said of them according to name, or according to formula, for that is strictly said of another what is said according to name and formula, as the Philosopher says in the text. If, then, another than primary substance is said of primary substance according to name and formula, in this way it is in category of substance. If they are in primary substances, then, since such things are accidents, they are in them either through something extrinsic or through something intrinsic. If through something intrinsic, they are either in them absolutely or in relation to another. If absolutely, either through the nature of matter, and in this way it is quantity, or through the nature of form, and in this way it is quality, since quality is what informs and denominates. If they are in them in relation to

another, in this way it is relation. But if accidents are in primary substances through something extrinsic, that extrinsic thing is related to primary substances either as measure to measured, or as agent to patient, or as something that is had to what has it. If it is related to primary substance as agent to patient, or conversely, in this way two categories result, namely action and passion, for the action of an agent on a patient causes a certain motion, which is called action from the agent, and passion from the patient. If that extrinsic thing is related to primary substance as measured to what is measured, since an extrinsic measure is not unless it is two, namely place and time, therefore an extrinsic accident can be related to a primary substance as place to what is placed in it, and in this way it is the category where. For where is a certain way of being which is caused in what is in a place from the relation place has to it—and this is what the author of the *Six Principles* wished to signify when he said that where is a limiting etc., according to which we say up and down are distinct. But if place is not related to what is located in it, in this way it is the category which is position. For position is nothing except a certain way of being caused in a body located in a place from the relation which place has to it and its parts, according to which we say something is seated or standing because its parts are disposed in the whole differently when it is seated and when it stands. And the author of the *Six Principles* wished to signify this when he said that position is a situation etc. If an extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as time to a temporal thing, in this way the category when results. For when is not unless a certain way of being is caused in a temporal thing from the relation which time has to it. And this is what the author of the *Six Principles* wished to signify when he said that when is what is left etc., according to which manner of denomination something is said to be on one day, or of one year. But if the extrinsic accident is related to primary substance as having is related to what has it, in this way the category of having results. And it is in this way that we say the attire of Socrates is related to Socrates when he is dressed. So the having caused in Socrates when he is dressed from the clothing which he has is said be his habit. And this is what the author of the *Six Principles* says, that having is of a body and of those round about the body, so that having consists in a certain application of those which are around the body to the body—and this category of having is not found in animals other than human beings except when they enter into the customs of human beings. Therefore Thomas says on *Physics* III that being attired and such as pertain to having clothing, as they are said of other animals than human beings that belong to the category of substance, they are in the category of having.

In this way, then, the number and sufficiency of the categories is received, so that categories are distinguished into three ways of being: being not in another, being in another, and being in relation to another. Being not in another belongs to substance, being in another merely absolutely belongs to quality and quantity, but being in another and in relation to another is with respect to relation and the other six categories. For the other six are certain relations, or are caused from certain relations. So although it can be granted that depending on another is of the essence of seven categories, still I do not believe is of the essence of quantity and quality. Even though quality and quantity agree in this, that both indicate being in another absolutely, still there is no reality found except in these two. They differ, however, in this, that quantity measures a substance and quality informs a substance.

In response to the arguments. In response to the first, when it is argued, “if one opposite is said in several ways so are the others,” I reply that this is true as far as what is signified is concerned, but as far as *supposita* are concerned. For if different things are opposites it is necessary that as many as are signified by one opposite be signified by the other. And let the minor premise be granted. Still it does not follow that as many are contained under the subject as are contained under accident. And therefore although accident contains nine genera, it does not follow that substance contains that many; and the reason that there are many genera of accidents is that many things can belong to one thing. Therefore, although there is one genus of substance, there can be many genera of accidents. That many belong to one is obvious, for some belong to substance as dispositions, some as effects, and so on for the rest.

And in the same way the second argument is apparent. For it was seen how the proposition is to be

understood, for if one opposite etc.

In response to the other, when it is argued, “just as acting is distinct from suffering action, etc.,” I reply that it is so in a certain way, and in a certain not. Just as acting is not suffering action, thus having is not being had. Nevertheless, there is not so much difference between having and being had as there is between acting and suffering action, for between acting and suffering action there is enough difference for the distinction of categories, but between having and being had there is not. And the reason for this is that categories are distinguished within ways of being, since they are distinguished within ways of predicating. Because of this substance is distinguished from the others. But ways of predicating arise from ways of being as ways of signifying, and because of this categories are distinguished within ways of being but not within all ways of being but only those ways which agree in nothing, and of which one does not reduce to the other. Now the ways of being of action and passion agree in nothing, for according to the way of being of action the cause gives being to the effect, and according to the ways of being of passion an effect receives being from the cause. Therefore action and passion are distinguished as cause and caused, but cause and caused are of different primary being, and agree in nothing, nor does one reduce to the other, and therefore from such different categories can arise. From this sort of different ways of being, then, different categories arise, but what has and what is had do not distinguish being in this way, nor do they arise from ways of being which distinguish a being as being; but these ways of being which are of what has and what is had are reduced to other ways of being, and so do not constitute different categories; and this way of being to which what has and what is had reduces is called having.

Question 13

Next it is asked about the chapter on substance, and it is asked concerning substances whether it is one genus.

And it is argued that it is not, because the corruptible and the incorruptible are not of one genus. But of substances some are corruptible, and some are incorruptible. The corruptible substances are these lower substances, the incorruptible such as the higher substances. Therefore not every substance belongs to one genus, and every substance is of the genus of substance. Therefore substance is not one genus.

Again, the species must be coequal under a genus. But material and immaterial substances are coequal substances. For an immaterial substance shares in the form of substance differently than a material substance does. Therefore material and immaterial substances are not under the genus of substance, but under the genus of the one.

On the other hand, it is argued: if a substance were not one genus, then there would be more than ten categories, because then there would be two categories of substance, but there are no more than ten categories, therefore etc.

It must be understood here that substance is a primary genus and one genus. That it is a primary genus is clear, because it constitutes the primary genus in beings, which is most truly being and the cause of being in all the others. Now accidents are not beings because of the being which they have in themselves, but because of being that is in the substance, hence, too, it is that there is no being except because of these beings, and hence it is that the being of substances is absolute being, while the being of accidents is a being in relation to something (*comparata*). Because of this Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics* II¹⁷ that the formula of the category of accident is that it is a reality the being of which is in another. If, therefore, that which has being in itself is more truly being than what has being in another, and only substance has being in itself, only a substance will be a being most truly.

To return to the argument, that is the primary genus in beings which is most truly being and the cause

¹⁷Avicenna, *De Philosophia Prima*, II 1, 74vb in the Venice 1508 edition of Avicenna's works.

of being in all the others, but substance is like this, therefore etc. From this it follows that substance is one genus. Since substance is the primary genus, which depends on no other in its being, if we assumed that substance is not one genus then we would assume that two genera are equally primary, of which neither depends on the other. But this is absurd, because as in all beings tracing it back finally brings us to a stand at one primary being, thus tracing back all the general comes to a stand finally at one primary genus, as is confirmed in the twenty-fourth proposition of Proclus.¹⁸ In every ordering one is before many. And therefore every order of multitude is reducible to one unity, and therefore there is a reduction of all genera to one primary genus, and that is substance. Now under this genus is contained every caused material and immaterial substance, but simple and composite. And this is apparent. For the category of substance is composed from two, namely from reality and from the manner of being added over and above itself. These are required in every category, through which categories are distinguished from one another. But categories are not distinguished through essences alone, since we see different essences contained under one category, for instance, the essence of human being and donkey. Therefore different manners of being are required through which they are distinguished. And in this way being is more formally in a category than reality, and it is called the form of predicating. And therefore every category is established from reality and from a formula of predicating.

What it is it, then, through which something reposes in the category of substance? I reply that it is through this, that it is another reality and nature to which there belongs a certain manner of being, to subsist in itself and stand under others. So whatever coincides with this manner of being is found in the category of substance. But every substance other than the first has this manner of being, therefore etc. The minor premise is proved: for it is plain that every substance other than the first has this manner of being, therefore such substances subsist in themselves. It is also clear that every substance other than the first subsists through accidents, because every substance other than the first is withdrawn from the simplicity of the first, and therefore in every substance other than the first being is added to essence. And since its substances subsists by its being, its substance subsists by an accident, since being in it is an accident of essence.

Now God is not in the category of substance, for even though it agrees with God most of all to subsist, still it does not agree with God to subsist through others, that is, an accident, nor to stand as an inferior under something superior. And therefore God is in the categories, but is outside of every category and is the measure of all the others which are in the first category of substance and the second category of accidents. And this is what the Commentator says on *Metaphysics* XII—just as in colors there is one color which is the measure of the all the others, so in substances there is one substance, which is the measure of all the substances, and this is the first mover, which is pure and is not mixed with potentiality.¹⁹ And this is what Avicenna says, that God is not that which is truly substance, but above substance.²⁰

As for the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued, “Corruptible and incorruptible etc.,” I distinguish concerning genus. For there is logical genus, which is an essential similitude found in several things differing in species, and there is physical genus, and that is matter which is subject to different natural forms. When, therefore, it is said that corruptible and incorruptible things are not one in physical genus, because the incorruptible do not have a material genus, because that is a corruptible physical genus, still [corruptible and] incorruptible can be of one logical genus.

In response to the other argument, when it is argued “species must be coequal etc.,” Armonius on the book of *Perihermenias*, when the question is moved about affirmation and negation, which of these is prior,

¹⁸Proclus, *Insti. theologica* prop. XXIV.

¹⁹Averroes, *In Metaphysicis* XII, comm. 22 (308E), comm. 30 (314 I-K).

²⁰Avicenna, *Metaphys.* 98vb-99ra.

replies that things can be coequal under a genus in two ways, either according to reality or according to participation in some name.²¹ Hence, according to reality and nature one species is more perfect than another and they are not coequal. But they are coequal as concerns participation in the genus, and thus material and immaterial substances are coequal, as they are contained under the genus of substance, even though according to perfection incorruptible substance is prior to corruptible substance.

Question 14

Concerning the text of the chapter on quantity, it is questioned first why he does not define quantity.

I reply to this that if quantity were to be defined, it could not be defined except through the subject, or its essential principles, or genus and difference. One does not define quantity through the subject, because quantity is a maximally abstract accident about all accidents, and therefore, to denote that abstraction one does not define it through the subject. Nor [does one define it] through essential principles, because it does not belong to the logician to consider the essential principles of something, but the metaphysician. Nor does one define it through genus and difference, since it does not have a genus and differences about itself, for it is a most general genus. And therefore one does not define quantity.

Note that in one way position is a category, in another way a species of quantity. For position can be said of the order of parts in some whole absolutely, and thus it is a species of quantity, or it can be said of an order of parts in some whole though comparison to place, and thus it is a category.

Question 15

It is asked why he does not put the moved under the genus of quantity here, since he does place the moved under the genus of quantity in *Metaphysics V*.²²

It must be replied that the Philosopher considers quantity here as it has the form of measure, and because time has the form of measure, but the moved does not, therefore he assumes time is in the genus of quantity, but the moved is not.

But someone might argue against this thus: whatever is that because of which is more so. But time is quantity because of the moved, since its diversity is due to the moved. Therefore etc.

As for this, when it is said, "Whatever is that because of which etc.," I reply that whatever is that because of which per se and primarily it is some such, is more such. And to the minor premise, I reply that time is not so much per se and primarily through what is moved, but through magnitude; and therefore it is not necessary that the moved be itself more a quantity.

Again, the moved is of the genus of that to which it is moved, and since the moved is sometimes moved to substance, sometimes to quality, sometimes to quantity, therefore it is said that it is not quantity per se.

Note that he assumes place to be a species of quantity, insofar as it is a measure of what has a location.

Note why the parts of number are not joined by any common limit, because if they were joined by something, this would maximally be unity, since it belongs to the formula of unity to be indivisible, at least in the way in which the divisible is constituted [from such a unity]. And this I hold for line and surface, which are

²¹Armonius Hermeae Fil., *In lib. De interpr. Ar. Interpretatio*, in A.H.F., *In Porphyrii Institutionem Aristotelis Categorias et librum de interpretatione*, Apud Vinc. Valgrisium, Venetiis 1559, 217.

²²*Metaphysics V 1.*

not indivisible without qualification, but are in the way in which divisibles are constituted [from them];²³ but unity cannot make the parts in number continuous,²⁴ because what makes them continuous is related to them in the formula of the formal in respect to them;²⁵ but unity is related in the formula of the material in respect of number;²⁶ and therefore it does not make the parts of number continuous.

Note that by that linguistic expression (*oratio*) which is a discrete quantity he does not intend something complex, but understands whatever, complex or incomplex, as long as the syllables succeed one another continuously in speaking, so that a linguistic expression which is a discrete quantity is an utterance, complex or incomplex, such that its syllables succeed one another continuously in speaking, and one syllable is not a continuation of another.²⁷ And through this, that he says the syllables succeed [one another], *oratio* is distinguished as a discrete quantity from number, because the unities remain in number, but it is not such with the parts of a linguistic expression which is a discrete quantity.²⁸ Although number is a multitude of discrete permanent [parts], a linguistic expression which is a discrete quantity is a multitude of discrete syllables²⁹ succeeding one another in continuous speech. Through the syllables' being, as he says, discrete, it is distinguished from a period of time, which has parts continuous with one another.³⁰

Note that in order that a quantity should have position three things are required. The first is that it have situations for its parts, so that one can assign where each part is situated, for instance, so one can say that this part of a line is situated in the beginning, and this one in the middle, and so on. The second is that the parts be joined through some common limit. The third is that the parts remain.³¹

Question 16

The next doubt concerns what he says about the parts of a line, that they are situated somewhere, because what is situated somewhere is in a place. but the parts of a line are not in a place, since they are not bodies. Therefore etc.

²³That is, the parts of number are ones, but they are not joined together as the unitary lengths making up line, for instance, are joined by their limiting points. These limiting points of the unit lengths making up a line are unities in a maximal sense, since they cannot be divided into shorter lines in a way corresponding to the way in which the unit lengths making up the line are joined.

²⁴That is, there is no unity (point) making the parts of number (the ones making it up) continuous with one another in the way a point joins the parts (unit lengths) of a line, making them continuous, so that they make up one unbroken line.

²⁵That is, what makes two unit lengths continuous is related to those lengths as their form, for it is the limits of the lengths, which define them, or constitute them as the lengths they are, that do this.

²⁶That is, the unit that makes up number is related to it not formally, but materially, since the units involved in number are parts of it, but do not limit or define it. So the parts of number are discrete, not continuous.

²⁷The idea seems to be that one syllable is not continuous with the next in the way that the parts of a line are, so that they share a limit, but they are continuous in the sense that no other syllable intervenes between them.

²⁸That is, the linguistic experience has *temporal* parts, which do not exist at the same time, but come one after another. Numbers have permanent parts which coexist at the same time.

²⁹Or, one supposes, given the first sentence in the paragraph, a single discrete syllable.

³⁰The parts of a period of time are continuous in the way that the parts of a line are, that is, they are joined by common limits (instants instead of points) which define them (since a period of time is defined by its beginning and end).

³¹That is, the parts are not passing temporal parts, but exist simultaneously in the whole.

I reply to this that the major premise is false, because something situated somewhere as in a whole, are not [situated] as in a place, and if the parts of a line are situated in the line as in a whole, they are not situated as in a place.

Question 17

A question is raised concerning the manner of arguing of the Philosopher, when he proves that large and small are not contraries.

For it is argued thus: this is large and this is small in relation to that; therefore this is large and this is small; if therefore large and small were contraries, large and small will be in the same.³² It seems that this is ignorance of what constitutes a refutation, as if it were argued thus, “this is good and this is not good in relation to that, therefore it is good and not good.”

I reply that it does not follow in virtue of its form, but if it is assumed that large and small are quantities, it follows well enough. If this is large and this is small in relation to that, then this is large and small absolutely, because quantities are in whatever they are in absolutely.³³

Question 18

Because the Philosopher says great and small are not contraries and does not say what the reason is, I ask what the reason for this is.

I reply that this is the reason, because perfect and imperfect do not make for different species. But large and small differ as perfect and imperfect. For the large is that which has a perfect quantity, but a small has a diminished quantity. But contraries do make for different species, therefore large and small are not contraries.

Question 19

It is asked about what he says, that place up and place down are contraries.

Note that place can be considered in two ways, either in as much as it contains absolutely, and thus no place is a contrary, since, as such, it is only a quantum; or in as much as it has a capacity to preserve or destroy, and thus place is a contrary, but this is by reason of a quality.

Note that nothing is the contrary of a quantity, and the reason for this is that contraries are agent and patient to one another, and they corrupt or expel one another. Now all such are moved, but everything moved is divisible, and being divisible, it is a quantum, and so it is prior in its matter to what it is when there is an additional action or passion. From this I argue: what is before every contrariety, is not any contrary. But quantity is in matter before every contrariety, therefore etc. The minor is obvious, because in the same instant of time, in which [substantial] form is introduced into matter, quantity arrives.

Note why quantity is not susceptible to more or less. I hold that this is because quantity does not have

³²The reference is to *Categories* 6, 5b32 ff. Aristotle is arguing that large and small are relatives, not quantities, on the ground that if they are quantities: “Further, if large and small are to be contraries, it will turn out that the same thing admits contraries at the same time, and that things are their own contraries. For the same thing turns out to be at the same time both large and small—since in relation to this thing it is small but in relation to another this same thing is large . . .” (Ackrill translation)

³³*Categories* 6, 5b11: “Next, a quantity has no contrary. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious that there is no contrary; there is, for example, no contrary to four-foot or five-foot or to a surface or anything like that. But might someone say that many is contrary to few or large to small? None of these, however, is a quantity; they are relatives. For nothing is called large or small just in itself, but by reference to something else . . .” (Ackrill translation)

a contrary. From this, that another is more such, because it grows nearer to one contrary extreme, it is said that something is whiter, because it is less mixed with black, and less such because it grows nearer to less. Since, then, no quantity is a contrary, a quantity cannot become more or less. The same reason can be given concerning substance, and in so far as it has no contrary, so far it is also not subject to more or less.

Question 20

Next it is asked whether that substance which is the most general genus, is simple or composite substance.

And it seems that it is simple substance, since the composite is not predicated of the simple, but that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of simple substances, for instance, of intelligences, for intelligences are simple substances, since, as Avicenna says in *The Book of Causes*, an intelligence is a substance which is not divided; therefore etc.

Again, the primary is related to the manner of a form, but substance which is the most general genus is primary, and therefore it is related to the manner of form. But form is something simple, therefore that substance which is the most general genus is something simple.

On the other hand, it is argued that the simple is not predicated of the composite, but that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of composite substances, for instance, of human beings, donkeys, cows, and such; therefore etc.

It must be understood here that the substance which is the most general genus can be considered as it really is, or as falling under the form of the most general genus, or as regards its essence. If it is considered as falling under the form of the most general genus, I hold that the substance which is the most general genus considered thus is simple and not composite. This is explained thus: that of which the form is not divided into other things prior according to understanding, nor into others prior in reality, is something simple and not composite. But the form of most general genus is not divided into others prior according to understanding, for instance, into genus and differences, since it does not have a genus and differences, since it is the most general genus, above which no other genus is found. And since it is not divided according to understanding, it is obvious that it is not divided in reality, since the understanding is well able to divide in accord with a formula even what is undivided in reality. Therefore etc.

Now if that substance which is the most general genus is considered in respect of its essence absolutely, I hold that it is not simple, nor composite. For substance is the most general genus in relation to its species, but in the essence of the genus considered as genus neither one nor several species is included. This is clear, since if you were to define some genus, for instance, animal, you would not receive any substance, for instance donkey or human being, though this essence is not in reality other than these, since a single reality does not make a genus. Therefore etc.

But if that substance which is the most general genus is considered in connection with its being one, thus it can be considered either as regards being in the understanding or as regards real being. If it be considered as regards being in the understanding, thus I hold it is neither simple nor composite, since as that substance which is the most general genus as regards its real being it is neither simple absolutely nor composite absolutely, and thus neither is it composite or simple considered as regards being understood, since a reality has the same disposition in being and in truth. If it be considered as to its real being, thus I hold it is both simple and composite, and we hold the same concerning animal in respect of human being and donkey. For the genus in its real being is nothing other than all its species. Now that substance which is the most general genus is related to simple and composite substance as genus to its species, and therefore in real being it is both simple and composite.

Thus three things are apparent, namely, that is the substance which is the most general genus be

considered as to its form, thus it is something simple; if it be considered as to its essence absolutely, thus it is neither simple nor composite; in the same way, if it be considered as to its being understood, it is neither simple nor composite; and if it be considered as to its real being, thus it is both simple and composite.

But you will reply that Boëthius says in his comment here,³⁴ that even though substance is threefold, matter and form and the composite, Aristotle treats the extremes here through the middle, which is the composite, and therefore according to Boëthius that substance which is the most general genus is a composite substance.

To understand this, it must be considered that everything contained in the category of substance is composite on two grounds, namely in reality, and from the manner in which accidental being is added to it. Hence these two, namely reality and form, structure (*integrant*) the category. What I call the form is the manner of being which belongs to the reality. Therefore the category of substance is constructed from the reality and the form, or the manner of being, that is, not being in another. For the Philosopher says in the text that it is proper to every substance not to be in any subject. That substance, therefore, which is the category is not some composite from matter and form, but is a composite from something material and something formal, or from essence and being, for every substance other than the First is composed from essence and being, and therefore every substance other than the First is contained under the category of substance. This, then, is what Boëthius understands, that although substance is threefold, namely matter, form and composite, he treats of the extremes through the middle.

From this I argue: That substance which is the most general genus is that which is the middle between matter and form, but this can only be the composite of matter and form, therefore etc. But I hold that Boëthius does not understand by form the form that comes into being and is destroyed, but the First form, which is God, who is His own being from Himself. But by matter he understands the primary subject with which being does not coincide from itself, and by that middle substance, which is treated here, he understands another essence with which being does coincide. And so that substance which is the most general genus is the composite from essence and being. Therefore Boëthius intends to say that the other extremes, namely the naming and prime matter which are both *per se* in the genus of substance, are to be treated through the middle, namely through the substance which is essence with which being coincides.

Next it must be understood that even though everything which is contained in the category of substance is composed from essence and being, still some of these, in addition to being composed from essence and being, are also composed from matter and form, and such can come to be and be destroyed, and are called composite substances. Others are composed only from essence and being, and such are called simple substances. For this reason, then, we hold that substance which is the most general genus contains under itself composite and simple substances, since it contains substance composed from matter and form, and that which is composed only from essence and being, but is not composed from matter and form. Both can be explained. As to the first, it is explained that it is not composed from matter and form. For an intelligence is an intellectual nature to a higher degree than our understanding. Now our understanding is assumed to be immaterial so that it might understand all things, and therefore the Philosopher says in *De Anima* III that it is necessary for our intellect to be unmixed, so that it might understand all things.³⁵ Since then the intelligences are the greatest intellectual substances, they must be immaterial and simple, and must not be composed from matter and form. But they are composed from essence and being. The proof of this is because it belongs to the what-it-is of each thing not to be caused in it through anything extrinsic, since if it were, what it is would be demonstrable of that of which it is. But being is created in an intelligence from without, namely from the First being, and the intelligence has a capacity to

³⁴Boëthius, *In Cat. Aristotelis*, Migne, PL 64, 184A-B.

³⁵Aristotle, *De Anima* III 4.

receive that being; and this is what he says in Comment 9 on the *Book of Causes*, that an intelligence has being and form, understanding by form its whatness. Thus it is apparent that that substance which is the most general genus is something composite, not a composite from matter and form, but from a reality and a mode of being added to it.

In response to the arguments: As to the first, when it is argued, “a composite is not predicated” etc., I grant this. And then I reply to the minor premise, what intelligences in a certain way are simple, and in another way composite. They are simple because they are not composed from matter and form, but are composed from essence and being. And therefore, although that substance which is the most general genus is composite, it can be proved of intelligences.

In response to the other, I grant the whole argument, since nothing is concluded except that the most general genus is something simple as regards its form, and this is granted. Or it can be held that even though that substance which is the most general genus is related to the manner of form, it is not necessary that it be as simple as the form, and so it can be composed from essence and being.

In response to the arguments on the other hand, when it is argued, “The simple is not predicated of the composite,” I grant it, and when it is said that that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of composites, I hold that it is not predicated of composites as they are composed of matter and form, but as they are composed of essence and being. And this is the common from through which substance is predicated of all those of which it is predicated. And therefore that substance which is the most general genus is simple insofar as it does not include in its form composition from matter and form, but only includes composition from being and essence.

Question 21

Next it is asked about the chapter on substance, namely, whether primary substance is more substance than secondary substance.

And it is argued that secondary substance is more substance than primary, since that because of which it is such is itself more such. But primary substance is substance because of secondary substance, since some human being is a human being and a human being is a substance, therefore some human being is a substance;³⁶ therefore secondary substance is more substance than primary.

Again, what is more a being is more a substance. But secondary substance is more a being than a primary substance, for a secondary substance is of the number of realities that remain and are indestructible, but a primary substance is able to come to be and to be destroyed; therefore etc.

On the other hand, it is argued: That substance which is substance strictly and principally and maximally is more substance; but primary substance is strictly and principally and maximally substance; therefore etc.

It must be understood here that a primary substance adds something over and above secondary substance. Primary substance is related to secondary as an individual to a species, but an individual adds something over and above its species; and therefore a primary substance adds something over and above a secondary substance, and I don't care right now if it is a reality or only a conception (*ratio*). Now primary substance names two things, namely the whatness of a species and an accident of that whatness; therefore a primary substance can be considered either in relation to its whatness or in relation to an accident. If it be considered in relation to its whatness, which is none other than the whatness of its species, in this way I hold

³⁶The point is that a particular human being, a primary substance, is shown by this demonstrative syllogism to be a human being using the general middle term, human being, a secondary substance. The middle term in a demonstrative syllogism is the cause, of course.

that a primary substance is not more a substance than a secondary substance, nor conversely. And the reason is that whatever things are so related that they are one whatness and nature, one is no more substance than the other. But a primary substance considered as regards its whatness and a secondary substance as regards its whatness are one essence and one nature. Therefore the Philosopher says in the text that secondary substances indicate primary substance, what they are, and nothing is properly introduced in picking out primary substances except species or genus; therefore etc.

Now if a primary substance is considered as it joins to itself some accident outside its whatness, in this way secondary substance is more substance than primary substance. This is explained thus: That which is a being in itself is more a substance than what is a being accidentally; but primary substance, if it be considered not only as to its whatness but as to an accident of its whatness, is a being accidentally, since it joins in itself two, one of which is an accident of the other. But a secondary substance includes nothing except its whatness. Therefore in this way secondary substance is more substance than primary substance, for secondary substance includes nothing except that which is *per se* in the category of substance, but a primary substance includes another that is not *per se* in the category of substance, since it includes both the whatness and an accident of the whatness. And therefore according to this secondary substance is more a substance than primary substance.

But if primary substance is considered as regards this act which is to stand under, in this way primary substance is more substance than secondary; for what stands under more things is more a substance, but primary substance stands under more things than a secondary substance; therefore etc.

But it must be noted that even though secondary substances include nothing except what is *per se* in the category of substance, but primary substance includes something else, even so, that which is signified primarily by the name of substance is primary substance. And the reason for this is that names are imposed more primarily on what is better known to us, but a particular, designated primary substance is better known to us than a secondary substance, and therefore of those things signified by the name of substance, that substance which is primarily signified is primary substance. And therefore the Philosopher says in the text that primary substance is what is strictly and principally and maximally called substance. "It is called," that is, signified, he says "it is called," and not "it is." And because of this argument composite substance is always taken to be more primarily signified by the name "substance" than form or matter, as appears in the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* VII.³⁷

Thus it is clear that in one way primary substance is more substance than secondary substance, and in a second way secondary substance is more substance than primary, and in a third way neither is more substance than the other.

In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued, "that because of which etc." this is true, that because of which something is such, that is itself more such, formally or affectively. And as for the minor, when it is said that "primary substance etc.," I reply that if primary substance is considered as regards what it is, thus it is not substance because of secondary substance, since in this way it is the same as secondary substance. If it is considered as regards its whatness and as regards an accident which it names, in this way primary substance is substance because of secondary substance, and in that, not by reason of its whatness, conveyed through the primary substance, but by reason of an accident.

As for the second argument, when it is argued, "what is more a being etc.," I grant it. And when it is said that "secondary substance is more a being," I reply that primary substance is considered as regards what it is, thus secondary substance is not more a being than primary substance, indeed, just as secondary substance is not able to come into being and cannot be destroyed, so primary substance is not able to come into being and cannot be destroyed taken in this way; but if it is considered as it joins whatness and accident in itself, thus I hold that secondary substance is more being than primary, since primary substance in this way can come into

³⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII 1.

being and be destroyed.

Question 22

Next it is asked about the part, “but it is in substances.” Now the Philosopher says there that an accident is not predicated of a subject according to its name and according to its formula. Therefore it is asked whether an accident pertains to the what it is of its subjects.

And it is argued that it is, since each thing is cognized through its what it is. From this it is argued: That through which something is cognized belongs to its what it is, but a subject is cognized through its accidents, because the accidents to a great extent lead us to cognizing what it is, as is said in *De Anima I*; therefore etc.

Again, that through which something is defined pertains to its what it is; but substance has its being defined through its accidents; therefore etc. The minor is proved: since in a perfect definition all the causes must be present, but, now, some accidents are causes of their subjects, for head and cold are causes of the subjects in which they are, therefore the subjects have their being defined through accidents.

On the other hand, it is argued: That which comes to something after it is an actual being does not pertain to its what it is, but accidents come to substances after they actually are; therefore etc.

It must be said to this that accidents do not pertain to the what it is of their subjects, for what it is does not differ really from that of which it is, but only conceptually. And this is apparent, since “what it is” is said from whatness, just as “a being” is said from essence. Now whatness and essence are the same in reality, but differ conceptually. What ever indicates essence absolutely, indicates whatness in the order of understanding, and because of this I hold that whatness is an object of the understanding. Hence whatness is called a subject which is actually predicated of a reality. Whatness is the same as essence, then. Consequently, what it is, and that of which the what it is is, are the same. And so the major premise is apparent. Now an accident is other in reality than that of which it is. It is because of this that it is called an accident, because it is an added nature. Therefore an accident does not pertain to the whatness of that of which it is an accident.

Again, this can be explained thus: Whatever is must be given through something prior. From this it is argued that posterior things do not belong to the what it is of prior things. Now accidents are posterior to substances, for every accident comes to a substance after it is in actuality; therefore etc. Because of this the Philosopher says in the text that accidents are not predicated of their substances either according to name or concept,³⁸ since if they were predicated of them according to concept, they would belong to their what it is. That, therefore, is predicated according to concept of something which belongs to its substance, and to it alone. But accidents are not predicated according to name and formula, and therefore they do not belong to the what it is of their subjects.

In response to the argument: As for the first, when it is argued, “That through which something is cognized etc.,” reply that cognition is twofold, essential and accidental. Essential cognition is obtained through essential principles of the reality; accidental cognition is obtained through accidents. Then, when he says, “That through which something is cognized etc.,” it is true if it is cognized through essential cognition, but not when we cognize a substance thus through its accidents, but we cognize it by an accidental cognition through accidents.

³⁸“Predicated according to name” would mean that the substance has the name of the accident true of it, which might, of course, happen (“This is a grey” said of a horse), but usually would not (“This is a green,” said of a car or a shirt). “Predicated according to concept (*ratio*)” would mean that the substance has the definition of the accident true of it, and this, Aristotle insists, is never true. Where the name of the accident is predicabile of a substance, it would not function in the same way as when it is used in saying that the accident is in or belongs to the substance (“The horse is grey” vs. “The horse is a grey”), and certainly does not function to predicate grey of the horse.

As for the other, when it is argued, “That through which something is defined etc.,” I grant the major premise. And when it is said that “subject is defined etc.,” I deny it. As for its proof, when you say that every cause is taken into the definition of a reality, I reply that this is true. But causes are twofold, namely some *per se* and some accidental. And I hold that *per se* causes must be placed in the definition of the reality of which they are causes, but not accidental causes, and it is in this way that accidents are causes of substances.

Question 23

Certain questions concerning the text of the chapter on relation are asked, and **first it is asked** why he does not define relation, but relatives. For he says, “But that to which another etc.”

I reply to this that if relation were defined, it would either be defined through its essential principles, which cannot be the case here, for a logician does not consider the essences of things, or through its genus and differences, which cannot be, since relation is a highest genus. So, in neither of these ways does he define relation or relatives. Or through a subject, but it can’t be done in this way, either, for the proper formula of relation is not being in a subject, but being in relation to another. Therefore the Philosopher, wishing to denote relation, denotes the extremes of relation, and he notes through this that relation has an essential dependence on its extremes, and therefore he says “But such are said in relation to something etc.”

And it must be noted that relation, which is a category, is not in relation to another, but is that by which something is referred to another, for if it were in relation to another, then that in relation to which it was would be a nature simultaneous with it, and would be a highest genus for this reason, and there would be more than ten categories.

Question 24

There is a doubt about what he says, that position is relational (*ad aliquid*). Isn’t position a category? Hence, it is agreed that it is, and so it does not seem to be in the category of relation.

I reply that position can be considered in two ways, either as it has the manner of predicating distinct from the category of relation, or as it consists in the relation of things to one another. In the first way position is a category. In the second way, position is in the category of relation. Note the reason why sitting and standing are not positions, and the reason for this is that sitting and standing are concrete, and such are not in any category, but this is said denominatively from positions.

Question 25

It is asked about his remark that virtue and vice are contraries, but double and half are not, since what seems to be the reason why one relative is contrary to something, and the other is not contrary to anything?

I reply that the relation, of all categories, has the noblest being, it is founded on realities of different genera and on the terms (*extrema*) of relation, and therefore all relatives are of other genera <than relative>, and therefore those relatives founded on a reality in which there is contrariety are contraries, and those which are founded on realities in which there is no contrariety are not contraries. And therefore, since double and half are founded on realities in the category of quantity, in which category there is certainly no contrariety, therefore double and half are not contraries. But since virtue and vice are in the genus of quality, in which genus there is indeed contrariety, therefore virtue and vice, even though they are relative, are also contraries. Hence relatives can be considered as they are relatives, and thus they are not contraries, but when they are considered as they are founded on realities of different genera, thus relatives are sometimes contraries, sometimes not.

Question 26

It is asked about his remark that the unequal is susceptible to more or less.

For it seems that this is false, since the unequal is quantity, and quantity is not susceptible to more or less.

I reply that the unequal can be considered in two ways, either as it is founded on absolute quantity, and thus it is not susceptible of more or less, or it can name a certain indeterminate measure, to which there might be addition or subtraction, and thus the unequal is susceptible to more or less. Now these quantities which indicate determinate measures are not susceptible to more and less. So double and half are not susceptible to more or less . . . ,³⁹ because such an unequal indicates an indeterminate measure, for the unequal can be what has a double quantity, or triple, or four-fold, and therefore it is susceptible to greater and less.

Question 27

It is doubted concerning this which he says, that relatives are simultaneous in nature, for since prior in nature and posterior in nature are relatives, prior in nature and posterior in nature will be simultaneous in nature, which seems to be false.

It must be understood that “relatives being simultaneous in nature” can be understood in two ways, either as regards the being of actual existence, or as regards being relative. Hence it is not necessary that they be simultaneous in nature as regards the being of actual existence because father and son are relatives, and it is not necessary that if the son is according to actual existence, the father is according to actual existence. But as regards relative being, it is necessary that relatives be simultaneous in nature, for just as this refers to that according to its nature, so that depends on that or refers to it according to its nature. For just as father refers to son, so son refers to father, and simultaneously, since whenever son refers to father, immediately father refers to son.

Then as regards the form of the argument: “Relatives are simultaneous in nature”—this is true as regards relative being, and when you say “prior nature etc.,” I grant it. And therefore they are simultaneous in nature as regards relative being, but not as regards the being of actual existence.

Note concerning this, that he says that when knowables are destroyed knowledge is destroyed,⁴⁰ and not conversely; for a knowable can be considered in two ways, either formally, as under the formula by which it is a knowable, or materially, and this is to consider it as regards that which it is that is knowable. If it is considered as regards that which is knowable, and so materially, in this way it is in the genus of substance or quality or quantity, according as those which are known are in different genera, and in this way it is not a relative; and when a knowable taken in this way is destroyed, knowledge is not destroyed, nor conversely. And what is knowable can be considered in yet another way, namely as it is in its essential principles, and if a knowable taken in this way is destroyed, knowledge is destroyed, but not conversely. If a knowable is considered formally, then if a knowable is destroyed, knowledge is destroyed and conversely. And in this way a knowable and knowledge are strictly relatives, and this property, namely that relatives are simultaneous in nature, agrees with them and with every relative if it is considered formally. So a knowable can be considered really or as regards its being outside, or as regards the being it has in its principles, or as regards being understood simultaneously, that is, as it is formally knowable.

Next, a conclusion of a demonstration can be called knowable insofar as it is knowable. For there is

³⁹Something seems to have dropped out of the text, a phrase such as “but multiple and aliquot part are susceptible,”

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Categories* 5.

knowledge of a conclusion just as there is understanding of principles. In another way a subject of which a passion is proved through demonstration is called that which is knowable. If a knowable taken in the first way is destroyed insofar as it is knowable, the knowledge which is had of it is destroyed, for if a triangle's having three angles equal to two right angles, which is the conclusion of a demonstration, is destroyed, the knowledge of it is destroyed, too. But if that which is knowable in the second way is destroyed, knowledge is not destroyed, since if rain is destroyed in some region, knowledge of rain is not destroyed because of this, for it still remains in its essential principles.

Note concerning this which he says, that a hand is not a hand of someone even though a hand can be a hand of someone, because a hand as it is substance is not so-called in relation to anything, but a hand as it is part of an organic whole, in this way can be so-called in relation to something. But a given hand is not so-called in relation to anything, since even though the part is referred to the whole, still a part is not referred to a part, and since primary substance has the formula of a part with respect to absolute substance, therefore a given hand, which has the formula of a part, is not strictly speaking referred to it.

Note that relatives can be considered in two ways: as they are of one another, and so substances are something in relation to one another, or as their being is related to another, and in this way no substance is related to another, since the being of no substance is related to another. And therefore, in order to exclude substance from a relation of relatives, and this according to the strict view, for the first was given according to Plato's view, as Albert says.

Note because of this, that he says, "to doubt concerning individual cases is not useless"—it seems that this is false, since to doubt is not to know, and not to know is useless. I reply that Aristotle understands doubting thus, knowing how to oppose arguments to either side of a contradiction. It is not useless to doubt, since it is useless not to know. And so the argument proceeds.

Question 28

To clarify further what is said in these questions, it is asked whether there is in intelligences a composition from genus and difference.

And it is argued that there is not, because the genus arises from matter, but the different from form. But in intelligences there is not composition from matter and form, therefore there is no composition in them from genus and difference.

Again, we see in these material things that species, which is composed from genus and difference, is the more perfect the more it is composed, so that human being is more perfect than plant, and plant more perfect than stone. Therefore, in the same way, if there is composition in intelligences from genus and difference, the more an intelligence is composed the more perfect it is, but this is false. Therefore in intelligences there is not composition from genus and difference.

On the other hand, it is argued, genus and species are correlative according to Porphyry, but in the intelligences species is found, but genus is not in the species nor any difference contracting genus to species. Therefore if genus is found in intelligences, difference is found in them, and therefore they are composed from genus and difference.

It must be replied that composition from genus and difference is found in intelligences. To make this evident, we must consider that genus is two-fold, namely genus of nature and logical genus. Genus of nature is something indeterminate according to the reality, which is suited to be completed⁴¹ through different forms, first through an incomplete form, then through a more complete form. And such a genus is called matter, and this what the Commentator intends concerning the words of the Philosopher, "in the foundations of nature

⁴¹I.e., made determinate.

nothing is distinct.” Matter does not have anything wholly in actuality, and of the forms it receives it has no form of itself. But first it receives the more perfect, and then the less perfect, and this is the true in the order of nature, not in the order of time, for an embryo lives the life of a plant in the womb before the life of an animal, which is prior by nature, but not in time. So the genus is⁴² something indeterminate according to the reality. But the logical genus is not something indeterminate in reality, but only in the understanding and in formula. And this commonality according to the formula arises from one way of being. Such a logical genus is called a predicable genus. And as a genus of nature is something indeterminate in reality, but determinate according to different forms, thus the logical genus is something indeterminate in formula, but determinate through different species, of which one is nobler than another. So it appears then what is the genus of nature and what a logical genus.

Since, then, it is asked whether there is composition in intelligences from genus and difference, I reply that speaking of the genus of nature, there is no composition from genus and difference in intelligences. But speaking of logical genus, there is. Proof of the first: For the genus of nature is either matter or arises from matter, so where there is no composition from matter and form, there is no composition from such a genus and difference. But in intelligences there is no matter and form, therefore etc. But speaking of logical genus, in intelligences there is composition from genus and difference, because these species from which, through the understanding, a common intention can be abstracted, these species all agree in one logical genus, because a logical genus names only one thing according to formula found in different species. Therefore these species from which there can be abstracted a common intention agree⁴³ in one logical genus. But from human being and intelligences there can be abstracted through the understanding one common intention, because understanding can attribute to both one mode of being, namely being in itself and not in another.⁴⁴ And therefore it is manifest that human being and intelligences agree in one logical genus. And so first it must be said that substance is the most general genus, and contains under it both simple and composite substances. Now just as human being and intelligences have something in common according to the understanding, because both have this being which is being in itself and not in another, so human being and intelligences have some properties by which they differ from one another, and those properties are their differences, or else the differences by which they differ are received from them. And therefore human being and intelligences are composed from genus and difference. And from what has been said it appears that substance, which is the most general genus, is not a genus of nature, but is a logical genus. Since human being and intelligences agree in the highest genus of substance, because both are contained under the genus of substance, but do not share (*communicant*) in a genus of nature, it follows that the most general substance⁴⁵ is not a genus of nature, but a logical genus, and therefore there is nothing absurd if something is found in (*reponatur in*) a logical genus. Hence that logical genus, the most general genus, substance, is, through some accidents in itself, the logical genus of both corporeal and incorporeal substances.

Next, body, which is immediately placed under substance, that body is a logical genus for superior and inferior bodies. It is the logical genus for these, and not a genus of nature, for a genus of nature is taken from matter, or is the matter itself. And therefore what does not share in matter does not share in a genus of nature. Therefore the body in which they agree is a logical genus, not a genus of nature, because in those species from

⁴²The edition adds “not”, but that seems to make no sense here.

⁴³The edition has the singular of agree, *convenit*, though in the same grammatical position just before it had the plural, *conveniunt*, which seems needed to agree with *ist(a)e species*.

⁴⁴That is, they are both substances.

⁴⁵The edition has “of nature” instead of “substance,” but that makes no sense.

which it is abstracted through the understanding one common intention is one logical genus. But from these bodies and from those there is abstracted one common intention through the understanding, that is, body, which is a logical genus only⁴⁶ for generable and destructible things, and for the celestial bodies,⁴⁷ therefore etc. Now the generable and destructible is a logical genus, and it is also a genus of nature for generable and destructible bodies. It is a genus of nature inasmuch as generable and destructible things share in matter, and this is generable and corruptible matter, therefore there is a genus of nature in respect of these bodies. Again, this is a logical genus, for it arises from one manner of being which is from reality materially, by which there arises one genus. So it appears that in intelligences there is a composition from genus and difference, speaking of logical genus, not of the genus of nature, and in this logical genus, substances communicate separately with their inferiors.

As for the Arguments, as for the first, when it is argued “Genus arises from matter, etc.,” I reply that genus of nature arises from true matter, hence universals <do not> share in the genus of nature, unless they share in matter. And the Commentator, attending to this, says on *Metaphysics* X that body is not equivocal as regards destructible and indestructible, is true. There is no univocal genus of nature, since the destructible and the indestructible do not share in matter. Still, it is true that body is the logical genus for both destructible and indestructible. Therefore the genus of nature arises from matter, but its difference from form. And you reply that in intelligences composition from matter and form is not found, and therefore composition is not found there from genus and nature and difference. But there is a composition from the logical genus and difference.

As for the other, when it is argued, “In these material things etc.,” I reply that in another way perfection is reached in material and immaterial substances, because in material substances perfection is attained more or less as it is more or less close to matter. For what is closer to matter is more imperfect, and what is more remote is more perfect. And therefore, the more a species is composed according to form, the more perfect it is. And because human being is more composed according to form than donkey, therefore human being is a more perfect form. It should not be understood that I wish to indicate it is more perfect in degree, but human being is more perfect according to forms because it contains actually and virtually many forms.⁴⁸ But in immaterial substances more or less perfection is attained with greater or less nearness to the first being, which is without qualification one. Among intelligences, the more one intelligence is simpler and more one than another, the more perfect it is. And the more removed <it is from the first being> the more imperfect it is. Then, as for the form of the argument, when it is argued “We see in material substances that the species is more composite etc.,” this is true. And this is because of this, that the species is composed from the genus of nature and not only from a logical genus. And you will reply, “Therefore it is like this in intelligences.” I hold that it is not, because in intelligences composition from genus of nature and its difference is not found, but only that from logical genus and its difference.

Question 29

Next it is asked whether there is anything contrary to substance.

And it is argued that there is. In every genus that is one there is one contrariety, but substance is one

⁴⁶Not a genus of nature.

⁴⁷If it is not clear, the point is that incorruptible celestial bodies and corruptible bodies below the moon do not share any matter, and so no genus of nature. The one is made from aether, the others from the four elements, and so there is no sort of matter at all that they share.

⁴⁸That is, it contains intellectual forms that donkey does not, as well as the sensory forms of an animal, and the vegetative forms of a living being.

genus, therefore in substance there is contrariety. But contrariety requires contrary extremes. Therefore in the genus of substance there are contrary extremes. Substance therefore is contrary to substance.

Again, contrariety in an effect argues for contrariety in the cause. But heat and cold, wet and dry, are effects of substantial forms, and hot and cold, wet and dry are contraries. Therefore substantial forms are contraries.

On the other hand, it is argued, for everything which has a contrary there can be change, for this suffices for change, that it be from one contrary to another. But for substance there is no change, as is proved in *Physics* V (2); therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that contrariety is two-fold. One sort is contrariety as it is more generally said, and another is contrariety said more strictly. Speaking about contrariety said more generally, two forms existing under the same genus can be called contraries. Those can be called contraries of which one has a more perfect formula, the other a less perfect formula. And in this way we can say that the differences dividing some genus are contraries, because one has a more perfect and the other a less perfect formula. But speaking of contrariety strictly so-called, those are said to be contraries which are placed furthest apart under the same genus, and it is possible that they be in the same thing, one and then the other. So the same human being is white and then is black, and so white and black are contraries strictly speaking. So three things are required for these to be contraries strictly speaking, namely that they are under one genus, and can be in the same thing in turns, and that they are furthest apart. That they be furthest apart is said in respect of greater and lesser distance, therefore if contraries strictly speaking are at the greatest distance, so that they are contraries, it is necessary that a middle <range> be there, which is distant more and less from both contraries. From this it is concluded immediately that those which are strictly contraries are divisible in accord with more and less, and therefore white is more and less white, and so on for the others. When, then, substance is not thus divisible, nor does it have such a middle <range>, substance will not be a contrary of anything strictly speaking.

Then, as to the question, when it is asked whether substance is a contrary, I reply that speaking of contrariety more generally, thus substance is a contrary, because in the genus of substance there can be found two species of which one has a formula more perfectly, and another less perfectly. And such are contraries by contrariety said more generally. And so we can form an argument like this: These are contraries by contrariety generally so-called, which differ as they are more and less perfect, [and which the less perfect causes,]⁴⁹ but in the genus of substance things can be found of which one is more perfect and the other less perfect, therefore etc. Indeed, this is necessary, because in the genus of substance species differ as more and less perfect, because species differ as in number. Now it is impossible to find two species in number equally distant from unity. Therefore it is impossible to find two species equally perfect under the same genus, and therefore species which are under the same genus differ as more and less perfect. Speaking of contrariety strictly so-called, I hold that no substances are contraries, because those are not strictly contraries which are not susceptible to more and less, but substance is not susceptible to more and less, therefore etc.

But if someone were perhaps to cavil thus, "Fire and water are contraries and are substances too, therefore etc." I reply that some things are contraries, either because they are contrary forms existing under the same genus, or because they are activities (?) of contraries, or because subject to contraries. Fire and water are not contraries in the first way, but they are contraries because they are subject to contraries. Therefore contrariety does not attend upon their being substances, but upon contrary qualities existing in substances.

As for the arguments, as for the first, when it is argued, "In every genus that is one etc.," this is true, extending the name of contrariety. And when you say that substance is a single genus, I grant it, and there is a contrariety there as it is said more generally, and in this way human being is contrary to donkey.

⁴⁹This is in edition. Perhaps it should be omitted.

As for the other argument, when it is argued, “Contrariety in an effect etc.,” I grant this. But it is not necessary that contrariety in accord with the same formula be found in cause and effect. And you say that “heat and cold etc.,” and I grant this. And therefore substantial forms are contraries in a certain way, inasmuch as they are subjects of contraries. And this is contrariety taken more generally.

Question 30

Next it is asked whether two opposed species in the same genus are equally perfect.

And it is argued that they are. If two species were not equally perfect, but one were more perfect than the other, since the more perfect is the cause of the less perfect, one opposite species would be the cause of the other, and so human being would be the cause of donkey. But this is false. Therefore two existing opposed species etc.

Again, things equally distant from the first principle, which is the most perfect, are equally perfect. But two opposed species are equally distant from the first principle, which is most perfect, because two opposed species in a genus of substance are infinitely distant from the first principle, as is everything that is caused. But there is nothing greater than an infinite distance. Therefore one is not more distant than another, and therefore they are equally perfect.

On the other hand, it is argued that things that differ as worse and better, differ as they are less or more perfect. But two species differ as worse and better, as is said in *Metaphysics* III (4). Therefore etc.

It must be replied to this that it is impossible that in the same genus two species should be equally perfect, and this is explained for a reason bearing on logic. Porphyry says that the same differences divide genera and constitute species. Now dividing differences are contraries, therefore the differences constituting species will be contraries. But of contraries one is related to the other as having, the other lacking. This is true in every case in all contraries. Therefore of the differences which constitute species one will have a formula of having, the other a formula involving privation. Now having is in every case prior to privation. Therefore in every case the constitutive difference will be more perfect than the other. And if so, one species will be more perfect than the other. Therefore it is impossible for two species to be placed under one genus that are equally perfect.

Again, this is apparent from a general argument. The species of realities are related like numbers. Now it is impossible to find two numbers equally distant from the first principle, which is what is most truly one. And so one is more distant than another.

As for the arguments, as for the first, when it is argued, “If two species etc.,” I reply that those which differ as more perfect or imperfect are ordered essentially or accidentally. If essentially, the more perfect is the cause of the less perfect, if accidentally the more perfect is not the cause of the less perfect, as for instance, human being is not the cause of donkey, because these species are ordered accidentally to one another.

As for the other argument, when it is argued, “those which are equally distant etc.,” I grant this. And when you say that species contained etc., I reply that they are not, indeed one is more distant than the other. And you prove that it is not, because both are at an infinite distance. I reply that two opposed species infinitely distant from the first principle, as far as the first principle is concerned, are equally distant, but they are not equally distant as far as the species are concerned. Although nothing is found more excellent and more perfect than the first principle, and because of this it is infinitely distant from everything, still some things are found more deficient than the first principle, and some less deficient. Therefore some are more, some less perfect.

Question 31

Next it is asked whether a substance is susceptible to more or less.

And it is argued that it is. Intension and remission in the effect argues intension and remission in the cause. Now heat and cold are effects of substantial forms, and something is more hot and something less cold, and it is similar with the perfect. Therefore substantial forms allows of more or less.

Again, a substantial form which has being in matter is susceptible to more and less, but “human being” names a substantial form existing in matter; therefore a substance is susceptible of more and less. But human being is a substance, therefore substance is susceptible of more and less. The major is proved, because the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII (7-6) that a substance which is a form does not receive more and less unless it is in matter, therefore his intention is that substantial form, as it is in matter, is susceptible to more and less. But “human being” names a substantial form in matter, therefore etc.

On the other hand it is argued, for every divisible form according to more and less there can be <accidental> change (*motus*), but there is no change by substance, therefore etc.

It must be understood that more and less convey comparison. Now comparison is of different things in respect of one thing, and therefore those things are not comparable according to more and less in anything if they do not share in it. And because of this we do not say sound is sharper than a pen, nor do we say light is brighter than darkness, for light and darkness do not share in that brightness. Therefore comparable things have one thing in common. But that one thing cannot be unless it is one in genus, or one in species, or one in attribution (*attribucione*). It cannot be one in number, because one in number does not participate in different things, but rather in more and less. Since, then, it is asked whether substance is susceptible of more and less, I reply that, if different substances are compared in respect of what is one in attribution alone, thus they are susceptible of more and less. For example, being said of every substance is one according to attribution, and substances through comparison as regards being certainly are susceptible to more and less, because one substance is more a being than another. This is explained thus: in each genus which is nearer to some first, it is more such, and what is further away is less such. Now in the totality of beings some substances are nearer to the first being, and some further away. Since, then, that which is nearer to the first being has more being, but that which is further has less being, between substances one will be more a being than another. And in this way we can say that substance is more being than accident, because the essence of an accident has no being except in another, while the essence of a substance has being in itself. Further, among accidents we can say that quantity is more being than quality, and quality than relation.

And if you say that more and less do not make for different species, if then substance and accident make for different species, substance and accident will not be comparable according to more and less, as it seems—I reply that that common dictum is not entirely true. Some are indeed comparable according to more and less which differ in species and genus, while they are one in attribution.⁵⁰ Because of this the Philosopher says in *Ethics* VIII (9) that whatever are of entirely distinct (*altera*) species receive more and less, and the Commentator explains this, “of entirely distinct species, that is, not agreeing in genus, and such can be said to be one only according to proportion.” It is apparent thus that different substances in species, if compared in beings, can be susceptible to more and less.

Again, if different (*diversae*) substances are compared within one genus, for instance, withing substantiated, thus one substance is more substance than another. For since substance is primary and principally being, that substance which is more being can be called more a substance. But this is proved because one substance can be called more a being than another substance, therefore etc. More a substance insofar as it is more perfect in nature, and in this way we can say that animal is more a substance than plant. And in every case what is more perfect is more a substance than what is less perfect. Now if different substances are compared

⁵⁰That is, they belong to different categories, as substance and accident, and the various sorts of accident just mentioned, do, and so they do not share a genus, or, of course, a species. However, certain common attributions that transcend categorical distinctions can be made of them, for instance, that they are, or are good.

as to that which is one according to species in them, thus I hold that substance is not susceptible to more and less. Hence, Socrates is not more a man than Plato. And the Philosopher notes this when he says that substance does not admit of more and less. For specific substance⁵¹ does not admit of more and less, because, it seems, specific substance, such as human being and the others, are related as⁵² in number, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII (9). Now form and species in number consist in indivisibles, and unity is something indivisible, for if unity be added or subtracted, immediately it makes the species vary in number, as is apparent to observation (*intuenti*).⁵³ The form in number, then, consists in indivisibles. If therefore specific substances are related as in number, it is obvious that specific substances consist in indivisibles. From this I argue, that of which the formula consists in indivisibles does not allow for more or less; but the formula of specific substances consist in indivisibles, therefore etc.

Again, this is explained thus:

⁵¹I.e. individuals belonging to a species of substance.

⁵²I.e., they are the same in number with themselves, different in number from other specific substances.

⁵³That is, if we increase or decrease a species by unities, which would mean adding or subtracting unities, i.e. individuals, from it, we change the number of members there are of the species? Or perhaps better, if we take a specific substance and remove unity, we destroy the thing, so that we no longer have one thing in number, and if we add unities, presumably the thing reproduces, so that now there are more than one thing of the species present.