

main, e.g., William L. Rowe's contention that the argument rests on an unknowable version of the principle of sufficient reason.¹

It is unfortunate that a volume dedicated to the work of a scholar as careful as Joseph Owens has not been carefully proofread and corrected before being released. I noted errors on at least 27 different pages. One of the most egregious examples may be found on pp. 92-93, where four times in three paragraphs 'causality' appears as 'casuality'. That particular error always calls to mind one of the first sets of papers I graded, in which a student explained that she owed her existence to the "casual activity" of her father. This valuable book deserves better than casual proofreading, and more than a casual reading.

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OCKHAM'S THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS: PART II OF THE SUMMA LOGICAE. Translated by ALFRED J. FREDDOSO and HENRY SCHUURMAN. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1980. Pp. viii, 212. \$20.00.

LATE SCHOLASTIC AND HUMANIST THEORIES OF THE PROPOSITION. By GABRIEL NUCHELMANS. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980. Pp. 237. \$36.50.

Freddoso and Schuurman's translation of Part II of the *Summa Logicae* is well executed, and a valuable addition to the small number of Ockham's works available in English. Freddoso's introductory essay to the translation, a serious monograph in itself, argues that this part of the *Summa Logicae* presents a theory of truth-conditions for sentences, offering convincing refutations both of the view that Ockham's account of supposition in Part I is a theory of truth-conditions and of the view that Part II presents a theory of truth, rather than presupposing one. This is very nicely done, and clears away some of the most important sources of misinterpretation of Ockham's semantics. The only place Freddoso falls down on a few minor points is in his treatment of Ockham's interpretation of

¹*The Cosmological Argument*, (Princeton, 1975), published after most of Owens's papers.

tensed statements. There is more heavy weather than need be over the problems in explicating past-tense propositions in terms of present-tense propositions, given that Ockham holds a proposition to be true only if it exists. (A *propositio*, for a medieval thinker, is a sentence, which must be thought, uttered or written to exist.) It is true that the necessary present tense might not have existed at the appropriate time in the past, but Anselm had proposed one of the solutions to this difficulty suggested by Freddoso, and hinted at the other, long ago in *De veritate* X. The excessive laboring annoys, but it is all cleared up in the end. More important is Freddoso's overly contrived reading of Chapter 22 on pages 30–33. Ockham does not explain himself in any detail, but surely if we take it that the past tense verbs of different sentences must both connote the same past time (perhaps past time in general) before they can enter into a square of opposition, Freddoso's difficulties dissolve. Ockham claims that "Socrates was not white" implies and is implied by "Nothing that was white was Socrates." Freddoso assumes that the second proposition entails that nothing was *ever* both white and Socrates, but why take it that way unless the first implies that Socrates was not *ever* white? If we don't take the first that way, but take it to mean that Socrates was not white at some specific time, then surely we must take the second to mean that nothing was white *at that time* which was also Socrates *at that time*. Then, no difficulties with the square of opposition arise. But my complaints are minor. (One more—*exponere* is translated on page 100, line 17 as 'expose'. Of course, this is mere oversight.) The book as a whole is a superb effort, worthy of the attention not only of historians of medieval philosophy, but also of anyone seriously interested in philosophical semantics.

Nuchelmans's work is of equal excellence, but of quite another character. This is the second volume of his encyclopedic review of the history of semantics, centering on the meaning of sentences. It discusses the period after Ockham through the spread of Ramist doctrines. Nuchelmans has considerable knowledge of twentieth-century work in semantics, and finds much of interest to a modern theorist in these late medieval thinkers. Most especially, Hieronymus Pardus (d. 1502), a Spaniard who worked among the Parisian nominalists after the 1481 revocation of the decree banning their teaching, emerges as a most interesting figure, defending a wholistic account of the meaning of propositions rather than building up their meanings out of the independently established meanings of their parts. For Pardo, see Chapter 3.3 on the propositional tie (is the copula an incomplete symbol?), Chapter 4 on the real items corresponding to a significant proposition (are they facts, or things apprehended in a certain way?), Chapter 6.4 on the simplicity of propositions, Chapter 8.4 on the change of truth values that a sentence may undergo (token-meaning ver-

sus type-meaning). The dispute between Pardo and the more orthodox views is a convenient thread for the reader to hold onto in finding his way through this massive compilation of information. Sometimes the anticipations of modern views Nuchelmans finds are trivial and unenlightening (so Chapter 8.5 on an 'anticipation' of speech acts), but in general they are excellent ways into these foreign times, and Nuchelmans never distorts the truth for effect. He is careful to make the presuppositions of his period clear, and shows us just how they differ from the twentieth-century presuppositions we are used to. I found the excitement at an end when the Renaissance began. Nuchelmans's work seems less pioneering here, but I suspect that there is little pioneering to do. What bothered me was the lack of any real semantic theory in these thinkers. Nuchelmans does what he can by them, but despite every effort at respect, in the end he points out "the general neglect" in Renaissance thought "of those fundamental problems to which late-scholastic philosophers gave pride of place" (page 208). For an undertaking of such magnitude this work is of a very uniform high quality, but it does fail here and there. On page 11, Nuchelmans doesn't seem to understand what he reports. A *realis propositio* here is first taken simply as the utterance or inscription, without considering the words in it as significant. When this is seen, Nuchelmans's reason why a *realis propositio* taken in this way is clearly "a part of the outside world" makes little sense. The real reason is that we are not dealing with linguistic entities as such, but only with nonlinguistic properties of real things that happen to be significant. On page 15 there is a straightforward mistranslation of a passage from John of St. Thomas. It should read "the second set consists of those signs which, when the thing represented is already cognized, represent something other than themselves." ("Sui" does not refer to the grammatical subject in "*ex praeexistente cognitione sui.*") This fits the definitions given on page 14. These are the only serious errors I found in the book, though they gave me pause at first, occurring early on as they do. I was pleased to find my initial qualms quickly allayed, and I recommend the Nuchelmans volume strongly to everyone interested in medieval philosophy or philosophical semantics.

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