Simon of Faversham was a secular scholar of the Arts at Paris and Oxford, who left a number of commentaries, on Peter of Spain's Tractatus, and on Aristotle's works concerning logic and the soul. He was born, probably, around 1260, educated at Oxford, and ordained Deacon in 1290 by Archbishop Peckham. His commentaries seem to reflect studies at Paris in the 70's and 80's, in particular, the work Peter of Auvergne. The new currents at Paris in the Arts in the 1290's, in the time of Radulphus Brito, do not seem to influence his work. Presumably, then, he was back in Oxford in the 90's, and his surviving works were written probably written in the 80's and 90's, and certainly before 1304, when Simon became Chancellor of Oxford, which would have put an end to his scholarly pursuits. He died in 1306. I have edited his two question commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, which are mature works, probably written in the 90's at Oxford. In these works he frequently cites Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas, and Albert the Great, and, of course, Averroës and Avicenna.

My concerns center on a phrase occurring frequently in these two question-commentaries—esse in effectu, which is used synonymously, it seems, with esse existentiae, indicating the existence of particulars, and in coordination with esse essentiae, which indicates, not existence, but the sort of being appropriate to an essence, a nature associated with a real definition. In the earlier set of questions on the Posterior Analytics, Question 7, we are told that

We ask whether it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is...
Again, it is argued that it is necessary to cognize beforehand if it is in an effect (in effectu), since every being is either being in the soul or is true being outside the soul. If, then, it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is, either this will be if it is in the soul, or if it is outside the soul. Not if it is in the soul, since this is diminished being, therefore if it is outside the soul. But this is being in the effect (esse in effectu). Therefore, etc.

Later in the question we are told the ultimate source of the phrase:

Still, the authority of Avicenna, at the end [At one extreme? It is in fact in Chapter 1 of that book] of the fifth book of the Metaphysics, can be adduced, for he says that the being of a reality (rei) is twofold: one is the being it has by nature (naturaliter) from itself, and that is the being of essence (esse essentiae), and one is the being it receives from another, and that is the being of existence (esse existentiae). Through the first being the reality is placed in a determinate category and in a determinate species of being, and this being pertains to the definition, from which it is said that the definition is an expression indicating what the being of a reality is. According to Avicenna the being of existence (esse existentiae), before actual being (esse actuale), only exists in the conception of the mind, and this second being coincides with a reality insofar as it is an effect of some other, so that the reality is said to be in an effect (esse in effectu) insofar as it itself is the end result of the action of some agent. And since that which is the end result of the action of an agent is singular (for every action involves singulars), it is said that the being of actual existence (esse actualis existentiae), strictly speaking, occurs only in singulars.

The Latin Translation of Avicenna in the Venice, 1508 edition actually uses the phrase esse in effectu, and I have been unable to find the phrase in Aquinas, Giles of Rome, or Averroës. Moreover, although the phrase occurs in Question 7, in connection with the citation of Avicenna, it does not occur in the immediately preceding question, its place being taken in the discussion by the phrase esse existentiae, which indicates the same thing even if it does not carry the same connotations. The introduction of the new usage is actually quite marked in the text. So it seems likely that Avicenna is the ultimate source

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of the phrase. Here is what Avicenna says (First Philosophy V 1):

Now we should talk about the universal and the particular. . . I hold, then, that universal is so-called in three ways. It is called a universal in accord with its being predicated in actuality of more than one, as, for instance, human being is, and an intention is called a universal which it is possible to predicate of more than one, even if none of these has being in effect. For instance, the intention of a seven-cornered house, which is universal because its nature can be predicated of more than one. But it is not necessary for many of them, or indeed any, to exist. . .

Now even though this form is universal in respect to individuals, in respect of the soul it is singular. Inasmuch as it is impressed on an individual (soul), since it is one of the forms in the intellect and since there are many individual souls in number. . . Therefore common realities in a way have extrinsic being, and in a way they do not. But that one and the same reality in number should be predicated of many, that is, predicated of this individual and of that, according to the way that it is itself an individual, is obviously impossible. But still, this will remain open, that common realities should have being in the effect according to the way in which they are common.

That the terminology was picked up by Faversham from this text in Avicenna, though, does not mean that his use of the term reflects Avicenna’s view of the relation between an essence and those existing things that have it.

From these passages, it seems that Avicenna attends chiefly to the relation between the concept in the mind, which he takes it is universal, even if it is also in a way a singular, inasmuch as it is a concept in one mind and other individual concepts of the same kind could occur in other minds. It is universal inasmuch as it is predicatable of many, but not necessarily of many actual beings. Being predicatable of many possible beings is sufficient. Now how do we draw the difference between the actual and the possible beings spoken of here? The answer seems to be that the actual being differs from a possible being inasmuch as it has a cause, and is itself an effect of that cause. If no cause has arisen for some being, then it remains waiting in the wings, a mere possibility, yet to be introduced

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into the natural world by its patron cause.

Such a view, whatever its initial plausibility, had notorious problems. It is the sort of thing in Avicenna that Averroës criticized, the assumption that existence was an accident that could belong to or fail to belong to something standing outside the realm of existents, an essence or nature. What exists is the particular individual, it seems, and it certainly does not come into existence by gaining an accident, for it would have to exist already to be a candidate to gain the accident. If we identify the accident concerned as "having a cause," these problems do not go away. However it is that something is caused to come into existence, the cause does not act on the thing that comes to exist, but rather on something else that is already there beforehand, or, if creation is in mind, on nothing at all. The existing thing is the outcome of the causing, and there must be an outcome for there to be a causing, but it is neither the cause nor what is affected by it, and the outcome is not there beforehand.

Indeed, the problems can be multiplied. The accident in question, "having a cause," may not seem specific enough. I suppose I may have any number of causes associated with me, a cause why I have a beard (my masculinity?), why I am short (my genetic code), why I can read Latin (practice and training), none of which would be the cause relevant to my existence. One way to respond to this is to insist that it is the cause of my existence that is at issue here—that is what is strictly speaking my cause. But then, to say that something exists which has a cause of its existence is to define in a circle. But perhaps this can be answered, for surely I must exist to have any kind of place in a causal order at all. I can't be caused to have a beard if I don't exist. One might even be tempted to say,
with Plato in the *Sophist*, the source of all this, that to exist is to have a place in an order of causes—though if one were naughty enough, one might wonder if it would be all right to have a place in a conceivable or imaginary order of causes, or does it have to be an existing one?

Now Faversham is on to all this, and when he speaks, following his reading of Avicenna, of the three ways in which something can be, *in effectu, as a universal*, and *absolutely*, he does not think he has identified three different real objects of reference, but rather three ways in which one such object can be considered. With Aquinas, Simon takes it that “being absolutely” is not a referring expression, but rather has meaning only in context, so that to “consider being absolutely”, for instance, is to consider the actual being of something after a certain manner. If that is right, then presumably being *in effectu* is not an accident of some abstract, “absolutely existing” essence, but, much more sensibly, an accident (in some extended sense of the term) of the individual reality (*res*) that actually exists, the accident in question being incident on the individual reality’s relation to the cause of its existence. But we can consider that reality as regards that accident, and so consider its particular individual accidents and relations, or we can consider it *absolute*, that is, as regards its essence alone, or as regards what is necessarily true of it.

But does Simon take a view, then, on the problem of the relation between essence and existence which takes seriously the notion that existence is a matter of being caused, attempting to reply to the problems just sketched? A review of the literature on Simon might suggest not. Pattin pointed out some time ago that Simon seems to follow Aquinas on the real distinction, and in part because of this, and in part for other reasons, Simon has
him, or anyone else, in the text), and esse *in effectu* figures heavily in his deliberations. And interestingly, though I found the phrase esse *in effectu* nowhere else in other authors, I did find it in Henry of Ghent, in both his *Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium* and his *Quodlibeta.*² (Henry's work was current in the 80's, and is attacked by Giles of Rome in his works on essence and existence, so it fits in with Simon's presence in Paris in the 70's and 80's that he should know his work. But we should at least consider other possibilities, since Simon does not explicitly cite Henry, even though he does mention Thomas, when he refutes him, and Giles, when he borrows an idea from him. It is just possible that everything he knows about Henry's views comes from Giles, but I was unable to locate the phrase esse *in effectu* in Giles's work, though I confess my search has not been absolutely thorough. Could Henry have got his views from Simon, as well as his use of the phrase esse *in effectu,* rather than the other way around? It seems far more probable that Henry is the source, given that Henry was a deep and original thinker, who worked continuously and hard, while Simon seems to have been a second-rater with a limited number of publications, whose commentaries show some independent thought, but are limited in scope, and get on chiefly by deciding among the opinions of others.)

Frist, why did Simon reject Thomas's view? Here is what he says:

Father Thomas reproves Avicenna in this, that he says that being is something added as an accident. [*De Potentia Dei,* q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.] For he grants that it is something added, but not as an accident. But he understands that it is something constituted through the essential principles of the reality

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(res) of which it is being, just as Avicenna understood that it is something real added. He understands badly, for being would be a certain actuality (actus), and so either primary or secondary actuality. Not primary actuality, since primary actuality does not differ from the essence of the reality, and it follows then that being is not added to the reality. Not secondary actuality, since such an actuality is an operation that does not proceed from a form [alone], for every such secondary actuality presupposes actual being, and it is obvious that nothing presupposes itself, therefore that actual being is not a secondary actuality. If, then, it is said that actual being is something real added above these two actualities, it is necessary to assume a third actuality in beings, which is contrary to the Philosopher.

On first reading, the argument smacks not a little of fallacy. After all, why should we say that primary actuality does not differ from the essence? Surely the essence is a sort of potentiality, not an actuality, and the primary actuality would be esse existentiae. But the underlying thought is, perhaps, of some concern. What, after all, is the actual realization of the essence which is existence? Does it involve the essence alone, so that the essence could become actual without assistance from without? Of course not, unless we are speaking of God, who perhaps has no essence and is perfectly actual. Then the actual realization involves something outside the essence, somehow added to it. But the essence could, it would seem, have no such addition if it did not already have actual being. (For instance, if the creation of a particular falling under the essence adds actual being to it, are we imagining that creation is an action of God on the created thing? The thing would have to be present already to be created, then.) The introduction of the distinction between act and potentiality does not, it seems, escape the problem with Avicenna's notion of existence as an accident added to essence. But this is a deep matter that cannot be resolved here. Let me go on and outline Simon's own theory. He lays it out in the following stages:
(1) No caused being is itself its own being. Proof: Being in a caused being is nothing more than a certain ordered relationship to what causes it to be. But no caused being is itself such an order. Therefore etc. [Comments: (a) The ordered relationship between the caused being and God might or might not characterize the world, depending on whether the being in question in fact exists. That seems to suggest that the ordered relationship does have a being, and moreover, not a necessary being, and so a caused being... But something seems crazy here. Surely we don't want to say that in order to bring me into being, God had first to bring into being a certain relationship between myself and him, and a relationship between that relationship and him, and so ad infinitum. His bringing me into existence implicitly contains bringing the relationship between me and him into existence. So Simon says that the being of a thing is precisely the relationship between it and its cause, not something caused by the existence of that relationship. The thing is caused by its cause, not the relationship to its cause! (b) Why is the being of a thing only the relationship to what produces it? Well, the only reason we can say that it exists, the only relevant fact we can point to, is that it has been introduced through this cause into the world of beings... Is that right? We can point to the fact that it affects other beings, for instance. Maybe to exist is to be part of the causal nexus, and existence is to be defined only in reference to other existents... That is what Simon does, actually, but he restricts the defining relation to the causing of the existent thing.

(2) Being is something added to caused beings. Proof: Being is something added over and above a complete concept of the thing, we can understand all about it without knowing if it exists or not. One understands through the thing's essential principles,
of course.

(3) **Being is not a reality added to caused beings.** The proof draws on Averroës: if a being is a being through something added, let that added thing be considered. It will be a being, and so a second added thing comes into the picture, etc. The response, of course, a la Thomas, is that being is not itself a being, but that by which something is, as whiteness is not white, but that by which something is white. Faversham responds that being won't work like white, here. For whatever it is by which something is white, this thing is still something even if it is not white. But if something is not a being, it is not at all. So there seems to be nothing for that by which it is a being (its actuality) to attach itself to, unless the thing already is independently of that by which it is!

(4) **Being is, then, an added formula (ratio).** Proof: this is the only alternative if it is not an added reality! The notion will be that the formula added is not part of the definition of the essence of the thing that is, nor does it follow on it, and it does not refer to a real accident of any kind, either (not even the fancy sort of 'actuality' that Thomas likes). Can there be such a formula, which indicates a real state of affairs by which the reality is, and is correctly applied to the reality?

(5) **A being is a being through a formula in relation to an agent that produces it.** Proof: The formula added cannot concern its essence, since that is always present even if it does not have existence, nor any accident, since an accident can only be added to something that already is. So it must indicate a relation, and this is the plausible relation to seize on. Here it might be objected that this respect is nothing real, but Simon insists that it is. What sort of reality, then? Not essence or any part of it, nor accident. So it must
be in the genus of substance. Here Simon professes to follow Giles of Rome. There are a number of relations that fall under Substance in a way: for instance the relation of its matter to its form must somehow be founded immediately on the existing individual substance. The same then, with the relation of the particular substance to its cause, it will be a relation that is not and added reality, for there is only the one reality, the particular substance that is, but a formula, added to its essence. The picture is this:

A. The only reality involved in the case of Plato's existence is the particular substance, Plato, and perhaps Plato's cause.

B. Plato's existence is no added reality, and if we pick out a reality referred to when we refer to the existence of Plato, it will be that existing thing, i.e. Plato. So the assertion of Plato's existence is a matter of asserting a formula which applies to Plato, but indicates nothing real in Plato.

C. But existence is in fact something added to Plato, even though a complete description of Plato's intrinsic characteristics does not include existence. It is not one of Plato's accidents, and not part of his essence, so it is not predicable of Plato in either of these two ways.

D. So what is added must be a formula indicating a relation, the relation of Plato to his cause.

E. But to say that Plato is caused is to introduce another reality, and it is not Plato's cause as an independent reality that is at issue, but its relation to Plato. Moreover, this is an odd relation, for it is not a relation entered into by the two relatives, for Plato did not
exist before he was caused. It is not a real relation. But the relation is, if you will, a metaphysical one.

F. So the relation of Plato to his cause is not, as it were, a part of the natural world. . . Still, it is true that Plato cannot exist without being caused, just as he cannot exist without having form informing his matter. It seems that existing as a particular that is contingent involves the presence of such relations, as it were, as part of the “form” of contingently existing being, but such relations establish the being rather than acting upon it. Or, there are certain relations a human being must have to be an actual human being, even though these relations are not either (1) part of its essence (which may specify only how it reacts with other existing beings and so on, how it fits into the system, not how it is such that it can fit in), or (2) some accident of it. So this is what is meant by saying that being is and added formula—the essence is now introduced into a new order, and so acquires some characteristics needed to fit it in that order, over and above (1) those characteristics it has in both new and old orders (specifying how it will conduct itself in the new), and (2) those characteristics it acquires after entering the new order (the natural world) due to its interaction with other things in it. Is there a superorder of reality which the essence and the particular substance both belong to? If so, then they are both realities in that superorder, and enter into natural causal relations with one another, but that is absurd (it is Avicenna’s view, as Averroës understands it). Is the natural order of particulars an extension of the order of essences? Of course not, for the essence does not acquire a new property within the order of essence. Perhaps from the standpoint of either order, the order of particulars or the order of essences, what is in the other looks
unreal. (Essence does not causally interact! The particular is never quite perfectly what it is! The problems and options here are all discussed in Plato’s Sophist.) Somehow, to understand the world, we must see things in the one order as reflections of those in the other, but, since we can never bring them both together into one causal order, as it were, but can only relate the two orders (the order of essential relations, the order of causal activity) in a way that leaves each regarding the other as not quite real, or, perhaps, through the mind, which then turns out uncomfortably to belong to neither order...

G. So we should not be surprised to see Simon denying that there is a real distinction between existence and the particular substance that exists, or between the substance and its essence. That is, any talk about any one of these three things is talk about only one real thing, has reference to only one real thing, the individual substance. The order of causation is where real things (res) and existence occurs. This substance can be considered in various ways, and so we can consider it as it has being of essence (is a potential thing, a kind of thing), or as it has the being of an effect or actual existence. (In neither of these ways, by the way, is the particular reality universal. It is only universal as it is thought. . . but that is another story. Thought, like existence, brings us to the brink of our natural understanding of the world as a system of nature, and pushes us to recognize metaphysical facts that are not part of the natural world, but are presupposed by it.)

H. But although Simon holds that esse in effectu is relational, but not as a real relation (a relation between two existing things prior to the relation) [perhaps it is a "constitutive" relation for one of the related items, though not for the other, of course!], he also insists that the relation is something real, and is to be found in one of the categories.
Here he draws explicitly on a notion of Giles of Rome and goes beyond anything in Henry of Ghent. Just as a point, though it is not a quantity, is something real, and is found in the category of quantity, not as a quantity but as something presupposed in quantity, namely a limit of certain quantities (lines); so esse in effectu is a kind of limit to an essence, the endpoint of a causal process. (Simon does not press this, but Henry would suggest that the causal process begins with the understanding of the essence in the mind of God, the exemplary form, so that the particular is the endpoint of the forms actualization (perhaps even its self-actualization, if one notes the simplicity of God). That brings us pretty close to Plato.)

1. Simon notes a possible objection: Aren't all relations founded on accidents? Aren't relational categories all found in the categories of accidents? But he holds that the relation of an existing thing to its cause of existence is not only real, if a metaphysical instead of a natural reality, but belongs to the category of substance. Simon argues that odd as it seems, there must be a relation founded directly on substance, which does not presuppose the existence of substance, but rather grounds the existence of the substance, else there would be no contingent substances at all. The essential dependence of a contingent substance on God, the non-contingent substance implies a relation between God and the substance, though not a relation in the order of natural causes. God creates, and creation is not a natural process and in no way reflects any activity coded, as it were, into some essence. There is no account how God creates, and cannot be one, for God, as necessary being that grounds contingent being, is not a part of any natural order reflected in a structure of essences.

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I don't think the mature Simon of Faversham is a Thomist, then, who strayed from the fold on just one point. It is not just that he is willing to follow other thinkers, so that, for instance, in the commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics* he follows Giles of Rome on his idiosyncratic treatment of the nature of logic. It might be pointed out that he follows Thomas, on the nature of the highest sort of demonstration, turning away from the views of Giles of Rome quite explicitly, but then Ockham and Scotus do, too. Simon started life as a Thomist, it appears, but he came to his own views as he matured. If these reflections, which, in their effort to make sense of Simon, certainly take things farther than his explicit discussion does, are right, then Simon takes a position much closer to the Augustinian view than does Thomas. He follows Henry of Ghent in his broad philosophical approach as well as the details of one particular issue. And I think, having worked with Simon for some time, that this is not an unfair assessment of him. He comments on Aristotle, but his fundamentally Augustinian, even Avicennan, approach often obtrudes itself, and when he follows Thomas, he often seems to take his Augustinian phraseology for non-Augustinian doctrines at its word, making him look rather clumsy and immature in his understanding of the man. But that is a topic for another paper. Let it suffice here that Pattin, relying on insufficient evidence, was wrong. Simon began as a Thomist, but he did not remain one.
A. Avicenna, *Metaphysics V* (Venice, 1508, fol. 86va)

Oportet nunc ut loquamur de universali et de particulari. Dico igitur quod universale dicitur tribus modis. Dicitur enim universale secundum hoc quod praedicatur in actu de multis sicut homo, et dicitur universale intentio quam possibile est praedicari de multis, etsi nullum eorum habeat esse in effectu. Sicut intentio domus eptangulae, quae universalis est, etsi quod natura elus est posse praedicari de multis. Sed non est necesse esse illa multa, immo nec etiam aliquid illorum. Individuum vero est hoc quod non potest intelligi posse praedicari de multis, sicut substantia Platonis huius designati. Impossibile est enim intelligi hanc esse nisi ipsius. Tantum ergo universale ex hoc quod est universale est quoddam, et ex hoc quod est quiddam cui accidit universalitas est quiddam alium. . . Diffinitio enim equinitatis est praeter diffinitionem universalitatis, nec universalitatis continetur in diffinitione equinitatis. Equitas etiam habet diffinitionem quae non eget universalitate. Sed est cui accidit universalitas, unde ipsa equitas non est aliquid nisi equitas tantum. Ipsa enim ex se nec est multa nec unum nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu. Ita ut hoc continetur intra essentiam equinitatis. . .


Now we should talk about the universal and the particular. I hold, then, that universal is so-called in three ways. It is called a universal in accord with its being predicated in actuality of more than one, as, for instance, human being is, and an intension is called a universal which it is possible to predicate of more than one, even if none of these has being in effect. For instance, the intention of a seven-cornered house, which is universal because its nature can be predicated of more than one. But it is not necessary for many of them, or indeed any, to exist. . .

But an individual is that which cannot be understood to be predicated of more than one, for instance, the substance of this one who is called Plato. It is impossible to understand this of anything except itself. Now such a universal, from his that it is a universal, is something, and since it is something to which universality belongs, it is also other <than the individual>. . . For the definition of horsemanship stands outside the definition of universality, nor is universality contained in the definition of horsemanship. Horsemanship even has a definition that does not need universality. But it is that to which universality belongs, hence horsemanship itself is not anything except horsemanship alone. From itself it is neither many nor one, nor does it exist in sensibles nor in the soul, nor is it any of these potentially or in effect, in such a way that this is contained within the essence of horsemanship. . .

Now even though this form is universal in respect to individuals, in respect of the soul it is singular. Inasmuch as it is impressed on an individual (soul), since it is one of the forms in the intellect and since there are many individual souls in number, therefore in the way in which they are particulars each will have its own universal concept. . . Therefore common realities in a way have extrinsic being, and in a way they do not. But that one and the same reality in number should be predicated of many, that is, predicated of this individual and of that, according to the way that it is itself an individual, is obviously impossible. But still, this will remain open, that common realities should have being in the effect according to the way in which they are common.

B. Giles of Rome, *De esse et essentia, Question IX* (1503 (reprint Minerva: Frankfurt, 1968) Folio 20vb.)
... sciemendum quod esse non est in genere per se. Et tamen est in genere substantiae, quod declaramus per simile. Nam posito quod non essent nisi duo praedicamenta, substantia et quantitatis, hoc autem hypothese stante querenmus quid sit punctus. Constat autem quod punctus nec est substantia nec est quantitas. Ergo erit quid medium inter substantiam et quantitatem, et per consequens erit quid medium inter substantiam et accidentes. Quia enim est non esse aliquid praedicamentum accidentis praeter quantitate. Huic autem objectionem quilibet de facili obviaret. Diceret quidem quod punctus est in praedicamento quantitatis, non quia quantitas, sed quia est quantitatis terminus. Unde non est in praedicaimento quantitatis per se punctus, vero est in huius praedicamento tanquam lineae terminus. Et quia omnis actus est terminus eius cuius est actus, ipsum esse quodammodo terminat essentia inquantum facti eam actu existere. Esse ergo est in genere substantiae et est in eodem genere in quo est essentia. Si ergo quaesas in quo genere est esse, est in genere substantiae, sed si quaeras quomodo habet esse in tali genere, diceretur quod non est in tali genere per se, nec est in genere substantiae tanquam substantia, sed est in genere substantiae tanquam actus substantiae, vel tanquam actus essentiae, sicut punctus est in genere quantitatis non per se, nec est in tali genere tanquam quantitatis, sed tanquam terminus. Res ergo ipsa quae est esse est in genere substantiae, habet tamen ipsum esse quaedam modum accidentalem actuali inquantum est superadditum substantiae...

... It must be known that being is not in any genus per se. Still, it is in the genus of substance, which we explain through a simile. For let it be assumed that there are only two categories, namely substance and quantity. Assuming this, let us ask what a point is. It is well known that a point is not a substance, nor a quantity. Therefore it will be something in the middle between substance and quantity, and so between substance and accident, since it is assumed that there is no category of accident other than quantity. Everyone will easily see the objection to this. So it is said that a point is in the category of quantity, not because it is a quantity, but because it is the limit of a quantity. Hence point is not in the category of quantity per se, but it is in this category as the limit of a line. And since there is a limit [i.e. goal or endpoint] to every act, of which it is the act, being itself serves as a limit to essence in a way, insofar as it makes it exist in actuality. Therefore being is in the genus of substance and is in the same genus in which essence is. If then you were to ask in what genius being is, it is in the genus of substance, but if you asked how it is that being is in such a genus, it must be held that it is not in such a genus per se, nor is it in the genus of substance as a substance, but it is in the genus of substance as the actuality of substance, or as the actuality of essence, just as a point is in the genus of quantity not per se, nor is in such a genus as quantity, but as a limit. The reality therefore which being is in the genus of substance, but its has being itself in a certain actual, accidental way, insofar as it is added to substance...


Primum esse [esse entia] habet essentia creaturae essentialiter. . . inquantum habet formale exemplar in Deo et per hoc cedit sub ente quod est commune essentiae ad decem praedicamenta. . . et est illud esse rei definitivum quod de ipsa ante esse actuale solum habet existere in mentis conceptu, de quo dicitur quod definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Secundum esse [esse actualis existentiae] non habet creatura ex sua essentia, sed a Deo, inquantum est effectus voluntatis divinae luxta exemplar eius in mente divina (fol. 7r)

The essence of a creature has the first being essentially. . . insofar as it has a formal exemplar in God, and so falls under being, which is common and essential to the ten categories. . . And this is the definitional being of a reality which, before it has actual existence, has existence only in a concept of the mind, of which it is said that definition is a phrase indicating what it is to be [that sort of thing]. A creature does not have the second being from its essence, but from God, inasmuch as it is the effect of the divine will together with the exemplar in the the divine mind.

D. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetal Questions III, Question 9 (cited in Wippel, p. 70-71).

1 I omit a repetition of the previous sentence with "per consequens" substituted for "ergo."
Et ut dicit Avicenna, cap. octavo, hoc esse proprie dicitur definitivum esse, et est dei intentione. Quod intelligo: quia tale esse non convenit aliqui nisi cuius ratio exemplaris est in intellectu divino, per quam naturam est fieri in rebus extra, ita quod sicut ex relatione et respectu ad ipsam ut ad causam efficientem habet quod sit ens in effectu, sic ex relatione quadam et respectu ad ipsam ut ad formam extra rem habet quod sit ens aliquod per essentiam. (Fol. 61r)

And as Avicenna says in Chapter 8, this being is strictly called definitional being, and is from the intention of God. Which I understand thus: because such being does not agree with anything unless its exemplary form is in the divine intellect, through which it is suited to come to be in external reality, so that just as from the relation and in respect to God as to the efficient cause it has that it is a being in the effect, so from a certain relation to it as to a form outside the reality it has that it is a certain being through essence.


Ex consideratione enim divini intellectus circa divinam essentiam ut est intellecta ab ipso sunt in ipso rationes ideales... quae sunt relationes ex hoc in deo secundum rationem ad ipsas essentias creaturarum, quae ex hoc sunt aliquid secundum essentiam quae respondent rationibus ideallibus in deo existentibus. Et ratione ipsius essentiae earum habent relationem realem ad deum. (Fol. 341v)

From the consideration of the divine intellect on the divine essence as it is understood by itself the ideal forms are in it... and so they are relations in God, according to form, to the essences themselves of creatures, which are, because of this, something according to essence which answers to the ideal forms that exist in God. And by reason of this their essences have a real relation to God.

F. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibetal Questions* XI, Question 3 (summarized by Wippel, p. 84-85)

...while existence (esse existentiae) does not add anything real to essence, it does not follow from this that the essence of a creature is its existence (esse). Such is true only of God. Existence rather adds to essence a relationship which involves a distinctive intelligible content (intentio). Since existence adds this intentio to essence as something accidental, that is to say, not as a real accident but as an "intentional" accident, it follows that a creaturely essence is not its existence... essence and existence are one and the same in reality and yet that essence is not simply to be identified with existence.” (Fol. 441r-441v)

G. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibetal Questions* III, Question 1 (summarized by Wippel, p. 85)

"Godfrey directs a series of criticisms against Henry's theory of intentional distinction of essence and existence... First of all... a thing does not acquire substantial being by reason of a relationship, but only a relative being.
On p. 189, note 12, he notes that Simon refers to Thomas Aquinas as the Expositor, particularly of the Posterior Analytics, but also of other books. So, as noted on p. 243, note 3, in D. Sharp (ed.), Questiones super Tertium De Anima, p. 330, "Expositor dicit Contra Gentiles..."

Pp. 243-246 on Simon of Faversham, loose translation (thanks to John Van Dijk):

"Simon of Faversham ca. 1240-1306: Concerning the scientific career of Simon of Faversham, secular cleric, we possess only a few pieces of information. Most likely he taught the artes at Paris, after which he took a chair at Oxford. There he taught theology as magister actu regens, became chancellor of the university in 1304, and died in 1306. All the writings which we possess from his hand are commentaries of the works of Aristotle. His teaching is Aristotelian in structure. At various places in his work he cites Thomas Aquinas and takes over various important points from Thomism. With Thomas he rejects the matter and form composition in spiritual substances, considers matter as pure potentiality, and accepts the doctrine of the essential form and the distinctio reals between essence and existence. Although the influence of Simon of Faversham on scholasticism remained exceedingly slight, and one can hardly point to a trace of his thought in the 13th and 14th centuries, nevertheless he appears important for the study of the real distinction because he was one of the first at Oxford who taught the real distinction and on this point experienced noticeably the influence of Thomas Aquinas.

"In the edition of Simon's Questions super libros Pradlamentorum by C. Ottaviano one finds a very interesting point, namely, "whether the substance which is a most general genus is simple or composite substance."

"Simon begins his exposition with the remark that one can take independence in three different ways: either one considers substance as a highest genus concept to which all the lower, subordinate, genera and kinds of things can be led back, and then substance is completely simple, since it cannot be led back any more to a higher genus; or if we consider substance in its pure essential conceptual content, then it is neither simple nor complex, for if the content of the concept of substance were simple we then would not be able to apply the concept of independence to complex beings. Were it on the contrary complex, then the concept of substance would not be sayable of simple beings. In its concrete realizations, however, substance is both simple and complex:

If it be considered as to its real being, thus I hold it is both simple and composite. For the genus in its real being is nothing other than all its species. Now that substance which is the most general genus is related to simple and composite substance as genus to its species, and therefore in real being it is both simple and composite.

"So substance here is not taken as a logical thought-pattern, but as concrete reality. Now then, one must admit that substance, taken in this way, is simple when it concerns purely spiritual beings, and that it is complex when it concerns corporeal independences. Therefore a simple substance is a substance which does not have the structure of form and matter, although it nevertheless is composed, in a different order, of existence and essence.

That substance, therefore, which is the category is not some composite from matter and form, but is composed from something material and something formal, or from essence and being, for every substance other than the First is composed from essence and being, and therefore every substance other than the First is contained under the category of substance. (P. 283, 24-28)

And so that substance which is the most general genus is composed from essence and existence. (Ibid. 36-37)

Intelligences are in a way simple, and in a way composite. They are simple because they are not composed of matter and form, but they are composites of essence and existence. (P. 284, 28-30)
And therefore that substance which is the most general genus is simple in this way, because composition from matter and form are not included in its formula, but it only includes composition of essence and being. (P. 285, 4-6)

“In order to prove this thesis Simon of Faveresham develops an argument which he undoubtedly must have found in the little work of Thomas, De Esse et Essentia [In his footnotes he compares the following passage to Chapter 4 of that work]:

Next it must be understood that even though everything which is contained in the category of substance is composed from essence and being, still some of these, in addition to being composed from essence and being, are also composed from matter and form, and such can come to be and be destroyed, and are called composite substances. Others are composed only from essence and being, and such are called simple substances. For this reason, then, we hold that substance which is the most general genus contains under itself composite and simple substances, since it contains substance composed from matter and form, and that which is composed only from essence and being, but is not composed from matter and form. Both can be explained. As to the first, it is explained that it is not composed from matter and form. For an intelligence is an intellectual nature to a higher degree than our understanding. Now our understanding is assumed to be immaterial so that it might understand all things, and therefore the Philosopher says in De Anima III that it is necessary for our intellect to be unmixed, so that it might understand all things. [Aristotle, De Anima III 4] Since then the intelligences are the greatest intellectual substances, they must be immaterial and simple, and must not be composed from matter and form. But they are composed from essence and being. The proof of this is because it belongs to the what-it-is of each thing not to be caused in it through anything extrinsic, since if it were, what it is would be demonstrable of that of which it is. But being is created in an intelligence from without, namely from the First being, and the intelligence has a capacity to receive that being; and this is what he says in Comment 9 on the Book of Causes, that an intelligence has being and form, understanding by form its quiddity. Thus it is apparent that that substance which is the most general genus is something composite, not a composite from matter and form, but from a reality and a mode of being added to it. (P. 284, 1-26)

“The last sentence of this text must not make us think of a kind of distinctio modalis, because "composed from a reality and a manner of being added to it" has to be understood as follows according to Simon:

everything contained in the category of substance is composite on two grounds, namely in reality, and from the manner in which accidental being is added to it. Hence these two, namely reality and form, structure (integrant) the category. What I call the form is the manner of being which belongs to the reality. Therefore the category of substance is constructed from the reality and the form, or the manner of being, that is, not being in another. For the Philosopher says in the text that it is proper to every substance not to be in any subject. (P. 283, 18-24)

“In another passage he characterizes being as something additional, an accident of essence.

And therefore in every substance other than the First, existence is added to essence. And since its substance stands under its existence, its substance stands under an accident, since existence in them is an accident of essence. (P. 278, 18-21)

“So Simon of Faveresham shows himself a proponent of the real distinction between substance and its act of existing, for substance is potency over against what it receives and what does not belong to its essence. Now then this is the case with existence, which it has received from God. Therefore, existence cannot belong to the inner components of essence, and therefore it must be added as an accident to essence."

Page 261: “In spite of the sharp criticism which the Pseudo-Grosseteste directed against the real distinction, this thesis was stubbornly defended, shortly after the death of St. Thomas Aquinas, by Simon of Faveresham and some of Thomas's brothers who had known him personally in Paris or had heard of his fame. The most important among them was Thomas of Sutton.”
Questions on the Categories, by Simon of Faversham

Question 20

Next it is asked whether that substance which is the most general genus, is simple or composite substance.

And it seems that it is simple substance, since the composite is not predicated of the simple, but that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of simple substances, for instance, of intelligences, for intelligences are simple substances, since, as Avicenna says in The Book of Causes, an intelligence is a substance which is not divided; therefore etc.

Again, the primary is related to the manner of a form, but substance which is the most general genus is primary, and therefore it is related to the manner of form. But form is something simple, therefore that substance which is the most general genus is something simple.

On the other hand, it is argued that the simple is not predicated of the composite, but that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of composite substances, for instance, of human beings, donkeys, cows, and such; therefore etc.

It must be understood here that the substance which is the most general genus can be considered as it really is, or as falling under the form of the most general genus, or as regards its essence. If it is considered as falling under the form of the most general genus, I hold that the substance which is the most general genus considered thus is simple and not composite. This is explained thus: that of which the form is not divided into other things prior according to understanding, nor into others prior in reality, is something simple and not composite. But the form of most general genus is not divided into others prior according to understanding, for instance, into genus and differences, since it does not have a genus and differences, since it is the most general genus, above which no other genus is found. And since it is not divided according to understanding, it is obvious that it is not divided in reality, since the understanding is well able to divide in accord with a formula even what is undivided in reality. Therefore etc.

Now if that substance which is the most general genus is considered in respect of its essence absolutely, I hold that it is not simple, nor composite. For substance is the most general genus in relation to its species, but in the essence of the genus considered as genus neither one nor several species is included. This is clear, since if you were to define some genus, for instance, animal, you would not receive any substance, for instance donkey or human being, though this essence is not in reality other than these, since a single reality does not make a genus. Therefore etc.

But if that substance which is the most general genus is considered in connection with its being one, thus it can be considered either as regards being in the understanding or as regards real being. If it be considered as regards being in the understanding, thus I hold it is neither simple nor composite, since as that substance which is the most general genus as regards its real being it is neither simple absolutely nor composite absolutely, and thus neither is it composite or simple considered as regards being understood, since a reality has the same disposition in being and in truth. If it be considered as to its real being, thus I hold it is both simple and composite, and we hold the same concerning animal in respect of human being and donkey. For the genus in its real being is nothing other than all its species. Now that substance which is the most general genus is related to simple and composite substance as genus to its species, and therefore in real being it is both simple and composite.

Thus three things are apparent, namely, that is the substance which is the most general genus be considered as to its form, thus it is something simple; if it be considered as to its essence absolutely, thus it is neither simple nor composite; in the same way, if it be considered as to its being understood, it is neither simple nor composite; and if it be considered as to its real being, thus it is both simple and composite.

But you will reply that Boëthius says in his comment here, that even though substance is threefold, matter and form and the composite, Aristotle treats the extremes here through the middle, which is the composite, and therefore according to Boëthius that substance which is the most general genus is a composite substance.

To understand this, it must be considered that everything contained in the category of substance is composite on two grounds, namely in reality, and from the manner in which accidental being is added to it. Hence these two, namely reality and form, structure (integrant) the category. What I call the form is the manner of being which belongs to the reality. Therefore the category of substance is constructed from the reality and the form, or the manner of being, that is, not being in another. For the Philosopher says in the text that it is proper to every substance not to be in any subject. That substance, therefore, which is the

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1 Boëthius, In Cat. Aristotelis, Migne, PL 64, 184A-B.
category is not some composite from matter and form, but is a composite from something material and something formal, or from essence and being, for every substance other than the First is composed from essence and being, and therefore every substance other than the First is contained under the category of substance. This, then, is what Boëthius understands, that although substance is threefold, namely matter, form and composite, he treats of the extremes through the middle.

From this I argue: That substance which is the most general genus is that which is the middle between matter and form, but this can only be the composite of matter and form, therefore etc. But I hold that Boëthius does not understand by form the form that comes into being and is destroyed, but the First form, which is God, who is His own being from Himself. But by matter he understands the primary subject with which being does not coincide from itself, and by that middle substance, which is treated here, he understands another essence with which being does coincide. And so that substance which is the most general genus is the composite from essence and being. Therefore Boëthius intends to say that the other extremes, namely the naming and prime matter which are both per se in the genus of substance, are to be treated through the middle, namely through the substance which is essence with which being coincides.

Next it must be understood that even though everything which is contained in the category of substance is composed from essence and being, still some of these, in addition to being composed from essence and being, are also composed from matter and form, and such can come to be and be destroyed, and are called composite substances. Others are composed only from essence and being, and such are called simple substances. For this reason, then, we hold that substance which is the most general genus contains under itself composite and simple substances, since it contains substance composed from matter and form, and that which is composed only from essence and being, but is not composed from matter and form. Both can be explained. As to the first, it is explained that it is not composed from matter and form. For an intelligence is an intellectual nature to a higher degree than our understanding. Now our understanding is assumed to be immaterial so that it might understand all things, and therefore the Philosopher says in De Anima III that it is necessary for our intellect to be unmixed, so that it might understand all things. Since then the intelligences are the greatest intellectual substances, they must be immaterial and simple, and must not be composed from matter and form. But they are composed from essence and being. The proof of this is because it belongs to the what-it-is of each thing not to be caused in it through anything extrinsic, since if it were, what it is would be demonstrable of that of which it is. But being is created in an intelligence from without, namely from the First being, and the intelligence has a capacity to receive that being; and this is what he says in Comment 9 on the Book of Causes, that an intelligence has being and form, understanding by form its quiddity. Thus it is apparent that that substance which is the most general genus is something composite, not a composite from matter and form, but from a reality and a mode of being added to it.

In response to the arguments: As to the first, when it is argued, "a composite is not predicated" etc., I grant this. And then I reply to the minor premise, what intelligences in a certain way are simple, and in another way composite. They are simple because they are not composed from matter and form, but are composed from essence and being. And therefore, although that substance which is the most general genus is composite, it can be proved of intelligences.

In response to the other, I grant the whole argument, since nothing is concluded except that the most general genus is something simple as regards its form, and this is granted. Or it can be held that even though that substance which is the most general genus is related to the manner of form, it is not necessary that it be as simple as the form, and so it can be composed from essence and being.

In response to the arguments on the other hand, when it is argued, "The simple is not predicated of the composite," I grant it, and when it is said that that substance which is the most general genus is predicated of composites, I hold that it is not predicated of composites as they are composed of matter and form, but as the are composed of essence and being. And this is the common from through which substance is predicated of all those of which it is predicated. And therefore that substance which is the most general genus is simple insofar as in does not include in its form composition from matter and form, but only includes composition from being and essence.

\(^2\)Aristotle, De Anima III 4.
Simon's First set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics

Question 6

Since it was supposed in the preceding question that it cannot be cognized beforehand concerning the passion that it is, therefore we ask whether it is necessary to cognize beforehand that it is concerning the passion.

It must be held that concerning the passion we cannot cognize beforehand that it is, and the reason for this is that what we have by demonstration is not cognized before demonstration. But we have the being of the passion by demonstration. The reason for this is that the being of a passion, just like that of every other accident, is inherence, for the being of an accident is a being in something. Now we have the inherence of the passion in the subject by demonstration, for this is what we know by demonstration, and therefore we have the being of the passion by demonstration, and nothing of this sort is cognized before demonstration. Therefore etc.  

Again, this is explained more fully: If it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion that it is, either it is cognized concerning the passion that it is in the being actual existence (in esse actualis existentiae), or that it is some reality (res) and some nature. It is not cognized before demonstration that it is in the being of actual existence, since, speaking of that sort of being, the being of a passion depends on the being of its subject, but it is not necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject if it is, speaking of the being of actual existence, for it is certainly possible to know something through demonstration concerning that which is not in the being of actual existence. Therefore, neither is it necessary to know beforehand concerning a passion if it is in the being of actual existence.  

Again, it is not necessary to know beforehand concerning the passion that it is some reality and nature, since the passion, in regard to its essence and nature, is caused from the essential principles of the subject. Now I argue that the principles of being and cognizing are the same. But the essential principles of the subject, which are conveyed by the definition of the subject, are the cause of the passion's being with regard to its essence and nature. Therefore, it is through the subject that it is cognized concerning the passion if it is some reality and nature, and this is not cognized before demonstration, but it is demonstrated through the definition of the subject, as was said before. But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion what it is, but not what it is definitionally, as is in a way obvious from what has been said, since the definition of a passion includes the essential principles of the passion, as well as the essential principles of the subject. Now we do not cognize the essential principles of the passion before demonstration, if we cognize the essential principles of a passion by demonstration through the essential principles of the subject, which are conveyed by the definition of the subject, the middle term in a demonstration. We do not cognize the inherence of the passion in the subject before demonstration, but we know this through a completed demonstration. If this is so, then we cognize the definition of a passion through demonstration, so we don't cognize it before demonstration. Because of this those persons went astray who said that the middle term is the definition of the passion in the highest sort of demonstration. It is obvious, then, in a way, that...

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5A more sophisticated version of this argument is provided in the second paragraph below. The point is that the actual existence is precisely its inherence in an actual subject, and so its being, that is, its occurrence in nature, is precisely its inherence in some natural occurring subject. But that the passion necessarily inheres in its subject is what is proved in a demonstration of the most powerful sort, and so it cannot be known beforehand.

4Simon's view, as we shall see in the next question, is that to know if a substance is is not to know if it actually exists, but to know if it is some real nature, a possible natural existent, as it were. He insists on this because some natures fail to be instantiated for a period of time, for instance, there are no roses in the winter, but they remain real natures, since they can occur in nature when the right conditions return. Given this, and Simon's view that the demonstration roots the being of the passion in the being of its proper subject, it would be silly to say we need to know that a passion is actually, that is, that it actually inheres in some existing subject, prior to demonstration, since we do not even need to know that after we have a demonstration.

5Albert the Great and Giles of Rome held to this view. Simon defends the view of Thomas Aquinas in his commentary. See the introduction to Longeway's William of Ockham on Demonstration. Simon's point here is that, for a passion, real being is inherence in its existing subject, and what it is (really) is something arising from the essence of the subject. Thus, real being and what it is (really) are both discovered through demonstration, in which the definition of the subject forms the middle term. What is known before demonstration about
and this will appear below, that the definition of the subject is the middle term in the highest sort of demonstration, since the cause of the passion and of the essential principles of the subject is the definition of the subject...

**Question 7**

We ask whether it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is...

Again, it is argued that it is necessary to cognize beforehand if it is in an effect (in effectu), since every being is either being in the soul or is true being outside the soul. If, then, it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is, either this will be if it is in the soul, or if it is outside the soul. Not if it is in the soul, since this is diminished being, therefore if it is outside the soul. But this is being in the effect (esse in effectu). Therefore, etc.

On the other hand, it is argued that if it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is in the effect when we have a demonstration concerning the subject, then there could not be a demonstration concerning that which is not in the effect. But this is false, as is apparent concerning rain and other things that are not.

It must be said that it is not necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is in the effect, and the reason for this is that it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject only that which pertains to the essential principles of the subject, for the passion is demonstrated of the subject through the essential principles of the subject alone, and not through any accident of it. Now being in the effect does not pertain to demonstrative principles, but is accidental to them. But <it can be objected that> one must take into account what is said elsewhere concerning this, for instance, in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. Still, the authoritative statement of Avicenna, at the end of the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, can be deduced, for he says that the being of a reality is of two sorts: one is the being a thing has naturally from itself, and that is the being of essence (esse essentiae), and one is the being it receives the passion, then, is what it is that is signified, and whether it is something signifiable. Albert and Giles would respond that the substance is the material cause of its passion, and figures as such in one sort of definition of the passion, but that the essence of the substance does not produce the passion as its efficient cause, as Thomas Aquinas holds. Thus, a statement attributing a passion immediately inhering in a subject to the subject is a principle, immediate and indemonstrable. In particular, if it cannot be demonstrated using the essence of the subject as the middle term. We can attribute the view of Giles and Albert to their Aristotelianism, for the notion that the essence of a substance can somehow be used to understand why it has its immediate passion is rooted in the idea that such a substance can, as the world is, be realized in matter only in such a way that it ends up having the passion in question. This is a neo-Platonic style of argument (found, for instance, in Robert Grosseteste), and seems to violate the principle that a true explanation must proceed through per se causes, for surely the essence of the subject is an accidental cause of the passion. That is, the essence of the subject does not produce the passion of itself, but only in virtue of certain limitations of the matter and situation in which it is to be made actual. In any case, as long as true explanation proceeds through per se causes, immediate passions will be used as middle terms to demonstrate secondary passions of a subject, but immediate passions will not themselves be demonstrable in the strictest sense.

6 *Aristotle, Metaphysics* VI 1, 1025b1-4-18, seems to be intended, or perhaps *Metaphysics* IV 2, 1003a33-1004a9, where it is argued that every way in which "being" is said is related to the primary sort of being, that which belongs to primary substances, that is, actually existing individuals. At 1003b26 Aristotle says that "one man and a man are the same thing, and existent man and a man are the same thing..." This text must have been cited to support the radical Aristotelian view that would make individuals the realities (res) that lie behind all else. Following this view (which is Simon's and Aquinas's as well as their opponents'), one might argue that what is shown in a demonstration is the actual inherence of proper accidents in individual substances, so that it is individual substances, actually existing, that are the subject of discussion in demonstration, not substance "absolutely" considered. On this view, when one cognizes beforehand if the subject is, one cognizes that there are actually existing individuals of the appropriate species, hence the first argument that it is. (In answer to Simon's counterargument one might respond that the demonstration has application as long as there have been or will be such individuals, and it can be said that the subject is present as long as there are, were, or will be such individuals. So the demonstration concerning rain applies, not to presently existing rain, since there is none, but to past and future, actually existing, rain. Thus no talk about rain's being absolute is necessary to account for the facts about demonstration.) I have to see if this can be backed up from Albert and Giles of Rome. But note that Thomas, and probably Simon, do not intend to suggest that one considers an essence somehow separated from actual existents when one considers a thing absolute, but only that one considers the actual individual in a particular way, that is, so as to abstract from its purely individual characteristics, and focus on the characteristics of its kind. In that case it would be necessary, perhaps, to encounter an individual of a given kind to form a concept of the kind through abstraction, but one would not need to consider the individual as such in demonstration, and so one need not cognize beforehand that it exists in actuality. Indeed, it may no longer exist in actuality, even if it must once have so existed so that one could get a concept of it.
from another, and that is the being of existence (esse existentiae). Through the first being the reality is placed in a determinate category and in a determinate species of being, and this being pertains to the definition, from which it is said that the definition is an expression indicating what the being of a reality is. According to Avicenna the being of existence, before actual being, only exists in the conception of the mind, and this second being coincides with a reality insofar as it is an effect of some other, so that the reality is said to be in an effect insofar as it itself is the end result of the action of some agent. And since that which is the end result of the action of some agent is singular (for every action involves singulairs), it is said that the being of actual existence, strictly speaking, occurs only in singulairs. Boethius, noting this, says that everything that is is because it is one in number, and this also seems to be the intention of the Commentator on the fifth book of the Metaphysics, for he says that a question concerning being can be a problem concerning a genus or a problem concerning an accident, and insofar as it indicates being of existence it is a problem concerning accident. And so it is obvious that being of existence is distinguished from being of essence because it does not pertain to the essence of a reality.

And now to resume the argument, it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject only that which pertains to its essential principles, but being actually does not pertain to the essential principles of the subject; therefore etc. Nevertheless, it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject if it is absolutely, that is, if it is some reality and nature. And that it is necessary to cognize beforehand if it is some reality and nature is obvious, since just as the question what it is is related to the question if it is, in the same way the cognition what it is is related to the cognition if it is. But the question what it is is related to the question if it is in such a way that it asks about the determinate being of a reality, for example, in what genus it is placed, and in what species, and the question if it is asks about the indeterminate being of a reality. Therefore the cognitions will be similarly related. But the determinate presupposes the indeterminate. Therefore, if it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject what it is, it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning if it is, but not if it is actually, but rather if it is absolutely considered. But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject what it is since the subject has the form of what is known to the greatest extent in knowledge. This, however would not occur unless it were cognized beforehand concerning the subject what it is; therefore etc.

In response to the arguments: in response to the first argument I grant what this argument proves, since it proves only that it is necessary to know beforehand concerning the subject if it is absolutely, and it does not prove that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is actually.

In response to the other, when it is argued, "the being of a reality is either being the soul, etc.," I hold

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7 Avicenna, De Philosophia Prima V 1, ed. Van Riet, p. 227 ff. and p. 237, ll. 22-28. Here, of course, is the response to the second argument that it is. Note that one might deny that there is any being absolute outside the soul. "Man is rational absolute" could be taken to mean "All actual men are necessarily rational." So Ockham, who would also hold that we must actually have been acquainted with some man before we can advance to the knowledge that men are rational, or even form a proper concept of man, though, of course, we could do the demonstration once we had the concept in place, even if the subject of demonstration were to cease to be in actuality. But, with Aquinas, Simon probably takes it that "being absolute" is not a referring expression, but rather has meaning only in context, so that to "consider being absolute", for instance, is to consider the actual being of something after a certain manner. If that is right, then presumably being in effectu is not an accident of some abstract essence, but, much more sensibly, an accident (in some extended sense of the term) of the individual reality that actually exists, the accident in question being incident on the individual reality's relation to the cause of its existence. But we can consider that reality as regards that accident, and so consider its particular individual accidents and relations, or we can consider it absolute, that is, as regards its essence alone, or as regards what is necessarily true of it.


9 Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics V 6, 1015b17–1017a6, comm. 12, Venice 1562, 114M–115A.

10 Probably in the commentary on Porphyry.
that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is outside the soul, that is, if it is some reality and nature that does not depend on the soul in its being. This is necessary in the real sciences, though not in the others. For I call being outside the soul that which does not depend on the soul, and being of essence is of this sort, and being actually and being understood and the like are accidents of this. For being actually occurs in the reality as it is singular, but being outside the soul occurs in the essence of the thing absolutely, and it is said to be outside the soul because it does not depend on the soul.

Simon's Second Set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics

Question 49

Since the Philosopher says that it is impossible for one who cognizes what it is to be ignorant if it is,\textsuperscript{11} it is asked whether being (esse) is something added to essence.

And it seems that it is, since the Philosopher says concerning the first that in everything other than the first what it is and that by which it is different,\textsuperscript{12} but what it is is the essence, and that by which it is is being; therefore etc.

Again, as the act of living is related to a living thing, so being to a being (ens), since living is in living things and being is in beings. But living is added to a living thing, since living is locomotion and sensing, according to the Philosopher in \textit{On the Soul},\textsuperscript{13} but sensing and locomotion are added to living thing. Therefore etc.

Again, this is argued by the argument of Avicenna,\textsuperscript{14} since everything that has being through its essence is determined from itself to being, and because it is determined from itself to being, its being is determined in such a way that it is necessary, and that it is its own being, and only one thing is like that, namely the first cause. Therefore in all other realities than the first cause being will be other than essence.

Again, Thomas argues in this way in his treatise, \textit{Of Being and Essence}.\textsuperscript{15} Being is not multiplied except through something added to it, for one being (esse) of this sort is not of itself multiplied, and since the being of the First is not itself added, therefore it is not multiplied. If, therefore, being in these is multiplied, this will be something added.

Again, this is argued by the argument of Albert in his commentary on the \textit{Book of Causes}.\textsuperscript{16} Every effect of the First Cause recedes from the simplicity of the First Cause, and therefore in every effect of the First there is found some formula of composition. But substances separated from matter are effects of the first cause, therefore there is composition in them. But there is no composition there of matter with form, nor of subject with accident, therefore in these there is necessarily found a composition of being with essence, therefore all the more in those inferior to them.

On the other hand, it is clear from the Philosopher, \textit{Metaphysics IV},\textsuperscript{17} for he says that the substance

\textsuperscript{11} Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics II} 8, 93a20–23.

\textsuperscript{12} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics XII} 6, 1071b12–25, cf. Aquinas, \textit{De ente et essentia IV}.

\textsuperscript{13} Aristotle, \textit{De Anima I} 1, 402a6–7; 2, 403b23–26.

\textsuperscript{14} Avicenna, \textit{De Philosophia Prima} VIII 3, ed. Van Riet, p. 395, l. 12 – p. 397, l. 52.

\textsuperscript{15} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De Ente et Essentia IV}.


\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics IV} 2, 1003b16–33.
of each is one without qualification and a being without qualification, and a being (ens) includes being (esse) and having being, therefore the substance of each is essentially something that has being, and therefore being will be of the essence of each thing, and so it is not something added.

Again, the Commentator on Metaphysics IV says that if one says "a human being is," the "is" can predicate a diminished being in the soul, or actual being (esse in effectu). If it indicates diminished being in the soul, then it is a problem of accident, if actual being, then it is a problem of genus. But in such a problem the predicate and subject belong to the same essence. Therefore etc. This is an axiom concerning which many have some doubt, as the Commentator reports on Metaphysics IV when discussing the opinion of Avicenna. He says that Avicenna hold that each thing that is caused (i.e., actual being) is a being through some added essence.

But there were two things that moved him to this view. First, because he assumed a being to be of the genus of denominators. But such being (esse) indicates the intention of the subject and of the accident, hence when the Philosopher says a being is, he assumes a being as subject, and being as an accident of the subject. Again, he said that a being and a reality are imagined in the soul as two intentions, and not one. And these two signify different things in all tongues, but they would not signify different things unless the one (i.e., being) added something different in signifying a reality. But, as he assumed, it signifies the essence of a reality, and therefore he assumed being as added to it and an accident of essence. But Avicenna assumed that being is a reality added to essence. It seems that he assumed this falsely, because if he said that being is a real accident added, then he would have been assuming ten genera of accidents, but this is impossible; therefore etc. Proof of the consequence, because if being is an accident it will either be in the genus of quality or quantity, and so on in order. And it can be in none of these, because all nine genera of accidents presuppose being. But nothing presupposes itself, therefore there are ten genera of accidents. Now some have said that being is in the genus of action. And this is false since there is a contrary to action, but actual being is not one of a pair of contraries, therefore etc. Again, action presupposes some accidental quality, but actual being presupposes nothing, but every accidental quality presupposes actual being. It is false, then, to say that it is in the genus of action. But Avicenna did not draw his conclusion from those things that move, for it is because he says that a being is of the genus of denominators etc., that he says that reality and being (ens) signify different things. The Commentator responds by holding that Avicenna was deceived because he did not distinguish between marks signifying different intentions, and the same intention but in a different way. Hence, for instance, he says there are three (sorts of) names that convert with one another in supposita. Some signify different intentions, for instance, human being and what is able to laugh, and still convert with one another in supposita. Some signify different intentions, but in the same way, as tunic and dress. But some signify the same intention, but in different ways, as one and being (ens). And therefore there is no tongue calling being one, and because of this one is verified through the other, as being (ens) through one.

Father Thomas reproves Avicenna in this, that he says that being is something added as an

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18 Avveroe, Commentary on the Metaphysics IV 4, 1007b19–1008a7, comm. 15; 1007a21–b18, comm. 14, Venice 1562, 82D–F, 80L–81A.

19 Avveroe, Commentary on the Metaphysics IV 2, 1003b23–36, comm. 3, Venice 1562, 67B–1; see also V 7, 1017a23–b9, comm. 14, 117CD.

20 I think this clause is what is meant, but the Latin is corrupt in some way.

21 That is, if I read it aright, Avicenna thought that both "being" and "reality" named something, and since they had different meanings they must name different things, and so reality names the real thing, and being a property of it.

22 So the two terms, according to Avveroe, have the same signification, but they signify what they signify (the actual reality) in different ways, and have different meanings for that reason. This approach was adopted, it seems, by William of Ockham, for instance, in Summa Logicae III.ii 27.

23 Since the two terms serve different functions in the language, even though they have the same signification, they cannot be predicated one of the other, and yet, since they have the same signification, they are verified through the same reality.
accident. For he grants that it is something added, but not as an accident. But he understands that it is something constituted through the essential principles of the reality of which it is being, just as Avicenna understood that it is something real added. He understands badly, for being is a certain actuality (actus), and so either primary or secondary actuality. Not primary actuality, since primary actuality does not differ from the essence of the reality, and it follows then that being is not added to the reality. Not secondary actuality, since such an actuality is an operation not proceeding from a form, but every such secondary actuality presupposes actual being, and it is obvious that nothing presupposes itself, therefore that actual being is not a secondary actuality. If, then, it is said that actual being is something real added above these two actualities, it is necessary to assume a third actuality in beings, which is contrary to the Philosopher.

Again, in a reality having an essence only three things are found, namely essence and the principles of essence, and accidents. If, therefore, Thomas assumes that actual being is none of these, then actual being will be nothing. Albert, in his commentary on the Book of Causes, assumes that actual being is added to essence on the basis of this argument, that every caused being has being from the first principle, but no caused being has its essence from another, but from itself. It is obvious, then, that in every caused being there will be another than its essence, which is its being. This argument does not seem to conclude <validly>. For it is necessary that everything that is posterior to the first go back to the first as to its cause. Since, therefore, being and essence of every caused being are caused by the first principles, they go back to the first cause as to their cause. By this same argument, then, things that are caused receive being from the first, and also essence.

Leaving aside these opinions, then, it seems we must respond otherwise, the evidence for which are three things to be considered. The first is that it is true of no caused being that it is itself its own being. The second is that being is something added to caused beings. The third is that being is not a reality added to caused beings, so it is added and is not a reality added.

The proof of the first is that in caused beings being is not other than a certain order or respect to what produces or generates it. A caused being, for instance, a human being, can very well be said to be a being, since it has a relation to what generates it, through which it is introduced into beings, therefore in caused beings being is nothing except a certain order to what generates. But it is obvious that no caused being is itself an order. <Being> is an order or respect. Therefore none of these is its own being.

Proof of the second point is that everything over and above anything of which there can be held a complete and essential concept of a reality is something added to a reality. But being is over and above something of which there can be a complete and essential concept, and hence Alghazali says in the beginning of his logic that we can understand quadruple without understanding if there is a quadruple. Being therefore is something added to a reality. And the argument is confirmed since I understand the reality through the same essential principles, whether it is an existing reality or not existing. When a variation is introduced in the existence of a reality it is not necessary to introduce a variation in the essential concept of the reality, so that being and non-being are added to the essence of a reality.

Proof of the third point. And this can be explained by the argument of the Commentator on Metaphysics IV, for we argue thus: A human being is a being, therefore either a being through its substance or through something added to its substance. If it is a being through its substance, we have what was proposed. If through something added, we ask about that added thing. Since it is necessary that it be a being, it is either a being through its substance or through something added. If through its substance, by the same argument there was a stand in the first; if through something added, there will be a process indefinitely, or it will be granted that being is of the essence of a reality. Now some, considering the matter superficially, use this argument of community to destroy. Since then it is asked whether it is a being through its substance or

24 Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia Dei, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.


27 Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics IV 4, 1007b19–1008a7, comm. 14, Venice 1562, 80L–81A.
though some added reality, they say that it is through some added reality, for instance, through being. And when it is asked about that, will it be a being, they reply that this is false. But it is that by which some other is a being, for instance, they posit an example, human being is white through whiteness, and still, whiteness is not white, but whiteness is that by which a human being is white. In the same way, they say that being is not a being, but is that by which some other is a being. But this does not work. I receive a being that is first of every caused thing, and by which a being is nothing, speaking more widely of such a being. I ask whether being is a being. If so, we have what was proposed. If not, since everything that is over and above that being is nothing, since a human being is formally a being through such being, therefore a human being, and whatever else, will formally be a being through nothing, which is impossible. And again, someone would not say that being is not a being unless this is because it is not a composite from being and something having being. But not withstanding this composition it can be said that it is one being. Therefore, even more, being will be a being over and above what is not composite.

Again, this is shown by another argument. If human being is a being through some added reality, what is added will either be of the genus of substance or accident. It cannot be said that it is of the genus of substance, since there are only three in this genus, namely matter and form and the aggregate, and none of them is this being, and since this is so, one of them will not be a being through some being.

Again, it cannot be said that there is a being through some added reality which is of the genus of accident, since every accident presupposes actual being, and beyond these realities there is no other reality. Therefore human being is not a being through something added to the reality itself, or to the essence in caused realities. It is apparent, therefore, that being is something added, and is not an added reality, from which it follows that it is an added formula. Human being, therefore, and everything caused will be a being not through any added reality, but through an added formula. But this added formula will either be absolute or relative. It cannot be said that human being is a being through an absolute formula, since as such human being would have being in the soul more than in external reality, since <being in external reality> is in respect of proper accidents, and therefore it follows that it is not a being through some absolute formula. Therefore it will be so through some formula in respect of an accident, or through some agents. Not through a formula in respect of some accident, since no accident precedes actual being, but every accident necessarily presupposes actual being. Therefore it follows necessarily that human being is a being formally in respect to an agent. For that alone precedes it in nature, hence if it is asked by me through what human being is formally a being, I reply that it is through this, that it is the end result of this coming-to-be. Now separated substances are beings through this that they are the end results of this making, but these are beings through these that they are the end results of this making by this agent and from this matter. But this respect is something real, since it can have being over and above the concept. But still it is not such a reality as is of the genus of accident, but is in the same genus with the reality in which it is, of which it is a reality.

And this is how brother Giles of Rome explains it, so that being is added, but not as some real accident, but as an accident of formula; and it is the same <really> as each of these of which it is. And if someone asks, since some relations are founded immediately on a substance, is it then false in every case that all relations are founded on accident, I reply that it is possible for some relations to be of the genus of substance. For it is obvious that matter has a relation to its form, therefore this relation is either in matter through the substance of the matter or through something added to its substance. If the first, we have what was proposed, that some relation is immediately founded on a substance; if not, then matter will have a relation and be ordered to something added, either, therefore, through its substance, and thus we have what was proposed, <or else through something added>. And the same argument was established before, if through something added, matter then has a relation and order to it. And now we either proceed indefinitely or there will be some respect and relation (respectum et relationem) immediately founded on a substance. But although actual being is not a reality added to the substance of a reality, still it will be some accident of formula, since it does not coincide with the essence of a human being as such, for human being as such

20Note that the reference here is to Thomas and his followers.

21Giles of Rome, De esse et essentia, de mensura angelorum, et de cognitione angelorum (Venice 1503), q. 9, fol. 20vb. Theorematum de esse et essentia, ed. E. Hoccleve, Theorema XXII. Simon is taking from Giles the notion that being might belong to the category of substance without being characterizable as a substance.
neither is nor is not, as Avicenna proves.\textsuperscript{30}

In response to the arguments it must be replied that they each take the question in its own way, and does not prove that it is something added, but rather prove that it is not something added, as was said.

But we must reply to them in order. In response to Boethius\textsuperscript{31} it must be replied that what he said, understood by this was that what it is and that by which it is are not the same according to the formula of understanding, and this is true, but if he understands that they differ in the reality, he understands this falsely, as has been shown.

In response to the second argument, it must be replied that it is true. Either it indicates the principle of life or the operation consequent on being a living thing. But if it is understood concerning the principle of life, thus it is related to a living thing as being is to a being, for just as living is not distinct from a living thing, in the same way neither is being from a being. But it that living is understood which is the operation of something living, I reply that it is not related to a living thing in the same way as being is related to a being.

In response to the third, it must be replied that “from” either indicates some circumstance of efficient cause, and thus the major premise is false, for everything that has being formally from itself is determined to being of itself as from an efficient cause. But if it indicates the circumstance of a formal cause, thus the proposition it true, for everything “that is has being formally from itself. And taking “from” in the first way .

\textsuperscript{52} In response to the fourth, “being is not multiplied except through something added.” I reply that this argument assumes that being as it is in itself is of one formula in all beings, which is false, indeed, there is a different formula of being according as it is said of substance and as it is said of accidents. Now, if this were true, it would not be multiplied except through something added. But as it is, it is not of the same formula, and therefore it can be multiplied, but not through anything added, so, for instance, the substance of human being from itself, and not through anything added, is different from the substance of a donkey. In the same way, the being of a human being from itself and not through anything added is different from the being of a donkey.

In response to the fifth argument, it must be replied that all things aside from the first cause recede from the simplicity of the first, and are removed from act, and approach to potency, and if, through this approach to and recession from potency is understood composition, it it is to be replied that in everything other than the first cause there is a certain composition. And the argument is resolved through this, and it is true that in these separated substances there is some composition in this, that they recede from the simplicity of the first cause. And when it is said, “if in this there is no composition of matter with form, nor of accident with subject, therefore there is a composition of essence with being.” I reply that it is a fallacy of the consequent. Indeed, in place of that composition, I give another, for instance, of potency with act, or the composition of the formula or the act of understanding. For they understand through a formula of understanding other than their substance, for none of them is its own action of understanding. Now the first cause does not understand through a formula of understanding other than its substance, and therefore in these separate substances other than the First, there is such a composition, but it is not a composition of essence with being.

\textsuperscript{30} Avicenna, \textit{De Philosophia Prima} V 1, ed. Van Riet, p. 227 ff.

\textsuperscript{31} Boethius, \textit{Quaestiones Substantiae}, Axioms II, VII, VIII, ed. Rand, pp. 40, 42. Aquinas interprets Axiom VII as implying a real distinction in his commentary on this work.

\textsuperscript{32} A space is left here in the manuscript.
First Set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics
by Simon of Faversham

Quaestio 7

Quaeritur utrum de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si est.

Et arguitur quod sic, quia questio quid est praesupponit quaestionem si est, ergo cognition quid est praesupponit cognitionem si est. Sed de subiecto oportet praecognoscere quid est. Ergo et si est.

Item, arguitur quod oportet praecognoscere si est in effectu quia omne esse vel est esse in anima vel esse verum extra animam. Si ergo de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si est vel hoc erit si est in anima vel extra animam. Non si est in anima, quia hoc est esse diminutum, ergo si est extra animam. Sed hoc est esse in effectu. Ergo etc.

Oppositum arguitur si de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si est in effectu, cum de subiecto habeatur demonstratio, tunc de eo quod non est in effectu non continget demonstrare. Sed hoc est falsum, ut appareat de pluvia et aliis quae non sunt.

Dicendum quod de subiecto non oportet praecognoscere si est in effectu, et ratio huius est quia illud solum oportet praecognoscere de subiecto ante demonstrationem quod pertinet ad principia essentiales subiecti, quia solum per principia essentiales subiecti demonstratur passio de subiecto, et non per aliquod accidens sibi. Nunc autem esse in effectu non pertinet ad principia demonstrativa, sed accidit sibi. Sed de hoc alibi habet videni ut IV Metaphysicae. Tamen ad hoc potest adduci auctoritas Avicennae fine V Metaphysicae suae. Dicit enim quod duplex est esse rei, quoddam est esse quod res habet naturaliter ex se et illud est esse essentiale, et quoddam est esse quod recipit ab alio et illud est esse existentiale. Per primum esse rei, esse rei in determinato prae dicendo et in determinata specie entis, et hoc esse pertinet ad definitionem, de quo dicitur quod definitio est sermo indicans quid est esse rei. Et secundum Avicennam illud esse existentiale ante esse actuale som existit in mentis conceptu. Secundum autem esse competit rei in quantum est effectus ciusdam alterius, unde dicitur esse in effectu secundum quod ad ipsam terminatur actio agentis. Et quia illud ad quod terminatur actio agentis singularis est, quia omnis actio est circa singularia, ideo dicitur quod esse actualis existentiae solum propri operandi agenti, et ad hoc advertens Boethius dicit quod omne quod est ideo est quia unum numero, et ista videtur esse intentio Commentatoris in IV V Metaphysicae, et dicit enim quod quaestionis esse de potest esse de genere vel problema de accidente, secundum quod dicit esse essentiae sic est problema de genere, secundum quod dicit esse existentiae est sic problema de accidente. Et ita patet quod esse essentiae distinguat contra esse essentiae proper quod non pertinet ad essentiam rei.

Et tunc resumatur ratio, illud solum oportet praecognoscere de subiecto ante demonstrationem quod pertinet ad principia essentiales subiecti, sed esse in effectu non pertinet ad principia essentiales subiecti, ergo etc. Tamen de subiecto ante demonstrationem oportet praecognoscere si est absolute,
Faversham, First Set of QQ. on P. A., Q. 7

hoc est\textsuperscript{18} si est aliqua res et\textsuperscript{99} natura,\textsuperscript{100} 94 et quod oporteat praecognoscere si est aliqua res\textsuperscript{93} et natura\textsuperscript{92} patet\textsuperscript{105} quia sicuit\textsuperscript{104} quaeest quid est\textsuperscript{106} ad quaestionem si est, sic\textsuperscript{98} cognitio quid est\textsuperscript{97} ad cognitionem si est; sed quaestio quid est sic se\textsuperscript{98} habet ad quaestionem si est quod\textsuperscript{99} quaerit de entitate rei determinata\textsuperscript{100} ut in quo genere repontitur et in qua specie\textsuperscript{100, 101} quaestio\textsuperscript{102} si est\textsuperscript{103} de entitate rei indeterminata;\textsuperscript{104} et ideo cognitiones simili ve se habebunt.\textsuperscript{104} Sed\textsuperscript{105} determinatum\textsuperscript{106} prae supponit indeterminatum. Ergo si\textsuperscript{107} de subiecto oportet\textsuperscript{100} praecognoscere quid est,\textsuperscript{106} oportet de eo\textsuperscript{101} praecognoscere\textsuperscript{111} 112 si est—non si \textbf{est in effectu} sed si est absolute. Sed\textsuperscript{112} de subiecto oportet praecognoscere quid est,\textsuperscript{114} quia subiectum habet rationem maxime noti in scientia, hoc autem non esset nisi de eo praecognoscere tur quid est;\textsuperscript{113} quare etc.\textsuperscript{114}

Ad rationes. Ad primam\textsuperscript{115} concedo\textsuperscript{116} quidquid ipsa probat, quia solut probat quod de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si est absolute, et non probat quod de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si \textbf{est in effectu}.\textsuperscript{116}

Ad aliam, cum arguitur "esse rei\textsuperscript{117} vel est esse in anima etc.,"\textsuperscript{118} dico quod de subiecto oportet praecognoscere si est\textsuperscript{119} extra animam, hoc est, si est aliqua res et\textsuperscript{120} natura\textsuperscript{121} quae in suo esse ab anima non dependet.\textsuperscript{121} Et\textsuperscript{120} hoc in scientiis realibus quamvis in aliis non. Voco enim\textsuperscript{122} illud esse extra animam quod ab anima non dependet, et tale est \textbf{esse essentialia}\textsuperscript{123} cui accidit \textbf{esse in effectu} et esse intellectum\textsuperscript{124} et omnia talia, \textbf{esse} enim \textbf{in effectu} competit rei secundum quod singularis est, sed esse extra animam competit essentialia\textsuperscript{125} rei absolute, quod dicitur extra animam quia ab anima non dependet.\textsuperscript{126}

**APPARATUS**

\textsuperscript{1}quenitur\] tunc add. K. \textsuperscript{2}utrum \textit{rep. et corr.} M. \textsuperscript{3}oportet\] oporteat K. \textsuperscript{4}et om. O. \textsuperscript{5}quia om. O. \textsuperscript{6}quid est corr. ex si est M (cf. K) \textit{opore}... \textsuperscript{7}cognoscimus si est ut dicit Philosophus in huius ideo etc. K \textsuperscript{8}quod\] de subiecto add. K. \textsuperscript{9}esse verum\] om. K. \textsuperscript{10}et add. M \textsuperscript{11}si] cum K \textsuperscript{12}vel hoc erit... animan non\] ergo oportet praecognoscere K \textsuperscript{13}quia hoc om. K \textsuperscript{14}diminutum\] diminutum M \textsuperscript{15}ergo\] de subiecto oportet praecognoscere add. K \textsuperscript{16}hoc\] esse extra animam non est allud quam K \textsuperscript{11}ergo\] ideo K \textsuperscript{17}cum... demonstratio om. K. \textsuperscript{18}contingere\] de demonstrare\] possit esse demonstratio K \textsuperscript{19}sed\] hoc est quod tunc appett esse K \textsuperscript{20}ut... sunt\] quoniam de eclipsi lunae est demonstratio cum tamen non sit in effectu ideo etc. K \textsuperscript{21}subiecto\] ante demonstrationem add. K \textsuperscript{22}quia illud solum\] quoniam solum est K \textsuperscript{23}subiecto\] ipso K \textsuperscript{24}et... sibi om. K. \textsuperscript{25}non pertinet \textit{rep. et corr.} O \textsuperscript{26}quia solum... \textbf{demonstrativa om. hom. M} (cf. K) \textsuperscript{27}demonstrativa sed accidit sibi\] essentialia subiecti sed ei accidit K \textsuperscript{28}sed\] si M \textsuperscript{26}sed... vider\] esse in effectu et illud supponatur ad praesens quia aliqua homo habet declarari K \textsuperscript{29}V] supra librum K \textsuperscript{31}tamen... dicit enim\] hoc tamen demonstrari potest per inventionem nunc (in marg.) (auctorum \textit{add. et del.}) in (?) \textit{add. et del.}\] sua Metaphysica vult enim ibi K \textsuperscript{32}quod om. O \textsuperscript{33}quoddam\] enim add. K \textsuperscript{34}esse\] rei add. K \textsuperscript{35}naturaliter\] essentialiter K \textsuperscript{36}illud\] hoc K \textsuperscript{37}et quoddam\] quoddam autem K \textsuperscript{38}esse\] rei add. K \textsuperscript{39}recept\] res habet K \textsuperscript{40}esse\] tale K \textsuperscript{41}esse \textit{inv.} K \textsuperscript{42}existentiae\] esse in effectu K \textsuperscript{43}primum om. K \textsuperscript{44}esse\] quod res habet ex se add. K \textsuperscript{45}reponitur\] ponitur K \textsuperscript{46}res... entis\] in genere determinato (corr. ex determinatio) et in
dicis esse extra animam non est nisi esse in effectu, ergo si de subiecto oportet praecognoscere quod est extra animam etc., dico quod esse in animam nihil aliud est quam esse extra animam, quia esse extra animam voco id qui de suo (corr. ex subiecto) esse non dependet ab animam cuiusmodi est esse essentiae rei, sibi enim accidit quod intelligatur vel quod sit in effectu non tamen accidit quod sit extra animam, unde esse in effectu est id quod pertinet ad essentiam secundum quod finitum est existens sed principia individuant (?) esse ante in effectu est quod pertinet ad essentiam rei secundum se, quod est particularis esse autem extra animam est esse quod competit essentiae rei absolute, et illud esse voco quod ab anima non dependet differunt ergo esse in effectu et esse extra animam et ideo licet oportet praecognoscere si est extra animam hoc est si est aliqua res vel natura non tamen oportet praecognoscere si est in effectu K

NOTES

A Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI 1, 1025b14-18, seems to be intended.


E Averroes, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* V 6, 1016b17-1017a6, comm. 12, Venice 1562, 114M–115A.
Second Set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics
by Simon of Faversham.

Quaestio 49

Quia Philosophus dicit quod cognoscentem quid est impossibile est ignorare si est, quae quidem igitur addidit quae sit additum essentiae.

Et videtur quod sic, quia Philosophus dicit super primum quod in omni quod est citra primum differt quod est et quo est, sed quod est est ipsa essentia et quo est esse; ergo etc.

Item, sicut vivere ad viventem, sic esse ad ens, quia vivere viventibus esse entibus. Sed vivere est additum viventi, quia vivere est movere secundum locum et sentire, secundum Philosophum in De Anima, sentire autem et movere secundum locum sunt addita viventi. Ergo etc.

Item, hoc arguitur ratione Avicennae, quia omne quod habet esse per essentiam suam ex se ipso determinatum est ad esse, et quod ex se ipso determinatum est ad esse ex se determinatum est esse tale quod necesse est, et ipsum suum esse, et tale tantum est unum, scilicet causa prima. Ergo in rebus omnibus aliis a primo esse erit aliud ab essentia.

Item, hoc arguitur ratione Thomae in tractatu suo De ente et essentia. Ipsum esse non multiplicatur nisi per aliquod additum sibi. Esse enim unum huiusmodi non est de se multiplicatum et quia esse primum non est aliquod additum, ideo non est multiplicatum. Si ergo esse in istis multiplicatur, hoc erit per aliquod additum.

Item, hoc arguitur ratione Alberti in commento suo super Librum de causis. Omnis effectus primi recedit in simplicitate primi, et ideo in omni effectu primi inventitur aliqua ratio compositionis. Sed substantiae separatae a materia sunt effectus primi, ergo in eis est compositio. Sed non est ibi compositio materiae cum forma nec subiecti cum accidente, ergo in ipsis necessario reperetur compositio esse cum essentiae, ergo multo fortius in istis inferioribus.

Opposition patet per Philosophum IV Metaphysicae. Dicit enim quod substantia uniuscuiusque est simpliciter una et simpliciter ens, et ens includit esse et habens esse, ergo substantia uniuscuiusque est essentialiter habens esse, ergo esse erit de essentia uniuscuiusque, quare non erit additum.

Item, Commentator super IV Metaphysicae dicit si dicatur sic, "Homo est," li "est" potest praedicare esse diminutum in anima vel esse in effectu. Si dicit esse diminutum in anima, tunc problema de accidente, si esse in effectu, tunc est problema de genere. Sed in tali problemate praedicatum et subiectum pertinent ad eandem essentiam. Ergo etc. Istud est axioma de quo multi dubitant, secundum quod recitat Commentator super IV Metaphysicae opinioni Avicennae. Dicit quod Avicenna dicit quod
unum quodque causatorum sit ens per aliquod additum essentialia.

Et duo erant ipsum moventia: Unum quod posuit ens esse de genere denominatorium. Esse autem tale dicit intentionem subiecti et accidentis, unde cum ens dicit Philosophus esse, posuit ens sicut subiectum, et esse sicut accidentens subjecti. Item, dicebat quod ens et res imaginatur in anima tamquam duae intentiones, et non una. Et ista duo significant aliud et aliud in omnibus linguis, sed non significarent aliud et aliud nisi unum adderet super aliud in significando res. Autem, ut posuit significat essentiam rei et ideo posuit esse ut additum sibi et accidentes essentialia. Sed Avicenna posuerit quod esse sit res addita essentialia. Videtur quod falsum posuit, quod si dicatur quod esse sit accidentis reale additum, ergo erit ponere decem genera accidentium, sed hoc est impossibile; ergo etc. Probatio consequentiae, quod si esse sit accidentis aut erit in genere qualitatis aut quantitatis, et sic deinceps. Et de nullo istorum potest esse, quod omnia novem genera accidentium praesupponunt esse. Nihil autem se ipsum praesupponit, quare erant decem genera accidentium. Quidam dicebant quod esse esset in genere actionis. Et hoc est falsum quia actionis est aliquid contrarium, sed esse in effectu non est aliquid contrarium; ergo etc. Item, actio praesupponit aliquam qualitatem accidentalem, sed esse in effectu nullam prae supponit, sed omnis qualitas accidentalis praesupponit esse in effectu. Falsum est, ergo, dicere quod est in genere actionis. Ea autem ex quibus fuit motus Avicenna non concludunt, cum enim dicit quod ens est de genere denominatorum etc. dicit res et ens significant diversa. Commentator respondet dicens quod deceptus fuit, quia non distinxit inter nota significantia diversas intentiones, et eadem intentionem, modo tamen diverso. Unde, sicut dicit tres sunt nomina quae convertuntur in suppositis, quaedam significant diversas intentiones, ut homo et risibilis, et tamen convertuntur in suppositis, quaedam diversas intentiones, modo tamen eodem, ut tunica et vestis, quaedam autem eadem intentionem, modo tamen diverso, ut unum et ens. Et ideo non est lingua dicendo ens unum, et propter hoc unum verificatur per aliud ut ens per unum.

Frater Thomas reprobat Avicenna in hoc quod dicit quod esse sit aliquod additum sicut accidentis. Concedit enim quod sit quid additum, sed non sicut accidentis. Sed quod sit quid constitutum per principia essentialia rei cuius est esse, sic intelligat, sicut Avicenna intellexit quod sit quid reale additum. Male intelliget, quia esse est quidam actus, aut ergo actus primus aut secundus. Non actus primus quia actus primus non differt ab essentia rei, sequuntur tunc quod esse non sit additum rei. Non secundus quia talis actus est operatio non procedens a forma, omnis autem talis actus secundus praesupponit esse in effectu, nihil autem se ipsum praesupponit manifestum est, ergo quod esse in effectu non est actus secundus. Si ergo dicitur quod esse in effectu sit quid reale additum praeter istos duos actus, oportet ponere actum tertium in entibus, quod est contra Philosophum.

Item, in re habente essentiam non invenimus nisi tria, scilicet essentiam et principia essentialia, et accidentia. Si ergo Thomas ponit quod esse in effectu nullus horum, ergo esse in effectu nihil erit. Albertus in commento suo super Librum de causis ponit quod esse in effectu sit additum essentialiae motus.
ex ista ratione, quia omne ens causatum habet esse a primo principio. Nullum autem ens causatum habet suam essentiam ab alic, sed a se ipso. Manifestum est igitur quod in quocumque ente causato esse erit alius ad essentiam, cuius est esse.\textsuperscript{5} Ista ratio non videtur concludedre. Necesse enim est quod omne illud quod est posterius primo vadat in primum tamquam in suum causam. Cum, ergo, esse et essentia cuiuscumque entis causati sint causata primo principio, vadent in primum tamquam in suam causam. Qua ergo ratione causata recipiunt esse a primo eadem ratione et essentiam.

Omissis ergo istis opinionibus, videtur esse aliter dicendum, ad cuius evidentiam tres sunt consideranda. Primum est quod de nullo ente causato verum est dicere quod ipsum est suum esse; secundum est quod esse est aliquid additum causatis; et tertium quod esse non est res addita causatis, unde est additum et non est res addita.

Probatio primi est quia in entibus causatis esse non est alius quam quidam ordo vel respectus ad producens vel generans. Bene alienum causatum uta homo dicetur esse ens, quia habet respectum ad suum generans per quod introductum est in entibus, ergo causatis esse non est nisi ordo ad generans. Sed manifestum est quod nullus entium causatorum est ordo. Est ordo vel respectus. Ergo nullum ipsorum est ipsum suum esse.

Probatio secundi est quia omne illud praeter quod potest haber i intellectus rei essentiales et completus, illud est additum rei. Sed praeter esse potest haber i intellectus rei completus et essentiales, unde dicit Algazel principio suae logicae quod possimus intelligere quaternarium non intelligendo si est quaternarius.\textsuperscript{4} Esse ergo est aliquid additum rei. Et confirmatur ratio, quia per eadem principia essentiales intelligo rem, re existente et non existente. Facta ergo variatione in existentia rei non oportet variationem fieri in intellectu essentiales rei, quare esse et non esse est additum essentiae rei.

Probatio tertia: Et hoc contingit declarare ratione Commentatoris secundum IV \textit{Metaphysicae}, arguamus enim sic:\textsuperscript{9} Homo est ens aut ergo est ens per suam substantiam\textsuperscript{10} aut per aliquid additum suae substantiae. Si sit ens per suam substantiam propositum habetur; si per additum quaero de illo addito, quia oportet quod sit ens, aut ergo erit ens per suam substantiam aut per aliquid additum. Si per suam substantiam eadem ratione fuit standum in primo, si per aliquid additum erit processus in infinitum vel erit dare quod esse sit de essentia rei. Hanc autem rationem communitatis alii superfanalysis considerantes utuntur destruere. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum sit ens per suam substantiam aut per rem additam, dicunt quod per rem additam ut per esse. Et cum quaeritur de illo illud erit ens, dicunt quod falsum est. Sed est illud quo alius est ens, sicut ipsi ponunt exemplum, homo est albus per albedinum. Et tamen albedo non est alba, sed albedo est illud quo homo est albus. Eodem modo dicunt quod esse non est ens, sed est illud quo alius est ens. Sed istum non valet. Accipiam enim ens quod est primum de omni causato et etiam de causa prima quo ente nihil est latius loquendo de tali ente. Ego quaero utrum esse sit ens. Si sic, propositum habetur. Si non, cum omne quod est praeter illud esse sit nihil, cum homo sit formaliter ens per tale esse,
ergo homo et quodcumque alius formaliter erit ens per nihil, quod est impossibile. Et item non\textsuperscript{11} diceret alius quod esse non esset ens nisi quia non est compositum ex esse et habente esse. Sed non obstante ista compositione potest dici quod unum sit ens, ergo multo fortius esse erit ens praeter hoc quod non sit compositum.

Item, hoc ostenditur alia ratione. Si homo sit ens per rem additum, aut erit illud additum de genere substantiae aut accidentis. Non potest dici quod sit de genere substantiae, quia ibi non sunt nisi tria, scilicet materia et forma et aggregatum, quorum nullum est hoc esse, et cum sic, aliquod illorum non erit ens per aliquod ens.

Item, non potest dici quod sit ens per aliquam rem additam quae sit de genere accidentis, quia omne accidens praesupponit \textit{esse in effectu}, et praeter istas res non est alia res. Quare homo non est ens per rem additam ipsi rei vel essentiae in rebus causatis, appareat ergo quod esse est aliquod additum et non est res addita, ex quibus sequitur quod sit ratio addita. Homo ergo et quodcumque causatum erit ens non per rem additam sed per rationem additam. Ista autem ratio addita aut erit absoluta\textsuperscript{12} aut respectiva. Non potest dici quod homo sit ens per rationem absolutam, quia ut sic magis homo haberet esse in anima quam in re extra, quia respectum habet ad propria accidentia, et ideo sequitur quod sit ens non per rationem aliquam absolutam. Erit ergo ita per rationem aliquam respectivam ad accidens aut per aliquid agens, non per rationem respectivam ad aliquod accidens quia nullum accidens praecedit \textit{esse in effectu}, sed omne accidens necessario praesupponit \textit{esse in effectu}; quare sequitur necessario quod homo sit ens formaliter per respectum ad agens. Illud enim solum praecedit ipsum in natura, unde si quae rerat a me per quid homo est ens formaliter, dico quod per hoc quod est terminus huius generationis. Substantiae autem separatæ sunt entia per hoc quod sunt termini huius factionis, sed ista sunt entia per hoc quod sunt termini huius factionis ab hoc agente et ab hac materia. Iste autem respectus est aliquid realis quia potest habere esse praeter intellectum. Si tamen non est tale realis quod sit de genere accidentis, sed est in eodem genere cum re in quo est res cuius ipsum est.

Et ita exponit Aegidius Fratrem Thomam, ita quod esse sit additum sed non sicut accidens reale, nec sicut accidens rationis, et est idem quod est unumquodque istorum cuius est.\textsuperscript{13} Et si quaereret alius, cum relationes quaedam sint quae immediate fundatur super substantiam, falsum universaliter quod omnes relationes fundatur super accidens, dico quod possibile est aliusquas relationes esse de genere substantiae. Manifestum est enim quod materia respectum habet\textsuperscript{15} ad formam istae, igitur respectus aut inest materiae per substantiam\textsuperscript{14} materiae aut per additum substantiae eius. Si sic, habetur proposition quod aliquis respectus immediate fundatur super substantiam. Si non, ergo materia habebit respectum et ordinem ad illud additum, aut igitur per substantiam suam, et sic habetur proposition. Et eadem ratione standum fuit prius, si per aliquid additum materia adhuc habet respectum et ordinem ad illud. Et nunc vel procedetur in infinitum vel erit dare aliquem respectum et relationem immediate fundatam super substantiam. Licet tamen
non sit res addita substantiae rei, tamen poterit esse aliquod accidens rationis, quia non competit essentiae hominii secundum quod homo, homo enim secundum quod homo neque est neque non est, ut probat Avicenna.\⁰

Ad rationes igitur dicendum, quia procedunt viis suis, quae non probant quod est aliquod additum bene probant quod non est aliquod additum sicut dictum est.

Dicendum tamen per ordinem ad ipsas. Ad Boetium⁹ dicendum quod ipse intellexit per hoc quod ipsum quod est et quo est non sunt idem secundum rationem intelligendi et verum est, si autem intelligat quod differat secundum rem, falsa intelligit, sicut ostensum est.

Ad secundum, dicendum quod verum est, vel dicit principium vitae vel operationem consequentem ad viventem, si autem intelligitur de principio vitae sic se habet ad vivens sicut esse ad ens, sicut enim vivere non est distinctum a vivente, similiter nec esse ab ente. Si autem intelligitur vivere quod est operation viventis, dico quod non similiter se habet esse ad ens.

Ad tertium¹⁵ dicendum quod “ex” vel dicit circumstantiam causae efficientis, et sic maior est falsa, omne enim quod habet formaliter esse ex se determinatur ad esse ex se sicut ab efficiente. Si autem dicit circumstantiam causae formalis, sic vera est propositio; omne enim quod est formaliter ex se habet esse.

Et accipiendo i.e. ex primo modo . . .¹⁶

Ad quartum, “esse non multiplicatur nisi per additum,” dico quod ista ratio supponit quod ipsum esse quantum est de se sit unius rationis in omnibus entibus quod tamen falsum est immo est alia ratio entis secundum quod dicitur de substantia et secundum quod dicitur de accidentibus modo si istud esset verum ipsum non multiplicaretur nisi per aliquod additum. Nunc autem non est eiusdem rationis, et ideo¹⁷ potest multiplicari non per aliquod additum, unde sicut substantia hominis ex se non per aliquod additum diversa est a substantia asini, similiter esse hominis ex se non per aliquod additum diversum est ab esse¹⁸ asini.

Ad quintum, dicendum quod omnia citra primum recedunt a simplicitate primi, et ab actu ponitur, et accedunt ad potentiam, et si per istum accessum et recessum ad potentiam intelligitur compositio,¹⁹ dicendum quod in omni citra primum est quaedam compositio.¹⁹ Et ex hoc dissolvitur ratio, et verum est quod in ists substantiis separatis est aliqua²⁰ compositio in hoc quod recedunt a simplicitate primi. Et cum dicitur, “si in ipso non est compositio materiae cum forma, nec accidentis cum subiecto, quare erit compositio essentiae cum esse,” dico quod est fallacia consequentis. Immo praeter²¹ illam compositionem dabo aliam, ut potentiae et actus, vel compositionem rationis vel actus intelligendi. Intelligent enim per rationem aliam intelligendi a substantia earum, nulla enim earum est suum intelligere. Ipsum autem primum non intelligit per rationem aliam intelligendi a substantia eius, et ideo in ipsis substantiis separatis aliis a primo est talis compositio, non autem est ibi compositio essentiae cum esse.
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NOTES

Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II 8, 93a20–23.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII 6, 1071b12–25; cf. Aquinas, *De ente et essentia* IV.


Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia* IV.


Averroes, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* IV 4, 1007b19–1008a7, comm. 15; 1007a21–b18, comm. 14, Venice 1562, 82D–F, 80L–81A.

Averroes, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* IV 2, 1003b23–36, comm. 3, Venice 1562, 67B–I; see also V 7, 1017a23–b9, comm. 14, 117CD.

Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia Dei*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.


Averroes, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* IV 4, 1007b19–1008a7, comm. 14, Venice 1562, 80L–81A.

Giles of Rome, *De esse et essentia, de mensura angelorum, et de cognitione angelorum* (Venice 1503), q. 9, fol. 20vb. *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, ed. E Hocedez, Theorema XXII.


Boethius, *Quomodo Substantiae*, Axioms II, VII, VIII, ed. Rand, pp. 40, 42. Aquinas interprets Axiom VII as implying a real distinction in his commentary on this work.